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Notations
Most of the notations that are used in this thesis are defined in the text when they
are used for the first time. Some basic notations remain, which we list below.
~~(k the binomial coefficient ~n-k)!
2N the set of subsets of N
~S~ the number of elements of the set S
~ the end of a proof
~;EN ~; the summation of all a;, i E N
jj;EN ~; the product of all x;, i E N
R the set of real numbers
RN the set of vectors whose coordinates are indexed by the elements of N
x~ y ~; ~ y; for every i E N(x, y E RN )




1.1 Games and graphs
This monograph deals with game theoretical situations that involve graphs or, more
general, networks. Graphs appear in cooperative game theory in several ways: they
can be used to model communication restrictions, in which case they have an impact
on a game already given, but they can also be used to model economic situations,
in which case they partly determine the game that evolves. The current section
provides a short introduction to cooperative game theory and it provides a review
on networks in game theory.
Game theory deals with the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooper-
ation between rational decision makers. It provides general mathematical techniques
for analyzing situations in which two or more individuals make decisions that will
influence one another's welfare. The foundations of game theory were laid by von
Neumann (1928) and the field was established with the publication of "The theory
of games and economic behavior" by von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944. Game
theory has a very general scope including questions that are basic to economics and
other social sciences.
Game theory studies conflict and cooperation through mathematical models.
These models may often seem unrealistically simple, but this simplicity may help to
focus on the real important issues, without being bothered by less important details.
In studying these simple models one may expect to come to a better understanding
of situations of conflict and cooperation.
The field of game theory can roughly be divided into two subfields, namely non-
cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory. This monograph is mainly
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concerned with cooperative game theory. A cooperative game with transferable util-
ity, or simply a TU-game, consists of a set of players N and a characteristic function
v: 2N --~ R, v(0) - 0, which describes for every subset of players the maximal gain
or minimal cost that these players can achieve when they decide to cooperate, re-
gardless of the actions that the other players take. The term transferable utility
refers to the fact that it is assumed that utility can be transfered from one player
to another. Hence, it is sufFicient to know the total utility that is obtainable by a
subgroup of players.
An example of a TU-game appears when there are two ( disjoint) groups of people
owning complementary goods, say right hand gloves and left hand gloves. Since right
hand gloves and left hand gloves typically belong together, a single right hand glove
or a single left hand glove is quite useless, but a pair of a right hand glove and a
left hand glove is worth something, say 1. Denote the group of people owning a
right hand glove by R and the group of people owning a left hand glove by L. The
glove game (N, v) corresponding to this situation has player set N- R U L, and the
characteristic function v assigns to a subgroup S of players the worth of the pairs
of gloves that these players can form. Since the number of pairs of gloves that the
players in S can form is simply the minimum of the number of right hand gloves
and the number of left hand gloves owned by the players in S, and the worth of a
pair of gloves is 1, we have v(S) - min{~R fl S~, ~L fl S~}.
In TU-game theory it is often assumed that the whole group of players decides
to cooperate and game theory tries to answer the question of how to divide the
gains (costs) among the players. An answer to this question is generally given in the
form of a solution concept. A solution concept is a function that assigns to a family
of TU-games (N, v) a set of payoffs, i.e. a subset of RN, where a vector x E RN
represents payoffs to the players in the sense that each player i E N gets a payoff
of x;.
Suppose that in our example of the glove game the number of people owning
a right hand glove is equal to the number of people that own a left hand glove,
i.e. ~R~ - ~L~. Then the worth of the grand coalition N is v(N) - IRI - ILI.
An acceptable way to divide these gains is to give each player 2, because they all
contribute one half of a pair of gloves that is going to be worth 1.
In the model of TU-games it is generally assumed that there are no restrictions
on communication and, hence, every subgroup of players can effectively cooperate.
This seems to be inappropriate in modelling certain economic situations, because
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sometimes agents are divided into subgroups in a natural way, for example by their
nationalities or by the companies that employ them. The simplest model that incor-
porates communication restrictions in cooperative games is the model of games with
coalition structures (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1964)), where a coalition structure
is defined as a partition of the player set into disjoint coalitions. Given a coali-
tion structure, effective communication between individual players can only take
place within the coalitions that constitute the structure. Besides that, these coali-
tions act as units. The study of games with exogenously given coalition structures
was started with the development of the various bargaining sets by Aumann and
Maschler (1964 ) and Davis and Maschler (1967). The research on games with exoge-
nously given coalition structures was continued in several papers including Aumann
and Dreze (1974), Owen (1977a, 1977b), Levy and MeLean (1989), Winter (1989,
1991, 1992), Driessen and Tijs (1990) and McLean (1991). Endogenous formation
of coalitions is already implicit in the theory of stable sets of von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944) and it is treated explicitly by Shenoy (1979), Bennett (1983),
Hart and ifurz (1983, 1984), Ic"urz (1988) and Zhou (1991).
Coalition structures, however, cannot be used to model situations in which direct
communication is not transitive. An example of a situation where direct commu-
nication is non-transitive is íound in the administrative machinery of a university
where one has to know the proper channels in order to get things done. To cap
ture non-transitive communication structures, Myerson (1977) introduced graphs t
model communication channels between players. In such a communication grap
the players are the nodes and the presence of a link between two players indicaG
that these two players can effectively communicate. A cooperative game togeth
with a communication graph on its player set is called a communication situatic
Communication situations were first studied by Myerson (19ï7) and this line of
search was continued by Owen (1986), Hamiache (1991), van den Nouweland a
Borm (1991), van den Nouweland, Borm, Owen and Tijs (1991), Borm, Owen t
Tijs (1992), van den Nouweland, Borm and Tijs (1992) and Potters and Reijni~
(1992).
All of the papers mentioned above deal with exogenously given communic~
graphs. Some work on endogenous formation of communication links was ~
by Aumann and Myerson (1988), who proposed a non-cooperative game in ei
sive form that results in the formation of a particular communication graph. '
applied this procedure to several examples and described so-called 'natural'
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munication graphs for these examples. Two of these examples were reconsidered
in Borm (1990), who slightly changed the model. However, no general results have
been obtained so far.
Models that do not fit into the line of research we described above, but that are
closely related can be found in Kalai, Postlewaite and Roberts (1978), Grofman and
Owen (1982), Vind (1983, 1986), Rosenthal (1988a, 1988b, 1992), Faigle and li'ern
(1990), Cilles (1990), Gilles and Owen (1990), van den Brink and Gilles (1991),
Furth (1992), Cilles, Owen and van den Brink (1992) and Spanjers (1992).
Situations in which a graph not only models communication channels but also
is essential in the determination of the possible gains of a group of players are
sequencing situations. In a sequencing situation (cf. Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs
(1989)) there is a queue standing before a counter. The queue consists of customers
who are waiting to be served. Each of these customers requires a specific service
time and, moreover, bears a fixed cost per time unit until he is served. In such a
situation the customers may be able to save costs by rearranging their positions in
the queue. In doing so, two players who want to switch need permission to do this
from the players who are standing in between, because this switch effects them too.
Hence, it seems natural to represent the queue by a graph that is a single line on
which the customers are points. Then the cost savings obtainable by a group of
customers are the accumulated cost savings obtainable by the components of this
group of customers with respect to the graph. The resulting cost savings game is
called a sequencing game.
In a sequencing situation it is assumed that the customers only have to be served
at one counter, but this is not always realistic. Sometimes customers have to be
served at a sequence of counters, for example in a self-service restaurant, where
counters with different types of food are placed one after the other and where there
is a cash-desk at the end. In such a situation the customers who have already been
served at a counter have to line up before the next counter. They normally do so
in order of arrival, i.e. in the same order as they were before the previous counter.
However, it may be profitable to rearrange before the next counter. A costs savings
game can be associated with this situation just as in case there is only one counter.
A situation in which jobs (or customers) have to be processed (served) by a sequence
of machines (counters) is known in the literature as a flow-shop.
Whereas in a sequencing situation the economic possibilities of the agents are
influenced but not determined by the graph representing their order before the
1.1 Games and graphs 5
counter(s), the literature also shows situations in which the economic possibilities of
a group of agents are completely determined by a network, consisting of a graph and
some additional information. Given a graph that is composed of a central supplier
and a number of geographically separated users together with interconnecting edges
which have a non-negative cost attached to them, one can define a minimal cost
spanning tree game (cf. Bird (1976) and Megiddo (1978)) where the value assigned
to a subgroup of users is the minimal cost of building a(sub)network that connects
them to the central supplier, without passing through nodes that belong to users
who are not in the coalition. Such a minimal cost spanning network will necessarily
be a tree because the costs are all non-negative. Allowing a coalition to pass through
nodes belonging to users outside the coalition, Granot and Huóerman (1981) defined
monotonic minimum cost spanning tree games. Cranot and Maschler (1991) gen-
eralized (monotonic) minimum cost spanning tree games and introduced spanning
network enterprises. A spanning network enterprise is a graph including the central
supplier and the locations of the agents, where each edge and each vertex has a fixed
cost, that can possibly be negative due to externalities. Further, the network can
also contain nodes that are not inhabited by users, called switch boxes. With such a
situation we can associate a spanning network game, in which the worth assigned to
a subgroup of users is defined as the minimal costs that this coalition has to make
to construct a network connecting them to the central supplier, in which they are
allowed to use nodes which are inhabited by users outside the coalition.
Another example oí a situation in which the economic possibilities of a group of
agents are completely determined by a network, is a flow situation. A flow situation
consists of a directed graph with two distinguished vertices, the source and the sink,
where for each arc its capacity and a control game are given. The control games
describe which coalitions of agents are allowed to use the ares. The corresponding
flow game assigns to a coalition the maximal flow that the coalition can send through
the network when using only ares that are controlled by this coalition and subject
to the capacity constraints on these ares. Flow games were extensively studied in
Kalai and Zemel (1982) and in Curiel, Derks and Tijs (1989). An extension of the
model of flow situations is to require a coalition to make a certain effort in order
to be allowed to use an arc, for example to do a necessary amount of maintenance
of the used ares. This sort of requirements can be modeled using multi-choice
games (cf. Hsiao and Raghavan (1990)). A multi-choice game is a cooperative game
in which each player has a number of activity levels at which he can choose to
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play. The reward that a subgroup of players can obtain depends on the effort of the
cooperating players. An example of a multi-choice game appears in a large company
with many divisions, where the profits of the company depend on the performance
of the divisions. This gives rise to a multi-choice game in which the players are the
divisions and the worth of a coalition where each division functions at a certain level
is the corresponding profit made by the company. The class of multi-choice games
contains the class of (ordinary) TU-games as a subclass, because a TU-game can be
viewed as a multi-choice game in which every player has exactly two activity levels,
namely to participate or not to participate.
Recently two models were introduced that are related to the model of multi-
choice games, namely games under precedence constraints (cf. Faigle and liern
(1992)) and games with restricted coalitions (cf. Derks and Peters (1992)). Both
models incorporate the model of multi-choice games in a typical way: one has to
define a new player set having elements that are pairs of players and corresponding
activity levels in the multi-choice game.
To conclude this section we draw the reader's attention to the paper of Sharkey
(1992), who provides a survey on network models in economics.
1.2 Summary
The larger part of this monograph, namely chapters 2 through 6, is devoted to
the model of communication situations. In chapter 2 communication situations
are formally introduced and two corresponding games are defined, the point game
and the arc game. Whereas the point game focusses on the role of the players
in a communication situation, the arc game takes another angle and is concerned
with the role of the communication links. Chapter 2 investigates relations between
properties of the original game and of the two associated communication games.
Further, we investigate the special class of cycle-complete graphs, which appears
when investigating one of these properties.
Chapter 3 deals with solution concepts for communication situations. We will
mainly be concerned with two solution concepts, namely the Myerson value and the
position value. Both values are defined with the aid of the Shapley values of the two
communication games that were introduced in chapter 2, the point game and the
arc game. It is shown that both values satisfy a couple of nice properties and it is
investigated whether some of these properties characterize either the Myerson value
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or the position value. For the Myerson value several axiomatic characterizations
are provided and the position value is axiomatically characterized on a subclass
of communication situations. Also, some alternative solution concepts are briefly
discussed.
The calculation of the Myerson value and the position value can be rather complex
and tedious. For some special classes of communication situations, however, elegant
calculation methods are provided in chapter 4. These calculation methods are based
on generating functions and they strongly depend on relations between the dividends
of the underlying game and the dividends oí the corresponding point game and arc
game of a particular communication situation.
In chapter 5 communication situations as introduced in chapter 2 are generalized
in several directions. We discuss hypergraph communication situations and directed
communication situations, where the communication possibilities of the players are
modeled by means of hypergraphs and by directed graphs respectively instead of by
undirected graphs. Further, the economic possibilities of the players are modeled by
means of non-transferable utility games (NTU-games) instead of TU-games in NTU
communication situations. Communication situations can also be generalized in yet
a different way: one can consider a more general framework for cooperation and
communication involving control games on points and communication ares. These
situations are discussed under the name controlled communication networks.
Chapter 6 is concerned with the endogenous formation of communication graphs.
While in chapters 2 through 4 we assumed the communication graph to be exoge-
nously given, in this chapter the players have to decide on the formation of some
communication graph, knowing the underlying TU-game and the allocation rule by
which a communication situation is going to be evaluated. In the process of the
formation of a communication graph, each player tries to influence this formation to
his own advantage. Hence, the formation process is a strategic process, which can
be modeled by means of a non-cooperative game. We will discuss two models for
the endogenous formation of communication graphs, an extensive form model and
a strategic form model. It is investigated whether predictions can be made about
the communication graphs that are likely to evolve with either model.
In the remaining chapters some other models involving games and networks ap-
pear. Chapter 7 discusses cost savings games that are derived from flow-shops. It
is well known that many of the classical flow-shop problems are NP-hard. In this
chapter however, we will introduce a subclass of fiow-shop problems that are char-
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acterized by the presence of a so-called dominant machine. It is shown that for this
kind of problems we can restrict our search for an optimal schedule to permutation
schedules if the optimality criterion is regular. Furthermore, an expression for the
completion times with respect to a semi-active permutation schedule is provided
and fast algorithms to find optimal schedules for the weighted completion times and
the maximal lateness criteria are described. Also, it is shown that a cost savings
game that is derived from a flow-shop problem with a dominant first machine can
be viewed as a cost savings game corresponding to a one-machine problem.
Chapter 8 is concerned with TU-games that correspond to spanning network
enterprises. Properties of these games are investigated and compared to properties
of monotonic minimum cost spanning tree games. Further, it is shown that the class
of spanning network games coincides with the class of monotonic TU-games.
Chapter 9 deals with multi-choice games in general and with multi-choice flow
games in particular. In this chapter cores and related solution concepts are ex-
tended to multi-choice games and relations between those concepts are investigated.
Also, possible extensions of the Shapley value to the class of multi-choice games are
discussed. Special attention is paid to the application of multi-choice games in flow-
situations. It is shown that multi-choice flow games ca.n be related to non-negative
multi-choice games with non-empty cores. Finally, two models that are related to
the model of multi-choice games are discussed in this chapter, namely games under
precedence constraints and games with restricted coalitions.
Chapter 2
Communication situations
In this chapter we provide the formal definition of a communication situation, which
was introduced by Myerson (1977). Also, two corresponding games are defined,
the point game (cf. Myerson (1977)) and the arc game (cf. Borm, Owen and
Tijs (1992)), and relations between properties of the original game and the two
associated communication games are investigated. Further, we will be concerned
with the special class of cycle-complete graphs, which appears when investigating
one of these properties.
Section 2.1 provides the formal definitions of communication situations, point
games and arc games. The class of cycle-complete graphs is defined and studied in
section 2.2, and it appears when investigating the heredity of the convexity property
of the original game in section 2.4. Further, section 2.3 concerns the heredity of
superadditivity and balancedness.
2.1 Communication games
A communication situation is a ttiple (N, v, A), where N- {1, 2, ..., n} is the set
of players, (N, v) is a TU-game having player set N and characteristíc function
v: 2~~ -~ R with v(~) - 0, and (N, A) is an undirected communication graph with-
out loops or parallel edges. Following earlier publications, the elements of A are
called ares or communication links. For convenience it is assumed that the game
(N,v) is zero-normalized, i.e. v({i}) - 0 for all i E N. We will sometimes identify a
game (N,v) with its characteristic function v. The set of all TU-games with player
set N is denoted by TUN and the set of all communication situations with player
set N is denoted by CSN.
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Let (N, v, A) be a communication situation. Then the game ( N, v) describes the
economic possibilities of the players if they can cooperate. However, it seems unrea-
sonable to assume that players who cannot communicate with each other are able
to cooperate. This reflection leads to the definition of the reward function.
Assuming that the players in a coalition S C N can effect communication through
the communication links in A(S) :- {{i, j} E A ~ {i, j} C S}, each coalition S
is partitioned into (communication) components in the following way: T C S is a
component within S if and only if (T, A(T)) is a connected (sub)graph and there is
no set T such that T~ T C S and (T, A(T)) is connected. The resulting partition
of S is denoted by S~A. Correspondingly, the reward rv(S, A) of a coalition S C N
having available the communication links in A(S) is defined as the sum of the gains
of its communication components, i.e.
rv(S, A) :- ~ v(C).
CES~A
Note that the fact that ( N, v) is zero-normalized implies that for all S C N
rv(S, A) -~ v(C) - ~ v(C) - ~ v(C) - rv(N, A(S)) ,
CES~A CES~A(S) CEN~A(S)
because the components of (N, A(S)) are the components of (S, A(S)) and all sin-
gletons {i} with i E N~S.
For communication situations two different types of communication games are con-
sidered: point games and arc games. While a point game focuses on the role of a
player in a communication graph in creating economic possibilities and establishing
communication between other players, an arc game reflects a dual point of view and
concentrates on the role of a communication link.
Definition. Let (N, v, A) be a communication situation. The point game (N, rA)
is given by
rÁ(S) - r~(S,A) for all S C N.
The arc game ( A,rN) assigns to every subset L of communication links the corre-
sponding reward of the grand coalition N, i.e.
r~,(L) - rv(N, L) for all L C A.
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 concentrate on relations between properties of the two types of
communication games, point games and arc games, and properties of the underlying
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games. In section 2.4 we will encounter a special class of communication graphs,
namely cycle-complete graphs, and this class of graphs is explored in the following
section.
2.2 Cycle-complete graphs
In this section cycle-complete graphs are introduced and it is shown that cycle-
complete graphs have features that are similar to well known features of cycle-free
graphs. Moreover, the relation between cycle-complete graphs and cycle-free graphs
is formalized in a characterization of cycle-complete graphs.
A closed path in a graph (N, A) is a sequence of points (xl, x2i . .., xe, x~~l ) with
the properties that xl, x2i . .., xttl E N, {xk, xk~l } E A for all k E { 1, 2, ..., t} and
xstl - xl. A cycle in the graph (N, A) is a closed path (xl, x2i ... , xt, x~ ) where
xl, ..., xt are all distinct points of N. Hence, we explicitly exclude closed paths that
have loops from the definition of a cycle.
Definition. A graph (N, A) is cycle-complete if the following holds:
If there is a cycle ( xl, x2i ..., xt, xl ) in (N, A), then the complete graph
on {xl, ..., xt} is a subgraph of (N, A).
In particular, both graphs without cycles and complete graphs are cycle-complete.
Cycle-complete graphs also turn up in books on graph theory, e.g. in Harary (1972).
He showed that a graph is cycle-complete if and only if it is the ólock graph of some
graph. Here, the block graph (P, E) of a graph (N, A) is defined in the following
way:
First define the blocks of graph (N, A) to be the maximal subsets S C N with
the properties that (S, A(S)) is a connected subgraph and there is no i E S whose
removal from the graph (S, A(S)) would increase the number of components. Now,
the blocks of (N, A) correspond to the points of (P, E) and two of these points are
connected by an edge if and only if the corresponding blocks have a non-empty
intersection.
On the other hand, cycle-complete graphs have features that are very similar to
properties of cycle-free graphs, as is stated in proposition 2.2.1. Before we state this
proposition we introduce some notation. Let (1V, A) be a graph and S C N. The set
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S is called A-connected if there is a component of (N, A) that contains S. The set
S is called A(S)-connected or, if no confusion can arise, just connected if (S, A(S))
is a connected graph.
Proposition 2.2.1 For a cycle-complete graph (N, A) and two points i, j E N that
are A-connected there exists a unique shortest path from i to j, where the length of
a path is defined as the number of ares on this path, as usual. Moreover, it holds
that every path from i to j includes the points on the unique shortest path from i
to j.
The proof of this proposition is rather longwinded, but not very hard and it is left
to the reader. Instead, we will illustrate the proposition with an example.




There are several paths from 1 to 8, e.g. (1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8) and (1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8), but it
is clear that every path from 1 to 8 must include the points 1,2,5 and 8. Points 2
and 5 are important because their removal from the graph would cause it to become
disconnected. Further, note that (1, 2, 5, 8) in itself is a path from 1 to 8.
Now, let S C N be A-connected. Then we define the set H(S) C N corresponding
toSby
H(S) :- ~{T C N ~ S C T, T is A(T)-connected}. (2.1)
If the graph ( N, A) is cycle-complete, then according to theorem 2.2.3 the set H(S)
is the smallest connected set containing S and it is called the connected hull of S.
2.2 Cycle-complete graphs 13
Theorem 2.2.3 A graph (N, A) is cycle-complete if and only if for every A-con-
nected set S C N there exists a smallest connected set containing S.
Prooj. Suppose (N, A) is cycle-complete. We will show that H(S) is a connected
set. From the definition of H(S) it is immediately clear that this implies that
H(S) is the smallest connected set containing S. 50, let i, j E H(S), i~ j,
and let (xl, ..., xk) be the (unique) shortest path from i to j in (N, A). Now let
T C N be such that S C T and T is A(T)-connected. Then, according to (2.1),
{i, j} C T and there is a path (y~, ..., y~) from i to j in (T, A(T)). Proposition 2.2.1
implies that this path must include the points on the shortest path from i to j, i.e.
{yl, . . . , y~} ~ {xl, . . . , xk}. Hence, {xl, . . . , xk } is a subset of every T that appears
in the right-hand side of (2.1). Therefore, {x~, ..., xk} C H(S) and (xl, ..., xk) is a
path from i to j in (H(S), A(H(S))). We conclude that for every i, j E H(S) there
exists a path from i to j in (H(S), A(H(S))), which is equivalent to saying that
H(S) is connected.
Now, suppose (N, A) is a graph that is not cycle-complete. Then there is a cycle
(xl, ..., x~, x1) in (N, A) and there are i, j E { 1, . .., t} such that i G j- 1 and
{x;,x~} ~ A. Obviously, {x;,x;~l,...,x~} and {x~,x~tl,...,x~,xl,...,x;} are two
connected sets both containing x; and x~. The intersection of these sets is {x;,x~},
which is not connected. ~
To formalize the relation between cycle-complete graphs and cycle-free graphs we
define the following operation on graphs.
Let (N, A) be a graph. We call a subset S C N completely-connected if the complete
graph on S is a subgraph of (N, A). We define the set L3(N, A) to be the set of all
maximal completely-connected subsets of N, i.e. Ci(N, A) is the set of completely-
connected subsets of N that are not contained in another completely-connected set.
Note that Ci(N, A) is not a partition of N unless N itself is completely-connected.
Now, a new graph ( P(N, A), E(N, A)) is defined, which has as its points the set N
as well as additional different points ps, S E Ci(N, A), i.e.
P(N, A) :- N U{ps ~ S E l3(N, A)}. (2.2)
Further, the set of edges of this new graph is defined by
E(N, A) :- {{ps, i} ~ S E L3(N, A), i E S}. (2.3)
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Hence, the new graph is obtained from the original one by replacing every maximal
completely-connected subgraph by a star. Example 2.2.4 demonstrates the operation
described above.
Example 2.2.4 For the graph (N, A) that is depicted in figure 2.2, the correspon-





Note that the operation that is described above adds a point for every edge if the
graph (N, A) happens to be cycle-free. Now we have the following result.
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Theorem 2.2.5 Let (N, A) be a graph. Then (N, A) is cycle-complete if and only
if the graph (P(N,A),E(N,A)) is cycle-free.
Proof. First assume that (N, A) is cycle-complete. We prove that this implies that
if S and T E Ci(N, A) are such that they have at least two points in common, then
S- T. So, let S, T E Ci(N, A) and xl, x2 E S n T, xl ~ x2. Suppose S~ T. Then,
since both S and T E Ci(N, A), neither S C T nor T C S. Hence, S`T ~ 0 and
T`S ~ 0. So, let x3 E S`T and xq E T`S. Since {xl,x2} C SnT, (x~,x3ix2,xq,z1)
is a cycle in (N, A). Cycle-completeness of (N, A) implies that {x3i xq} E A. Since
x3 and xq were arbitrarily chosen, we see that the complete graph on the set S U T
must be a subset of (N, A). This is in contradiction with our assumption that
S,T E L3(N, A) and S~ T.
Now, suppose (x1i x2, ..., xt, xl) is a cycle in the graph (P(N, A), E(N, A)). With-
out loss of generality we assume that x~ E N. Note that t must be even, because on a
path in the graph (P(N, A), E(N, A)) the vertices in N and the vertices not in N al-
ternate. Hence, we know that xl, x3, ..., xt-1 E N and x2, xq, ..., x~ E P(N, A)`N.
Further, since xl, ..., x~ are all distinct and two different sets in 13(N, A) have at
most one point in common, we know t) 6. From the way we constructed the graph
(P(N, A), E(N, A)) it is clear that (xi, x3, ..., xi-~, x~ ) is a cycle in (N, A). Together
with cycle-completeness of (N, A) this implies that the complete graph on the ver-
tices xl, x3i ..., xt-1 is a subgraph of (N, A). Hence, we can find S E Ci(N, A) to be
such that {xl, x3, ..., xt-1 } C S. But then it is immediately clear that x~ - ps for
all j E {2, 4, ..., t}, since ~TnS~ ~ 2 for all T with x~ - pT for some j E{2, 4, .. ., t}.
This contradicts that (xi, x2i ..., xi, x~ ) is a cycle. So, the graph ( P(N, A), E(N, A))
does not contain a cycle.
To prove the other implication, suppose (N, A) is not cycle-complete. Let
(xl, x2, ... , xt, x~tl - xl ) be a cycle in ( N, A) such that the complete graph on
{x~, x2, ..., xt} is not a subgraph of (N, A). For every j E { 1, 2, ..., t} there is an
S~ E L3(N, A) such that {x~, x~ti } C S~. Note that not all S~ can be the same,
because the complete graph on {xi, x2, ..., xt} is not a subgraph of (N, A). Now
(xi, Ps, , xs, .. ., ps„ xsti )~s a closed path in ( P(N, A), E(N, A)) with at least t~- 2
different points. It is clear that from this we can find a cycle in (P(N, A), E(N, A)).
Hence, the graph (P(N, A), E(N, A)) contains a cycle. o
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2.3 Superadditivity and balancedness
This section and section 2.4 deal with inheritance problems: it is investigated in
what way a communication network influences an economic situation and what its
effects are on certain desirable properties of cooperative games. The current section
investigates what conditions should be imposed on the communication graphs such
that superadditivity or balancedness of the underlying game is inherited by the point
game or arc game.
Definition. A TU-game (N, v) is superadditive if cooperation is profitable, i.e.
v(S U T) ~ v(S) f v(T)
for all disjoint coalitions S, T E 2N.
With respect to superadditivity we have the following theorem, whose first part is
due to Owen ( 1986).
Theorem 2.3.1 Let (N, v, A) be a communication situation. Then the following
two assertions hold:
(i) If the underlying game (N, v) is superadditive, then the point game (N, rA) is
superadditive.
(ii) If the arc game (A, r~,) is non-negative and superadditive, then the point game
(N, r:t ) is superadditive.
Prooj oj part (ii). Let S, T C N be such that S(1 T-~. We have to prove that
rÁ(S U T) J rÁ(S) f rÁ(T).
Because ( N, v) is zero-normalized, (2.4) is equivalent to
r~,(A(S U T)) ~ riv(A(S)) f riv(A(T))-
Since (A,r~,) is non-negative, superadditivity of (A,rN) implies
r~,(A(S U T)) ~ rN(A(S) U A(T)).
Further, the fact that A(S) fl A(T) -(~ together with superadditivity of (A, rn,)
gives
riv(A(S) U A(T)) ? rN(A(S)) ~ riv(A(T )). (2.7)
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Now, inequalities (2.6) and (2.7) readily imply (2.5). ~
Whereas theorem 2.3.1(i) shows that superadditivity of the underlying game is in-
herited by the point game without imposing any restrictions on the communication
graphs, example 2.3.2 shows that there is no non-trivial class of communication
graphs for which superadditivity of the underlying game is inherited by the arc
game.
Example 2.3.2 Let (N, v, A) be a communication situation with at least 3 players
and v(S) ~
rf ~S~ C 1. Hence, the game (N,v) is superadditive. Suppose
- ~S~ if ~S~ ? 2
the communication graph (N, A) is such that there is a communication component
containing at least 3 players. Then we can find i, j, k E N such that {i, j} E A and
{j, k} E A. Then, with a:- {i, j} and b:- {j, k}, we have
r~,({a}) -~ r~,({b}) - v({i, j}) -~ v({j, k}) - 4 1 3- v({i, j, k}) - r~,({a, b}).
Hence, the arc game (A, r~,) is not superadditive.
We proceed by investigating the balancedness property.
Definition. A TU-game (N,v) is balanced if for all maps Q: 2N`{0} -~ Rf
satisfying
~ Q(S) es - eN
SE2N`{0}
it holds that
~ ~3(S) v(S) ~ v(N).
SE2f`'`{0}
Here, es E {0, 1}N is the vector with es - 1 if and only if i E S, for all S C N.
Further, ( N, v) is totally balanced if for every S C N the subgame ( S, v ~s) is bal-
anced, where v ~S (T) :- v(T) for all 'l C S.
Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) showed that the class of balanced TU-games
coincides with the class of TU-games with non-empty cores.
Definition. The core C(N, v) of a 7'U-game (N, v) is the set of all divisions of the
amount v(N) against which no subcoalition can protest effectively, i.e.
C(N, v) :- {x E RN ~~ x; - v(N) and ~ a; ~ v(S) for all S E 2N`{0}}.
~EN ~ES
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Theorem 2.3.3 shows that for balancedness of the underlying game to be inherited
by the point game we only have to require connectedness of the communication
graph.
Theorem 2.3.3 Let (N, v, A) be a communication situation. Then the following
two assertions hold:
(i) If the communication graph (N, A) is connected and (N, v) is balanced, then
the point game (N, rÁ) is balanced.
(ii) If (N, v) is totally balanced, then the point game (N, rA) is totally balanced.
Prooj. To prove part (i), let (N, A) be a connected communication graph and let
(N,v) be balanced. Hence, C(N,v) ~ 0. Take x E C(N,v). We will show that
x E C(N,rA). Since (N,A) is connected, rÁ(N) - v(N). Therefore, the fact that x
is ef~icient for (N, v), i.e. ~iEN xi - v(N), immediately implies that x is efficient for
(N, rn ) -
Now, let S C N. Then
rn(S) -~ v(C) C~~ xi -~ x
CES~A CES~A iEC iES
,
which implies that x E C(N, rÁ). Hence, C(N, rÁ) ~ Q and (N, rÁ) is balanced.
We proceed by proving part (ii). Let (N, A) be an arbitrary communication graph
and let (N, v) be a totally balanced game. Let S C N and C E S~A be arbitrary.
Since (N, v) is totally balanced, we can find x~ in the core of the subgame (C, v ~c).
From part (i) it follows that a~ is in the core of (C,rA ~c). This leads to a vector
y E RS defined by y; :- x~', where C; is the unique component of (S, A(S)) con-
taining player i, for all i E S. Using the fact that for every T C S each component
of (T, A(T)) is contained in a component of (S, A(S)), one can easily show that y
is in the core of (S,rA ~s). Hence, every subgame of (N,rÁ) has a non-empty core
and (N,rÁ) is totally balanced. ~
With respect to balancedness of the arc game, example 2.3.2 implies that even if
the underlying game in a communication situation is totally balanced and the com-
munication graph is a tree, then the corresponding arc game need not be balanced
(set N:- {1,2,3} and A:- {{1,2}, {2,3}}). Further, for balancedness of a non-
negative arc game to imply balancedness of the point game we do not have to impose
any restrictions on the communication graphs.
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Theorem 2.3.4 Let (N, v, A) be a communication situation where the arc game
(A,rN) is non-negatíve and balanced. Then the point game (N,rÁ) is balanced.
Proof. It suffices to prove that the core of (N,rÁ) is non-empty. We know that the
core of the arc game is non-empty. Hence, let y E RA be in the core of (A, rN).
Since the arc game is non-negative, y must be non-negative. Now define a vector
x E RN as follows. For each i E N
yi~-2 ~ ya,
aEA,
where A; :- {a E A ~ i E a} denotes the set of all communication links in A of
which player i is an end point. Hence, x; is half of the worth that is assigned by the
core element y to the ares incident on i. Then
~ xi - ~ z ~ ya - ~ ya - rIV(A) - rA(N)
iEN iEN aEA, aEA
and x is efficient for the point game. Further, for each S C N
~~i - ~ z L~ ya J~ z L ya
iES iES aEA, - iES aEA,nA(S)
- ~ ya J rN(A(S)) - rA(S)-
aEA(S)
Hence, we conclude that a E C(N, rÁ).
2.4 Convexity
This section, which is based on van den Nouweland and Borm ( 1991), investigates
relations between convexity of the underlying game and the two communication
games. In particular, assuming the underlying game to be convex, necessary and
sufficient conditions on the communication graph are provided such that the com-
munication games are convex. We start by providing the definition of convexity.
Definition. A TU-game ( N, v) is convea if the marginal contribution of a joining
player increases when the coalition he joins gets larger or, in formula, if
v(S U{i}) - v(S) ~ v(T U {i}) - v(T)
foralliENandaIISCTCN`{i}.
It is obvious that a convex game is superadditive. We consider two communication
situations where the underlying game is convex in the next example.
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Example 2.4.1 Let (N, v, A) and (N, v, B) be communication situations where
N- {1, .. ., 4}, v(S) - ~S~ - 1 for all S~ Ql and where (N, A) and (N, B) are the
communication graphs represented in figure 2.4.
(N,A) (N,B)
Figure 2.4
The game (N,v) is convex, since for all i E N it holds that v({i}) - v(~) - 0 and
for all S C N`{i}, S~ 0, v(S U{i}) - v(S) - 1. Further, since rA(S) - v(S) for
all S, (N,rA) is convex too. However, (N,rB) is not convex, because
rB({1,4} U{3}) - ré({1,4}) - 2~ 1- rB({1,2,4} U{3}) - rB({1,2,4}).
What happens here is that in the communication situation (N, v, B) joining a smaller
coalition can effect a larger jump in the size of a communication component: When
joining players 1 and 4, player 3 causes these players to be able to communicate
where they were not c,apable of communicating before.
A property that the graph ( N, A) possesses but (N, B) does not possess is
cycle-completeness. In theorem 2.4.2 and example 2.4.3 it is shown that cycle-
completeness is a crucial property.
Theorem 2.4.2 Let ( N, v, A) be a communication situation where the underlying
game ( N, v) is convex and the communication graph ( N, A) is cycle-complete. Then
the corresponding point game (N,rÁ) is convex.
ProoJ. Let i E N and S C T C N`{i}. We have to prove that
rA(S U {i}) - rÁ(S) C rA(T U{i}) - rÁ(T), i.e.
~ v(C) - ~ v(C) C ~ v(D) - ~ v(D). (2.8)
CESu{i}~A CES~A DETu{i}~A DET~A
When player i joins coalition S he causes the communication components of S
containing a neighbour of his to stick together in one large component of S U{i},
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whereas the other components of S remain unchanged. In formula, this means that
with C; :- ~J{C E S~A ~ 3j E C: {i, j} E A} U {i} we have that C; E S U{i}~A
andifCESU{i}~A,C~C;,thenCES~A.
So, defining C:- {C E S~A ~ 3j E C:{i, j} E A}, we have
~ v(C) -~ v(C) - v({i} u U C) -~ v(C).
CESu{i}~A CES~A CEC CEC
Analogously we obtain
~ v(D) -~ v(D) - v({i} U U D) -~ v(D),
DETu{i}~A DET~A DED DED
whereD:-{DET~A~3jED:{i,j}EA}.
Hence, ( 2.8) is equivalent to
v({i} U~ C) -~ v(C) C v({i} U U D) -~ v(D). (2.9)
CEC CEC DE1) DED
We proceed by showing that player i cannot link up more communication compo-
nents of coalition S than he links up components of coalition T. This is true because
we can number the elements of C and D in such a way that C- {Cl, ..., C,} and
D-{D1, ..., Dt}, where t~ s and C, C Dr for all r E {1, ..., s}. This can be seen
as follows:
It easily follows that for all C E C there exists precisely one D E D such that C C D,
because S C T. Now suppose there are E1, E2 E C, El ~ E2, and F E D such
that E' C F and EZ C F. Let jl E El and j2 E Ez be such that {i, jl} E A and
{i, j2} E A. Note that {jl, j2} ~ A. Since {jl, j2} C F E T~A, there is a path in
(T, A) from jl to j2. So, since i~ T, there is a cycle from i to i over jl and j2 in
the graph (N, A). However, since (N, A) is cycle-complete this should imply that
{jl, jz} E A.
Now we can use the properties of the game (N,v). Superadditivity of the game
(N,v) implies
s ~






v({ï} U ~ Ur) - v(DI) ~ U({2} U~ Ur U lil) - iJ(lil),
r-1 r-2
s s z
1J({2} U U Dr U~.1) - v(D2) 1 U({2} U U Dr U U Cr) - v(C2)e
r-2 r-3 r-1
e-1 a
v({i} U D, U U Cr) - v(D,) ~ v({i} U U Cr) - v(C,).
r-1 r-1
Adding these inequalities we obtain
s s
v({i} U U Dr) - ~ v(Dr) ~ v({i} U U C) -~ v(C). (2.11)
r-1 r-1 CEC CEC
Now (2.10) and (2.11) readily imply (2.9). o
The following example shows that the condition of cycle-completeness in theo-
rem 2.4.2 is necessary in the sense that for each communication graph that is not
cycle-complete there exists a convex game such that the corresponding point game
is not convex.
Example 2.4.3 Let (N, A) be a communication graph that is not cycle-complete.
Then, clearly, there is a cycle ( xl, ..., xt, xl) in (N, A) and there are í, j E{1, . .. , t}
such that i C j- 1, {x;,s~} ~ A and for all k E {i ~ 1,..., j- 1}, {~k,x~} E A.
Consider the convex game ( N,v) where v(S) - ~S~ - 1 for all S~~, and define
S :- {x;, x~ } and T :- {x~, . . . , xt}~{x;~i }. It follows that
rA(S U{x;~i}) - rÁ(S) - 2~ 1 - rq(T U{x;~i}) - rA(T).
Hence, ( N, rÁ) is not convex.
For the analogue of theorem 2.4.2 with respect to arc games one needs a strengthen-
ing of cycle-completeness towards cycle-freeness. This follows from the next theorem.
Theorem 2.4.4 Let (N, v, A) be a communication situation where the communi-
cation graph (N, A) is cycle-free and the point game ( N, rA) is convex. Then the
arc game (A,rN) is convex.
Proof. Let a -{i, j} E A and Ií C L C A`{a}. We have to prove that
r~,(L U{a}) - rj`,(L) ~ rj~(Íi U {a}) - rj"(Ií ) or, equivalently,
~ v(T) - ~ v(T) ~ ~ v(S) - ~ v(S). (2.12)
TEN~Lu{a} TEN~L SEN~I~u{a} SEN~h"
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Define Tk ( Sk) as the component in N~L ( N~lí ) that contains player k E N. Clearly,
N~(LU{a})-{TEN~L~i~T,j~T}U{T;UT;}and
N~(KU{a})-{SEN~K~i~S,j~S}U{S;US;}.
Since (N, A) is cycle-free, we know S; fl S; - 0 and T; fl T; - ~. Hence, ( 2.12) is
equivalent to
v(T; U T;) - v(T;) - v(T;) ? v(S; U S;) - v(S;) - v(S;). (2.13)
Because Tk is a component of N~L, Tk is A(Tk)-connected for k E {i, j} and, more-
over, T; U T; is A(T; U T;)-connected. Similar results hold for S;, S; and S; U S;.
Hence, ( 2.13) is equivalent to
rÁ(T; U Ti) - rÁ(T;) - rÁ(Ti) ? rÁ(s; u S;) - rA(S;) - rA(si). (2.14)
Since If C L we have that S; C T; and S; C T;. So, convexity of the game (N, rA)
implies
rÁ(T; U T;) - rÁ(T;) ~ rÁ(S; U T;) - rÁ(S;) and
rÁls: U Ti) - rÁlTi) J rÁlsi U Si) - rálsi)~
Adding these inequalities we obtain (2.14). ~
A direct consequence of theorems 2.4.2 and 2.4.4 is the next result.
Corollary 2.4.5 Let (N, v, A) be a communication situation where the underlying
game (N, v) is convex and the communication graph (N, A) is cycle-free. Then the
corresponding arc game (A, r~,) is convex.
The following example shows that for each communication graph that is not cycle-
free there is a convex game such that the corresponding arc game is not convex.
Example 2.4.6 Let (N,A) be a communication graph that contains a cycle
(~i~ . . - . ~s, ~iti - xi ). Consider the convex game (N, v), where v(S) - ~S~ - 1
for all S~ 0. Defining ak :- {~k,~k}r} E A for k E {1,...,t}, K:- {ar} and
L:- {ar,.. . , at-~ }, it follows that
r~,(K U{ai}) - rN(Ií )- 1 ~ O- rN(L U{a~}) - rN(L).
Hence, (A, rN) is not convex.
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With respect to the converse of theorem 2.4.4, it holds that convexity of a non-
negative arc game immediately implies convexity of the point game. So, in particu-
lar, for this result we do not have to restrict to cycle-free communication graphs.
Theorem 2.4.7 Let (N, v, A) be a communication situation where the arc game
(A,rN) is non-negative and convex. Then the point game (N,rÁ) is convex.
Proof. Let i E N and S C T C N`{i}. We have to prove that
rÁ(S U{i}) - rÁ(S) G rA(T U {i}) - rÁ(T). (2.15)
Because (N, v) is zero-normalized, ( 2.15) is equivalent to
rN(A(S U{i})) - rN(A(S)) C r~,(A(T U{i})) - rn,(A(T)). (2.16)
Since (A, r~,) is non-negative, the superadditivity of (A, r~,) implies
rN(A(T U{i})) ~ rN(A(S U{i}) U A(T)). (2.17)
Further, by the convexity of the game (A,rN), we have
rN(A(S U {i}) U A(T)) - r~,(A(T)) ~
rj~,(A(S U{i})) - rj~,(A(S U {i}) (1 A(T)) -
rN(A(S U {i})) - rT,(A(S)). (2.18)
Now, inequalíty (2.16) is a direct consequence of (2.17) and (2.18). ~
The necessity of the non-negativity condition in theorem 2.4.7 follows from the next
example.
Example 2.4.8 Let (N,v, A) be the communication situation where N-{1,2},
A- {{1,2}} and v({1}) - v({2}) - 0, v(1V) --1. Obviously, the arc game (A,rN)
is convex. For the point game, however, we have
r;({1}) - rA(0) - 0 1 -1 - rÁ({1,2}) - rÁ({2})
and, hence, the point game is not convex.
Combining theorems '1.4.4 and 2.4.7 we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4.9 Let (N, v, A) be a communication situation where the game (N, v)
is non-negative and the communication graph (N, A) is cycle-free. Then the point
game (N, rÁ) is convex if and only if the arc game (A, rN) is convex.
Chapter 3
Solution concepts
This chapter deals with solution concepts for communication situations. We will
mainly be concerned with two solution concepts, namely the Myerson value and the
position value. Both values are defined with the aid of the Shapley values of the two
communication games that were introduced in the previous chapter, the point game
and the arc game. It is shown that both values satisfy a couple of nice properties and
it is investigated whether some of these properties characterize either the Myerson
value or the position value. Unfortunately, no axiomatic characterization is known
for the position value on the class of all communication situations, but the position
value can be characterized on a sribclass of communication situations. For the
Myerson value several axiomatic characterizations are provided. Also, the logical
independence of the properties that are used to characterize both values is shown. In
doing so, one gets a clear idea of the impact of the axioms. Further, some alternative
solution concepts are briefly discussed.
The Myerson value and the position value are formally introduced in section 3.1
and axiomatic characterizations of both values are provided in section 3.2. Sec-
tion 3.3 deals with the logical independence of the axioms in the axiomatic char-
acterizations of section 3.2 and some alternative solution concepts are discussed in
section 3. ~.
3.1 Myerson value and position value
The two types of communication games that were introduced in section 2.1 give
rise to two allocation rules for communication situations, the Myerson value and
the position value. Both allocation rules are based on the Shapley value, whose
'? ~
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definition we will provide below.
As is well known, a TU-game (N, v) can be expressed as
v - ~ ~„(S) us, (3.1)
SE2N`{8}
where ( N, us) is the unanimity game on S, defined by
us(T) - ( 1 ifSCT
Sl 0 else
and the dividends 0„(S) (cf. Harsanyi (1959)) are given by
~„(S) - ~(-1)ISI-ITI v(T)
TCS
for all S E 2N`{0}. Since the unanimity games form a basis, reprensentation (3.1)
is uniquely determined.
Definition. The Shapley value ~ : TUN -~ RN (cf. Shapley (1953)) is the linear
function with
~(N, us) - ÍSI es.
Hence, for all (N, v) E TUN,
~(N, v) - ~ ~~~~ ) es.
sEZN`{e}
Alternatively, the Shapley value can be described by
~;(N, v) - 1~ ~ [v(PRo(i) U {í}) - v(PRo(i))] (3.4)
n' oEP(N)
for all i E N, where P(N) denotes the set of permutations of N and
PRo( ):-{jEN~a(j)Ca(i)}
denotes the set of predecessors of i according to o.
Yet another formula for the Shapley value is given by
~,(N v) - ~
~S~l(n - ~ - ~S~)~ (v(S U {i}) - v(S)) (3.5)
scN:;~s n.
for all i E N.
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Now, returning to communication situations, let N be fixed. An allocation rule for
CSN is a function 7 that assigns to each communication situation (N, v, A) a payoff
vector y(N, v, A) E RN, providing player i with a payoff of ~y;(N, v, A), i E N. The
Myerson value and the position value are two such allocation rules. The Myerson
value of a communication situation is the Shapley value of the corresponding point
game, whereas the position value is obtained by first assigning each communication
link its Shapley value in the corresponding arc game and then dividing the value of
a link equally among the two players at its end points. This seems reasonable if one
assumes that each player can block the use of any arc of which he is an end point.
Definition. Let (N, v, A) be a communication situation. Then the Myerson value
of (N,v,A), u(N,v,A) E RN, (cf. Nfyerson (1977)) is given by
l~(N~v~A) - ~(N~rá)-
Further, the link value of (N, v, A), ~(N, v, A) E RA, and the position value of
(N,v, A), n(N, v, A) E RN, (cf. Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992)) are given by
a(N,v,A) - ~(A,rN)
an d
~~(N,v,`4) - ~ s~a(N,v,A)
aEA,
for all i E N, where A; denotes the set of all communication links in A of which
player i is an end point.
Example 3.1.1 Consider the communication situation (N, v, A), with player set
N -{ 1, 2, 3}, and where v is the unanimity garne u{~,z} and (N, A) is the commu-




The point game (N,rÁ) of this situation is the unanimity game (N,u{i,z}). Hence,
for the Myerson value it holds that p(N, v, A) -( 2 , 2, 0).
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Some calculation shows that, with a :- {1,2}, 6 :- {1,3} and c:- {2,3},
,1o(N, v, A) - 3 and ab(N, v, A) -~~(N, v, A) - s.
So,
a,(N v A) - ~rz(N v A) -' 4 'z's}s
~r3(NvA)-' i~~.~-iz's z s-s~
s-izand
Note that although player 3 is a zero-player in the point game, meaning that
rÁ(S U {3}) - rÁ(S) for all S C N`{3}, he obtains a positive payoff according
to the position value because player 3 can act as an intermediate between players 1
and 2.
Theorem 3.1.2 shows that in order to compute the Myerson value or the position
value of a player it sufiices to consider the communication component containing
this particular player, because both the Myerson value and the position value are
component-decomposable.
~ An allocation rule 7 : CSN --~ RN is component-decomposable if for all communi-
cation situations (N, v, A) E CSN, all C E N~A and all í E C it holds that
7:(N,v,A) -1'~(C,v ~c,A(C)) ,
where v ~~ denotes the restriction of v to C, defined by v ~~ (S) :- v(S) for all
S C C. For convenience we will use the notation (C, v, A) instead of (C, v ~~, A(C)).
Theorem 3.1.2 The Myerson value and the position value are component-decom-
posable.
Proof. We only provide a proof for the Myerson value, and leave it to the reader to
prove component-decomposability for the position value. So, let (N,v,A) E CS~
and C E N~A. Then for all S C IV we have
S~A - ((S n C)~A) u ((S~C)~A) .
Hence, for all i E C and all S C N with i~ S we have
rÁ(S U {zJl - rÁlSl - ~ v(~~ ~ ~ Ul~)
DE((Su{i))nC)~A DE((Su{i})~C)~A
- ~ v(D) - ~ v(D)
DE(SnC)~A DE(S`C)~A
- rA((.S U {2}) Í~ C) - rA(S Í~ C) .
3.1 Myerson value and position value 29
Therefore, using expression ( 3.5) for the Shapley value, we see that for i E C




- ~ ( n~ )(rA((S ÍÏ C) U {1}) - TÁ(S ÍÍ Ci))
SCN: i~S
- ~ ITI!(ICI C~ - ITU! (rá(T U{i}) - rá(T))
TCC: i~T
~i(C,rA Ic) - ~ilC, v, A) f
where the third equality follows from the fact that for all T C C with i~ T
ISI!(n - i - ISI)! - "~~ ~n - ICII (ITI f k)!(n -1- ITI - k)!~ L. 1 ~scN:snc-T n- k-o k n.
ITI!(ICI - I - ITI)!
I~I!
It takes quite some effort to verify the last equality:
Consider the quotient
Q .- ~~ (n - IC11(ITI ~ k)!(n -1- ITI - k)! (ITI!(ICI -1- ITI)!1-' ( . )
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We have to prove that Q- 1. Rearranging the terms in (3.6) and setting c:- ICI
and t:- ITI, we obtain
"-` 1 tfk n-c-kfc-l-t
Q-~(~)( t )( c-I-t ~
Consider (~)Q. This expression equals the coeflicient of the term xn-` in the power
series




` ` (t) (t)
[~ ~t ~ k~ xk - ~I rk[~ xttk~ - it
~k-0 xk~
- I( 1`~t~ I t! I
t! l I -x J - t! (] -x)ttl - (1 -~.)t}1~
where (...) ~t~ denotes the tth derivative.
In a similar way we obtain
~rk~c-l-t~ k 1
I` x -






~t f k~ k~ ~
o"
~~c ~ C- 1-~~ k~ - 1 ~~C } kl k
t ~ ~ C-1-t ~ (1-y)c}1-~. c J~,
where the last equality follows similar to our earlier computation. Now, the co-
efficient of the term x"-` in this last power series equals (~). This proves that
(~)Q -(~) and, hence, Q- 1. ~
With respect to Shapley values of TL~-games it is known (cf. Shapley (1971)) that
the Shapley value of a convex game is a core-element of the game. However, for a
balanced game that is not convex the Shapley value is not necessarily located in the
core. For communication situations we have theorem 3.1.3, which shows that under
the conditions of theorem 2.4.2 and corollary 2.4.5, respectively, the Myerson value
and the position value are core-elements of the point game.
Theorem 3.1.3 Let (N, v, A) be a communication situation where the underlying
game ( N, v) is convex. Then the following two assertions hold:
(i) If the communication graph is cycle-complete, then ~(N, v, A) E C(N, rÁ).
(ii) If the communication graph is cycle-free, then n( N, v, A) E C(N, rA).
Proof. Part ( i) is a direct consequence of theorem 2.4.2 and the fact that the Shapley
value of a convex game is a core-element.
Part ( ii). Suppose (N, A) is cycle-free. According to corollary 2.4.5 the arc game
(A,rN) is convex. Hence,
~(.q,r~,) E C(f1,rN). (3.7)
Next we show that
~(A,rN) ) 0. (3.8)
Clearly, it suffices to prove that rN(L U{a}) - rN(L) ~ 0 for all a E A and all
L C A`{a}. Let a - {i, j} E A and L C A`{a}. Then.
r~,(L U {a}) - r~,(L) ~ rj(,({a}) - rj~,(0) - ti({z, j}) 1 v({i}) f v({j}) - ~,
where the first inequality follows írorn the convexity of (A,r;~,) and the second one
from the superadditivity of ( IV, v).
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Now let S C N. Then, using ( 3.7) and (3.8),
~~~(N'v'A) - ~ L~ i~a(A,rN) ~
~ES iES aEA,




~ ~ilN, v, A) - ~ ~alA, riV) - rrV1A) - rá(N).
iEN aEA
Hence, a(N, v, A) E C(N, rA).
3.2 Axiomatic characterizations
a
This section concentrates on axiomatic characterizations of the allocation rules that
were introduced in the previous section, the Myerson value and the position value.
We introduce some properties for an allocation rule y: CSN -~ RN.
~ Component-e,~ciency: for all (N, v, A) E CSN and all components C E N~A
~ y;(N, v, A) - v(C).
iEC
This means that the allocation rule divides the value of each component among its
members.
~ Fairness: for all (N, v, A) E CSN and {i, j} E A
y;(N,v,A) -ry;(N,v,A`{{i, j}}) - ry~(N,v,A) -ry~(N,v,A`{{i, j}}).
So, according to a fair allocation rule two players loose (or gain) the same amount
when the communication link connecting them is deleted.
~ Balanced contributions: for all (N, v, A) E CSN and i, j E N
-y;(N, v, A) - 7;( N, v, A-; )- 7; (N, v, A) - 7; (N, v, A-; ),
where
A-; :- {a E A ~ i is not an end point of a}.
Hence, the loss that player j can inflict on player i by breaking up all communication
links of which he ( j) is an end point is the same as the loss that i can inflict on j
by undertaking a similar action.
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Two axiomatic characterizations of the Myerson value are provided in theorem 3.2.1.
The first part of this theorem is due to Myerson (1977) and will not be proven here.
Theorem 3.2.1
(i) The Myerson value is the unique allocation rule on CSN that is component-
efficient and fair.
(ii) The Myerson value is the unique allocation rule on CSN that is component-
efficient and has balanced contributions.
Proof of part (ii). Since Myerson (1980) showed that an allocation rule that has
balanced contributions is fair, in view of part ( i) it suffices to show that the Myerson
value has balanced contributions.
Let (N, v, A) E CSN be fixed. Using expression ( 3.5) for the Shapley value we
obtain
p:(N,v,A) - ~,(N,ru) - ~n (~S~ ~ 1)~(~n ~ ~S~)~(rn(S) - rq(S~{i})) (3.9)
scN n.
for all i E N. Now let S C N and í E N. Component-efficiency for ~, the fact that
v is zero-normalized and the fact that A(S`{i}) - A(S)-; imply
rÁ(S) - ~ pk(N,v,A(S)) and rÁ(S~{i}) - ~ ~k(N,v,A(S)-;).
kEN kEN
Using this, we see that expression ( 3.9) implies
{~;(N,v,A) - ~ (ISI - 1)I(~n - ISI)I I ~ F~k(N,v,A(S)) - ~ l~k(N,v,A(S)-:)~
SCN n' `kEN kEN
(3.10)
for all i E N. Fix i, j E N. From (3.10) we derive
l~;(N,v,A)-p;(N,v,A-~) -
~ (~S~ - 1)!(n - ~S~)1 . ~
(F~k(N, v, A(S)) - Frk(N, v, A(S)-~) -i lscN n' kEN
~k(N,v, A-~(s)) ~ ~k(N, v, (A(s)-~)-~)~s.l l )
Since, obviously, A-~(S) - A(S)-~ and (A(S)-~)-; -(A(S)-;)-„ the right-hand
side of (3.11) is symmetric in i and j. So, interchanging i and j we obtain
~; ( N, v, A)-~; (N, v, A-; )-~, ( N, v, A)- u; ( N, v, A-; ).
This proves that the Myerson value has balanced contributions.
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In order to describe the axiomatic characterization of the position value in theo-
rem 3.2.2 we need three more properties of an allocation rule ry : CSN -~ RN.
~ Additivity: for all (N, v, A) E CSN and (N, w, A) E CS~
ry(N, v f w, A) - ry(N, v, A) -}- y(N, w, A).
Hence, when evaluating two communication situations having the same player set
and communication graph, one can add the earnings in the two situations for each
coalition and then compute the outcome of the allocation rule for the new commu-
nication situation.
~ Superftuous arc property: for all (N, v, A) E CSN and all a E A that are superftu-
ous for (N, v, A), i.e. rv(N, L) - rv(N, L`{a}) for all L C A, it holds that
y(N, v, A) - ry(N, v, A`{a}).
This means that an arc whose deletion of a subsystem of ares does not affect the
reward of the grand coalition, can be deleted from the communication situation
without changing the outcome of the allocation rule.
~ Arc anonymity: for all (N, v, A) E CSN that are arc anonymous, i.e. there exists
a function f: {0,1,...,~A~} -~ R with rv(N,L) - f(~L~) for all L C A, it holds
that there exists an a E R such that
rys(N,v,A) - ~. IA~~
for all i E N. Hence, if the worth of the grand coalition only depends on the
number of ares that are present, then the payoffs to the players are proportional to
the number of adjacent ares.
Let CSN denote the subclass of communication situations for which the communi-
cation graphs do not contain cycles. The following theorem is due to Borm, Owen
and Tijs (1992).
Theorem 3.2.2 The position value is the uniyue allocation rule on CS;~ that satis-
fies component-efficiency, additivity, the superfluous arc property and arc anonymity.
Proof Additivity of ~r follows straightforwardly from additivity of the Shapley value
and the fact that for all (N, v, A), and (N, w, A) E CSN it holds that rN~rN - rNw.
To prove component-efficiency of n let (N, v, A) E CSN and C E N~A. then
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(~) L ~a(A(C), rN) (~) rN(A(C)) - v(C) ,
aEA(C)
where equality (1) follows from expression (3.4) for the Shapley value and the fact
that
rn,(G U{a}) - rn,(L) - rn,((L fl A(C)) U {a}) - r~,(L rl A(C))
for all L C A and all a E A(C), and where equality (2) follows from efficiency of the
Shapley value.
Now, let a be a superfluous arc for (N, v, A) E CSN. This arc is a zero-player in
the game (A, r~,) and hence ~a(A, r~,) - 0. From this we see that ~r(N, v, A`{a}) -
n(N, v, A). Hence, a satisfies the superfluous arc property.
Suppose (N, v, A) is arc anonymous and let f : {0, 1, ..., ~A~} -~ R be such that
rN(L) - f(~L~) for all L C A. Because all ares are symmetric in the game (A,r~,)
~a(A,riv) - rN(A) ~ ~A~-i
for all a E A. Hence,
~i`N'v' A) -~ z~a(A, riV) - 2- IAiI ' riV(A) - ~A~-1
aEA,
for all i E N and we can choose a- 2. rN(A) . ~A~-~, which proves that ~r satisfies
arc anonymity.
Now, let ry be an allocation rule on CS;` that also satisfies component-efficiency,
additivity, the superfluous arc property and arc anonymity. We show that ry- n
must hold. Since a and 7 are additive, it suffices to show this for multiples of
unanimity games. So, let (N, v, A) E CS;` be such that v- Qus for some Q E R and
S C N with ~S~ ~ 2. If S is not A-connected, then arc anonymity and component-
efI'iciency of ~r and ry imply -y;(N„Qus, A) - 0 - ~r;(N, ~3us, A) for all i E N.
If S is A-connected, then consider K(S) (cf. (2.1)). Obviously,
rn;`S ( L ) -
~ ,l3 if A(H(S)) c G
0 else
and every arc in A`A(H(S)) is superfluous. Hence, the superfluous arc property
implies y(N,QuS,A) - ry(N,~3uy,A(H(S))). Further, the communication situation
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(N,Qus, A(H(S))) is arc anonymous: with j(0) -... - j(~A(H(S))~ - 1) :- 0 and
f(~A(H(S))~) :- Q, it holds that rNs(L) - f(~L~) for all L C A(H(S)). Therefore,
by arc anonymity of ry, there is an a E R such that
?'~(N,Qus,A(H(S))) - a - IA(H(S)):~




for all i E N. ~
Replacing arc anonymity with point anonymity, an axiomatic characterization à la
theorem 3.2.2 of the Myerson value on the class CS;v can be provided.
~ A communication situation (N, v, A) E CSN is point anonymous if there exists a
function f: {0,1, ... , ~D~} -~ R with rv(S, A) - j(~S fl D~) for all S C N, where
D:-{iEN~~A;~?1} (3.12)
is the set of points that have at least one adjacent arc.
An allocation rule -y : CSN -~ RN satisfies point anonymity if for every point
anonymous communication situation (N, v, A) E CSN there exists an ~ E R such
that
y(N, v, A) - aeo.
Theorem 3.2.3 The Myerson value is the unique allocation rule on CSN that
satisfies component-efficiency, additivity, the superfluous arc property and point
anonymity.
The proof of theorem 3.2.3 is quite similar to the proof of theorem 3.2.2 and can be
found in Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992).
We can get rid of the condition of cycle-freeness in theorem 3.2.3 if we either
strengthen the superfluous arc property or replace it by the superfluous point prop-
erty.
~ An allocation rule ry : CSN -~ RN satisfies the superfluous point property if for
all (N, v, A) E CSN and every point i E N that is superfiuous for (N, v, A), i.e.
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rv(S, A) - rv(S`{i}, A) for all S C N, it holds that the value does not change if all
links that are adjacent to player i are omitted or, in formula,
y(N, v, A) - 7(N, v, A(N~{i})).
~ An allocation rule 7 : CS~` ~ RN satisfies the strong superfiuous arc property if
for all (N, v, A) E CSN and all a E A whose absence does not influence the point
game, i.e. (N, rÁ) -(N, rÁ`{a} ), we have
y(N, v, A) - ry(N, v, A`{a}). (3.13)
Clearly, for a superfluous arc a condition (3.13) is satisfied. However, example 3.2.4
shows that not every are satisfying condition (3.13) is superfluous.
Example 3.2.4 Consider the communication situation (N, v, A), with player set
N- {1,2,3} and where v- u{i,z} and A- {{1,2},{1,3},{2,3}}. Then, with
a:- {2,3} we have rÁ - rÁ`{a} - u{r,z}. However, arc a is not superfluous in this
situation, because with b:- {1, 3}
r~,({a,6}) - v(N) - 1 ~ 0- v({1,3}) ~ v({2}) - r~,({b}).
Part (i) of the following lemma is crucial in the proof of theorem 3.2.6. This lemma
states that for allocation rules satisfying certain properties the value of a communi-
cation situation is determined by the point game or the arc game.
Lemma 3.2.5
(i) Let ry : CSN - a RN be an allocation rule that satisfies component-efficiency,
additivity and point anonymity. Then y(N, v, A) - ry( N, rA, A) for all
(N, v, A) E CSN.
(ii) Let ry : CSN --~ RN be an allocation rule that satisfies component-efficiency,
additivity and arc anonymity. Then for all (N, v, A) and (N, w, A) E CSN
that have the same corresponding arc game, i.e. (A, rN) - (A, rN), it holds
that -y(N, v, A) - ry(N, w, A).
ProoJ. To prove part ( i), let (N, z~, A) E CSN. Then also (N, rÁ, A) E CSN and
the point game (N, p) :- (N, rÁ ) corresponding to this commtmication situation is
(N, rÁ), because for every S C N
P(S) - ~ rn(C) - ~ v(C) - rn(S) .
CES~A CES~A
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Let (N, w) denote the game (N, v- rÁ) and consider the communication situation
(N, w, A) E CSN. The point game (N, rÁ) corresponding to this situation assigns 0
to all S C N, because
ri(S) - rá(S) - P(S) - 0
for all S C N. Hence, (N, w, A) is point anonymous, with J: {0, 1, ... , ~D~} ~ R
defined by f(k) :- 0 for all k E{0,1,..., ~D~}. Now component-efficiency and point
anonymity of ry imply
ry;(N,w,A)-0fora1liEN. (3.14)
Further, additivity of ry implies
ry(N, w, A) - ry(N, v, A) - y(N, rÁ, A). (3.15)
Combining (3.14) and ( 3.15) shows
ry(N, v, A) - ry(N, rÁ, A).
The proof of part (ii) runs along the same lines as the proof of part (i) and therefore
we leave it to the reader. ~
Theorem 3.2.6
(i) The Myerson value is the unique allocation rule on CSN that satisfies compo-
nent-efficiency, additivity, the superfluous point property and point anonymity.
(ii) The Myerson value is the unique allocation rule on CSN that satisfies
component-effiiciency, additivity, the strong superfluous arc property and point
anonymity.
Proof. It follows from theorem 3.2.1 (i) that the Myerson value is component-
efficient. Further, it is easily seen that the Myerson value satisfies additivity and
point anonymity.
We proceed with part (i). To prove the superfluous point property, let i be a super-
fluous point for (N, v, A) E CSN. Then player i is a zero-player in the point game
(N,rÁ) and it follows from expression (3.4) for the 5hapley value that ~;(N,rA) - 0
and ~~(N,rÁ) -~~(N~{i},rÁ ~N~{;}) - I~~(N~{i},v ~N~{;},A(N~{i})) for all
j E N`{i}. By component-decomposability of Ei it follows that for all j E N`{i} we
have~c~(N`{i},v ~N`{;},A(N`{i})) - p~(N,v,A(N`{i})), and component-e(~iciency
of ~ implies that p,(N, v, A(N~{i})) - 0. Hence, p satisfies the superfluous point
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property.
We proceed by proving uniqueness. Let 7 be an allocation rule on CSN that also
satisfies component-efficiency, additivity, the superfluous point property and point
anonymity. We show that -y - p must hold. So, let (N, v, A) E CSN. Then,
according to lemma 3.2.5 (i), 7(N, v, A) - y(.N, rÁ, A). Using (3.1) we see
rÁ - ~ ~,.A(S) us.
sEZN`{0}
Hence, additivity of 7 implies
7(N, rÁ, A) - ~ 7(N, 0.;, ( S) us, A).
sEZN`{e}
Because (N, v) is zero-normalized, it holds that (N, rA) is zero-normalized and, con-
sequently, Or~ ({ i}) - 0 for all i E N. Further, it is not hard to show, using
expression (3.2) and induction to ~S~, that O,Á(S) - 0 for all S C N such that S is
not A(S)-connected. Hence, component-efficiency and point anonymity of 7 imply
that for S E 2N`{0} such that ~S~ - 1 or S is not A(S)-connected
1'~(N, Or~(S) us, A) - 0
for all i E N(see the proof of lemma 3.2.5). Now, let S C N, ~S~ ? 2 be such that S
is A(S)-connected and let Q:- OrA(S). We show that ry(N„Ous,A) - p(N,~3us,A).
Since S is A(.S)-connected, every point in N`S is superftuous. ííence, the superfluous
point property implies
7(N,Qus, A) - 7(N, Qus, A(S)).
Further, the communication situation (N,Qus, A(S)) is point anonymous: Defining
f(0) -... - f(~S~ - 1) :- 0 and f(~S~) :- F3 we have that rA"s(T) - f(~T fl S~) for
all T C N. Therefore, by point anonymity of ry, there is an cr E R such that
7(N,Qus,A(S)) - aes.
Using component-efficiency we see that a- ~S~ must hold and hence
7(N,Qus,fl) - I~les - fi(N,Qus,A).
We proceed with the proof of part (ii). It is irnmediately clear from its definition
that the Myerson value satisfies the strong superfluous arc property. Now, let y
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be an allocation rule on CSN that satisfies component-efficiency, additivity, the
strong superfluous arc property and point anonymity. Instead of proving directly
that ry- ~, we will prove that ry necessarily satisfies the superfluous point property.
Together with part (i) of this theorem this implies that ry-~. So, let i be a super-
fluous point for (N,v, A) E CSN. Hence, rv(S, A) - rv(S`{i}, A) for all S C N. Let
a E A; and consider (N, rÁ`{a}). Take S C N. We distinguish between two cases. If
S~(A`{a}) - S~A, then, obviously, rá`{a}(S) - rÁ(S). Suppose S~(A`{a}) ~ S~A,
then with a- {i, j} we have that S~(A`{a}) -{C E S~A ~ í~ C} U{C;, C~},
where C; (C~) denotes the unique component of S~(A`{a}) containing player i(j).
For all components C of S~(A`{a}) other than C; we know that
v(C) - rÁ(C). (3.16)
Further, since j~ C; we have
v(C;) - rá(C;) - rÁ(C;~{i}) , (3.17)
where the last equality follows from the fact that i is a superfluous point. From (3.16)
and (3.17) we derive rÁ`{a}(S) - rÁ(S`{i}). Using the fact that i is a superfluous
point we see that this last term equals rA(S).
We proved that (N, rá`{a}) -(N, rA). Using the strong superfluous arc property this
implies that ry(N, v, A) - y(N, v, A`{a}). Of course we can repeat this operation
and eliminate all ares in A; one by one. This results in y(N,v, A) - ry(N,v, A`A;).
Noting that A`A; - A(N`{i}), this proves that the allocation rule ry satisfies the
superfluous point property. 0
Unfortunately, it is not possible to prove along the lines of the proof of theo-
rem 3.2.6 that the position value is characterized axiomatically on the class CSN by
component-efficiency, additivity, the superfluous arc property and arc anonymity. It
is still an open problem how to characterize the position value or the link value for
the class CSN of all communication situations. It would also be interesting to find
an axiomatic characterization of the position value on the class of communication
situations (N, v, A) where there are no communication restrictions at all, i.e. for
which A-{{i, j} E 2~ ~ i~ j}, because this class corresponds to the class of
all (zero-normalized) TU-games. Maybe one of the axiomatic characterizations we
provided for the Myerson value can be helpful in combination with the following re-
lation which formally describes the dual character of the link value and the Myerson
value.
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Proposition 3.2.7 Let (N, v, A) E CSN and denote by (A, M) the line graph of
(N, A), i.e. for a, 6 E A with a~ b we have {a, b} E M if and only if there is a
player i E N such that {a, b} C A;. Then
a(N, v, A) - p(A, r~,, M).
Proof. Clearly, it suffices to prove that the arc game (A,r~,) corresponding to
(N, v, A) and the point game (A, p) :- (A, r;y ) corresponding to (A, rN, M) are
identical. Let L C A, L~ 0. Then, with N(L) :- {i E N ~ A; fl L~ 0},
p(L) - ~ rN(!C) - ~ ~ v(C) - ~ v(N(If)) , (3.18)
KEL~M KEL~Af CEN~h" h"EL~M
where the last equality follows from the fact that ( N( If ), If ) is connected if
(K, M(K)) is connected. Since the function f: L~M ~{C E N~L ~ ~C~ 1 2}
defined by f(K) :- N(lí) for all lí E L~M, is a bijection, ( 3.18) equals
~ v(C) - rN(L)
CEN~L
and the proposition is proved. O
3.3 Logical independences
In the previous section we provided several axiomatic characterizations of the Myer-
son value and the position value. A natural question that arises is whether we really
need all the axioms that we used in the characterizations. Van den Nouweland,
Borm and Tijs (1992) proved that the four axioms in the characterization of the
position value in theorem 3.2.2 are logically independent. In doing so, they found
out that an arc anonymous communication situation that has a superfluous arc nec-
essarily has an arc game that assigns zero to every subset of ares. In this section
we will prove that the four axioms in the characterization of the Myerson value in
theorem 3.2.3 are logically independent. Along the way we will encounter some nice
results such as lemmas 3.3.2 and 3.3.5, which are of interest in itself. Further, we will
consider the allocation rule that divides the worth of a communication component
equally among its members.
In the sequel we provide for each of the four properties component-efficiency, addi-
tivity, the superfluous arc property and point anonymity, an allocation rule on CSN
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that does not satisfy this particular property but does satisfy the remaining three
properties.
The irredundancy of component-efficiency follows immediately by considering the
allocation rule that assigns zero to every player in every communication situation.
Further, since the position value satisfies component-efI'iciency, additivity and the
superfluous arc property, the irredundancy of point anonymity follows from the next
example.
Example 3.3.1 Consider the communication situation (N, v, A) E CS;', where
N- {1,2,3}, v is the unanimity game u{i,z} and A- {{1,3},{2,3}}. Some
calculation shows that p(N,v,A) -(3, 3, á), whereas ~r(N,v,A) -(4, 4, 2).
To show the irredundancy of the superfluous arc property we define a new allocation
rule p that for each communication situation divides the worth of a communica.tion
component equally among its members. In formula, for all ( N, v, A) E CSN and
iEN
P;(N, v, A) :- v(C;) - ~C.~-',
where C; is the unique component of (N, A) that contains player i. In order to prove
that p satisfies point anonymity we need the following result.
Lemma 3.3.2 Let (N, v, A) E CSN be a point anonymous communication situa-
tion. Then there exists an a E R such that for all C E N~A with ~C~ ~ 2
rv(C, A) - a - ~C~. (3.19)
Proof Let f: {0,1,..., ~D~} ~ R be such that rv(S, A) - f(~Sfl D~) for all S C N,
where D is as in ( 3.12). If there is exactly one component C such that ~C~ 1 2,
then we simply define a:- v(C) . ~C~-~. Now suppose CI and C2 are two different
components of (N,A) such that ~C~~ ~ 2 and ~C2~ ~ 2 and let c:- ~Cl~. Let
k E { 1, ..., c} and S C Cl be such that ~S~ - k- 1. Then, with i E C2 we have
f(k - 1) f f(1) f(ISI ) -~ I(I{i}~) - rv(S ,A) f rv ({i},A)
rv(SU {i},A) - f(~SU {i}~) - f(k).
Since k E { 1, ..., c} was arbitrary, we see that f(k) - f(k - 1) f f(1) for all
k E{1, ..., c} and it follows with induction that f (c) - c. f(1). Because C~ and CZ
are arbitrary this implies
rv(C, A) - Í(1) ' ~C~
for all C E N~A with ~C~ ~ 2. ~
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Theorem 3.3.3 The allocation rule p : CSN ~ RN satisfies additivity, component-
efl'iciency and point anonymity.
Proof. Additivity and component-efficiency follow immediately from the definition.
Now let (N, v, A) E CSN be point anonymous and let o E R be as in ( 3.19). For
i E D we have
P;(N,v, A) - v(C;) ~ IC~I-' - rv(C;, A) ~ ~C;~-' -~
and for i E N`D we have
p;(N, v, A) - v({i}) - 0.
Hence, p satisfies point anonymity. O
The following example shows that the allocation rule p does not satisfy the super-
fluous arc property.
Example 3.3.4 Consider the communication situation (N, v, A) E CS;~, where
N- {1,2,3}, v- u{i,2} and A- {{1,2},{1,3}}. Then p(N,v,A) -(i,i ~)3 3 3
We calculate p(N, v, A) - ( z, 2, 0). Since p(N, v, A) ~ p(N, v, A), in view of theo-
rem 3.2.3 p cannot satisfy the superfluous arc property.
However, in view of lemma 3.3.2, component-efFiciency and point anonymity for
p and p imply that p and p coincide for point anonymous communication situa-
tions. Further, theorem 3.2.6 and example 3.3.4 imply that p cannot satisfy the
superfluous point property or the strong superfluous arc property. Together with
theorem 3.3.3 this shows the irredundancy of the superfluous point property and
the strong superfluous arc property in theorem 3.2.6.
It takes quite some effort to prove the irredundancy of the additivity property. We
start by exploring superfluous ares.
Lemma 3.3.5 Let (N, v, A) E CSN be point anonymous and let a E A be super-
fluous for (N, v, A). Then (N, v, A`{a}) is point anonymous too.
Proof. To avoid misunderstanding we introduce DA :- {i E N ~ A, ~ 0} and
Dn~{a} -- {i E N ~(A~{a}); ~ 0}. Let J: {0,1,...,~DA~} -~ R be such that
rv(S,A) - f(~S n DA~) for all S C N. We distinguish between two cases. If
DA - DA`{a}, then for all S C N
rv(S, A`{a}) - r~(S, A) - j(~S n D,~~) - j(~S n Da`{a}~)
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and (N,v,A`{a}) is point anonymous.
Suppose DA`{a} ~r DA. Let i E DA`DA`{Q} and let k E { 1, .. ., ~DAI - 1} and
S C DA`{i} with IS~ - k. Then
f(k t 1) - f(~S n DA~ f 1) - f(~(S U{i}) n D,,~) - rv(S U{i}, A)
- rv(S U{i}, A`{a}) - rv(S, A`{a}) f v({i})
- rv(S, A`{a}) - rv(S, A) - 1(IS n DAI )-.f (k)-
It now follows with induction that f(k) - f(1) for all k E {1,...,IDA1}. Since
(N,v) is zero-normalized, we know f(1) - rv({i},A) - 0(i E N). Hence,
rv(S, A`{a}) - rv(S, A) - 0 for all S C N and (N, v, A`{a}) is surely point anony-
mous. 0
For all (N, v, A) E CSN we define
A' :- {a E A ~ a is not superfluous for (N, v, A)}.
Lemma 3.3.6 Let (N, v, A) E CSN have a superfluous arc a, then A' -(A`{a})'.
Proof. Suppose b E A`{a} is superfluous for (N, v, A`{a}). Then, for all L C A`{a}
rv(N, L U {a}) - rv(N, L) - rv(N, L`{b}) - rv(N, (L`{b}) U{a}) ,
which implies that b is superfluous for (N,v,A). Hence, A' C(A`{a})'. It is
straightforward to verify that every arc (~ a) that is superfluous for (N, v, A) is also
superfluous for (N,v,A`{a}). Thus, (A`{a})' - A'. ~
To show the irredundancy of the additivity property we define the allocation rule Q
as follows. For all (N, v, A) E CSN
p(N, v, A) if (N, v, A) is point anonymous
o(N, v, A) :-
p(N, v, A') else.
Theorem 3.3.7 The allocation rule o : CSN -~ RN satisfies component-efficiency,
the superfluous arc property and point anonymity.
Proof. To prove component-efficiency, let (N, v, A) E CSN and C E N~A be fixed.
If (N, v, A) is point anonymous, then component-efficiency for p implies
~ a;(N, v, A) - v(C).
~EC
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If (N, v, A) is not point anonymous, we have to consider (N, v, A'). Note that N~A'
is a finer partition than N~A. Hence, there are k E N and Cl, ..., Ck E N~A' such
that {Cl, ..., Ck} is a partition of C. Now
k k
~~;(N,v,A) - ~ ~ p;(N,v,A') - ~v(C;) - ~ v(T)
iEC j-1 iEC~ j-1 TEN~A': TCC
- ~ v(T) - rv(N, A'(C)) - rv(N, A(C)) - v(C).
TEN~A'(C)
To prove point anonymity for o, first note that p(N, v, A) - p(N, v, A) - v(N, v, A)
for each point anonymous communication situation (N, v, A). From point anonymity
for ~c it now follows that o satisfies point anonymity.
To prove the superfluous arc property let (N, v, A) E CSN have a superfluous arc
a. If (N,v,A) is point anonymous and there are either none or at least two com-
ponents C E N~A with ~C~ ~ 2, then rv(S,A) - 0 for all S C N ( see the proof
of lemma 3.3.2) and o(N, v, A`{a}) - 0- a(N, v, A). Suppose (N, v, A) is point
anonymous and there is a unique component C E N~A with ~C~ ~ 2. According
to lemma 3.3.5 ( N, v, A` {a} ) is point anonymous too. Moreover, if DA`{a} ~r DA
the second part of the proof of lemma 3.3.5 irnplies rv(S, A) - 0 for all S C N and
o(N, v, A`{a}) - 0- Q(N, v, A). If DA`{a} - DA, then either C E N~(A`{a}) or
there are Cr,C2 E N~(A`{a}) with ~Cl~ 1 2 and ~C2~ ~ 2 such that C- Cl U C2.
In the first case N~(A`{a}) - N~A and
v;(N,v,A`{a}) - p;(N,v,A`{a}) - v(C;). ~C;~-' - p;(N,v,A) - o;(N,v,A)
foralliEN.
In the second case, by lemma 3.3.2 we know
r~(Cr, A) ' ~Cr~-1 - rv(Cz, A) ' ~Cs~-r.
v(C) - rv(C,A) - rv(C,A`{a}) - v(Cl) f v(CZ).
v(C) ' ~C~-' - v(Cr) ' ~Cr ~-' - v(Cs) ' ~Cz~-~
and, consequently, o(N, v, A~{a}) - Q(N, v, A).
Now, suppose (N, v, A) is not point anonymous. We distinguish between two cases.
If (N, v, A`{a}) is not point anonymous, then lemma 3.3.6 irnplies
Also,
Hence,
o(N,v,A~{a}) - p(N,v,(A~{a})') - p(N,v,A') - o(N,v,A).
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If (N, v, A`{a}) is point anonymous, then by lemma 3.3.5 (N, v, A') is point anony-
mous too and
v(N,v,A`{a}) - p(N,v,A`{a}) - }r(N,v,A`{a}) l~l p(N,v,A')
- p(N,v,A')-o(N,v,A'),
where equality (1) follows from the fact that the Myerson value satisfies the super-
fluous arc property. O
The allocation rule v does not satisfy additivity, as is shown in the next example.
Example 3.3.8 Consider the communication situation (N, v, A) E CS;v, where
N- { 1, 2, 3, 4}, v- u{i,z} f u{z,s} and (N, A) is the graph that is shown in figure 3.2.
3
Figure 3.2
The communication situation (N,v,A) is not point anonymous since
rv({1,3,4},A) - 0 ~ 1 - ru({1,2,4},A).
It is easy to check that (N, v, A) does not have a superfluous arc. Hence,
~(N, v, A) - P(N, v, A~) - P(N, v, A) - ( z, z, z, z).
On the other hand,
~(N, u{i,s}, A) - P(N, u{i,z}, A~ {{3, 4}})-( 3, 3, fl, 3)
an d
o( N, u{ss}, A) - P(N, u{ss}, A` {{ 1, 4}})-(0, 3 , á, 3).
The sum of these two is (3, 3, 3, 3) ~ v(N,v, A).
We conclude this section with the remark that none of the axioms in theorem 3.2.1
are redundant. Further, although it follows frorn what we did above that component-
efficiency, the superfluous point property and the strong superHuous arc property
are irredundant in the characterizations of p in theorem 3.2.6 (i) and (ii), it is not
yet known whether additivity and point anonymity are irredundant.
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3.4 Alternatives
In the previous sections we concentrated on the Shapley values of two different
types of communication games, point games and arc games. Of course one could
also consider other game theoretic solution concepts. Potters and Reijnierse (1992)
considered the core, the bargaining set, the kernel and the nucleolus for commu-
nication situations where the communication graph is a tree. In this section we
will shed some light on the r-value. Also, we will consider a third type of com-
munication games which is some kind of mixture of point games and arc games
and in which the communicative strengths of players and communication ]inks are
evaluated simultaneously.
Definition. For (N, v, A) E CSN, the TU-game (N U A, w) is given by
w(S U L) :- ~ v(C)
CES~L




The allocation rule ó is an attempt to find a compromise between the two extremes
~ and ~r: Instead of putting all the weight on the players and the communication
links respectively, both are evaluat.ed simultaneously now. It can be shown that if
the underlying game is a unanimity game and the underlying communication graph
is a tree, ó is a convex combination of the Myerson value ~ and the position value a.
Proposition 3.4.1 If (N, A) is a tree, then it holds for each S C N with ~S~ ? 2
that
ó(N,us,A) - as~(N,us,A) f (1 - c~s)l~(N,TIS,A) ,
where
aS - (21A(H(s))I ~- I)-' IA(H(s))I.
Pmoj. Noting that ~H(S)~ - ~A(H(S))~ f 1, it. readily follows that




~(1 f zIA; ~ A(H(s))I) (21A(H(S))I f 1)-' if i E H(s)
b;(N, us, A) -
0 if i E N`H(S).
Of course, similar expressions can be found for p(N, us, A) and ~(N, us, A), namely
!~í(N, us, A) -
and
~ ~H(S)~-' if i E H(S)
0 if i E N`H(S)
~A~f1A(H~S))~ jf Z E H(S)
~í(N, uS, A) -
2IA(N(S))I
0 if i E N`H(S).
Using these expressions, the proposition is easily proved. ~
Clearly, since b satisfies additivity and the weight as depends on S, proposition 3.4.1
cannot be generalized towards general TU-games, Moreover, the following example
shows that the result cannot be extended to communication graphs with cycles
either.
Example 3.4.2 Let N- { 1, 2, 3} and consider the unanimity game ut~,2}. If there





~(N, u{~.z}, A) -~(N, u{~,s}) -( 2, 2, fl)
s s z
~(N, u(i,z}, A) - ( iz~ i~~ ~z)
~ ~ i
b(N, u{i,s}, A) -( is ~ is ~ is ).
Hence, b is not a convex combination of p and ~r.
It is not difficult to provide an axiomatic characterization of the allocation rule
b restricted to the class CSN à la theorem 3.2.2 and theorem 3.2.3: Component-
efficiency, additivity and the superfluous arc property still apply and the fourth
axiom is some mixture of point anonymity and arc anonymity.
Now, let us consider the r-value. The r-value (cf. Tijs (1981)) is a single-valued
solution concept that is defined for the class of quasi-balanced games. In order to
introduce this class of games we first provide some additional notions.
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Let (N, v) be a TU-game. Then the most player i can expect to get in this game is
his utopia payoff M;(N, v) defined by
M;(N,v) - v(N) - v(N`{i}) ,
because the players in N`{i} would be better off without player i if this player were
to get more than M;(N, v). With the aid of these utopia payoffs we can define a
lower bound for the payoff that a player i can expect to get. Let S C N be a
coalition of which player i is a member. Then player i can offer the players in S`{i}
to pay them their utopia payoff and claim the remainder R„(S, i), given by
R„(S,i) :- v(S) - ~ M~(N,v).
7ES`{i}
Now player i can choose a coalition which leaves him the largest possible remainder,
namely
m;(N,v) :- max R„(S,i) ,
SCN: iES
which is called the minimal right of player i. Note that m;(N,v) 1 v({i}) for all
iEN.
The class of quasi-balanced games is defined using utopia payoffs and minimal rights
in the following way.
Definition. A TU-game (N, v) is quasi-balanced if the following three assertions
hold:
(i) For each player the utopia payoff is at least the minimal right.
(ii) The sum of all minimal rights of the players does not exceed v(N).
(iii) The sum of all utopia payoffs of the players is at least v(N).
In the following definition it will become clear why the r-value is only defined for
quasi-balanced games.
Definition. The T-value assigns to a quasi-balanced game (N, v) the unique efficient
compromise between the vector of minimal rights and the vector of utopia payoffs.
In formula,
r(N,v) - a„m(N,v) -} (1 -a„)M(N,v) ,
where ~„ E[0, 1~ is such that
a„~ m;(N,v) ~(1 - a„) ~ M;(N,v) - v(N).
iEN iEN
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Hence, cr„ - 0 if m(N, v) - M(N, v) and otherwise
v(N) - ~iEN ~1i(N, y)
av - ( (
~iENmilN,v) - ~iEN MiINrT~)
To define an allocation rule for communication situations that is based on the
r-value, we could simply consider the r-value of the corresponding point game for
situations where this makes sense, i.e. for communication situations where the corre-
sponding point game is quasi-balanced. Example 3.4.3 shows that such an allocation
rule violates component-efficiency.
Example 3.4.3 Consider the communication situation (N,v,A) with player set




It is easily seen that for each player i it holds that
M;(N, rq) - rÁ(N) - rA(N~{i}) - 2- 1 - 1.
Further, since the utopia payoffs are relatively large, for each player the remainder
is maximal in the coalition that only contains this player, i.e. for each i E N we
have mi(N,rÁ) - rÁ({i}) - 0. Noting that rÁ(N) - 2, we see
r N rv 3m N rv f?M N, rv ) z z z z z( ~ q) - 5 ( i A) g ( q-(5~ gi 5~ Si g)~
Hence, some of the worth 1 oí the component { 1, 2} is shifted to the players in the
component {3,4,5}.
Since component-efficiency is an axiom we want to hang on to, the following defini-
tion seems more reasonable.
Definition. Let (N,v,A) be a communication situation such that for every com-
ponent C E N~A the game (C,rÁ ~c) is quasi-balanced. Here, (C,rÁ ~c) denotes
the restriction of rA to C, defined by rÁ ~c (S) :- rÁ(S) for all S C C. Then
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the communication r-value assigns to each player i E N his r-value in the game
(C;, rÁ ~c,), where C; denotes the unique component of (N, A) containing player i.
In formula, for each i E N
vr,(N,v,A) :- r;(C„rA c~).
Clearly, efficiency of the r-value implies that the communication r-value is
component-efficient. An axiomatic characterization of the communication r-value à
la Tijs (1987) can be provided by adapting the restricted proportionality property
and the minimal right property in such a way that they also apply to communication
components. Related work was done by Driessen and Tijs (1990), who defined and
characterized the r-value for games with coalition structures.
In section 2.3 we encountered a class of communication situatons for which the
conditions that all games (C,rA ~c), C E N~A, are quasi-balanced are satisfied.
Theorem 3.4.4 Let (N, v, A) be a communication situation where the underlying
game (N, v) is totally balanced. Then for every component C E N~A the game
(C, rÁ ~c) is quasi-balanced.
Proof. According to theorem 2.3.3 (ii), the point game (N,rA) is totally balanced.
Hence, for every C E N~A it holds that the game ( C,rÁ ~c) is balanced. Since
Tijs ( 1981) proved that a balanced game is quasi-balanced, we see that the games
(C, rÁ ~c), C E N~A, are quasi-balanced. ~
Chapter 4
Calculation methods
The calculation of the Myerson value and the position value can be rather complex
and tedious. For some special classes of communication situations, however, elegant
calculation methods can be provided. These calculation methods are based on gen-
erating functions and they strongly depend on relations between the dividends of
the underlying game and the dividends of the corresponding point game and arc
game of a particular communication situation.
In section 4.1 relations between dividends are explained and these relations are
shown to lead to nice explicit formulas for the Myerson value and the position value
in situations where the communication graph is cycle-íree and the underlying game
is a quadratic measure game or a pure overhead game. This section is based on
Owen (1986) and Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992). In section 4.2, which is based on
van den Nouweland, Borm, Owen and Tijs (1991), integral formulas are derived for
the computation of the Myerson value and the position value in situatíons where
the communication graph is cycle-free and the underlying game is a pure overhead
game.
4.1 Relations between dividends
Let (N, v, A) be a communication situation. For the definition of the dividends
~„(S) of the underlying game and the dividends D,Á(S) of the point game we refer
to (3.1) and ( 3.2). Analogously, the arc game ( A,rN) can be expressed as a linear





for all L E 2A`{0}.
riv - ~ ~.N(L) uL ,
LE2~`(0}
OrN(L) - ~ (-I)~L~-~h~ TN(K)
tiCL
Relations between the dividends of the underlying game and those of the two asso-
ciated communication games are described in the next theorem.
Theorem 4.1.1 Let (N, v, A) E CSN. Then the following two assertions hold:
(i) If the communication graph ( N, A) is cycle-complete, then with respect to the
dividends of the point game we have for all S E 2N`{~}
Or;,(S) - ~ Ov(T) ,
TEE(S)
where (cf. (2.1))
E(S) :- {T E 2N`{0} ~ H(T) - S}
is the set of all coalitions whose connected hull is S.
(ii) If the communication graph (N, A) is cycle-free, then with respect to the divi-
dends of the arc game we have for all L E 2A`{~}
O~N(L) - ~ Ov(S) ,
SEA(L)
where
A(L) :- {S E 2N~{0} ~ L- A(H(S))}
is the set of all coalitions that need exactly all ares in L in order to be able to
communicate.
ProoJ. We only provide a proof of part (i). Suppose (N, A) is cycle-complete.
Instead of using the definition of the dividends 0,~(S), we will use the fact that the
representation of a game as a linear combinat,ion of unanimity games is unique.
We first consider unanimity games. So, let T E 2N`{~} be fixed and consider
(N, uT, A). If T is not A-connected, then rAT (S) - 0 for all S C N. Further, if T is
A-connected,then
~ 1 if H(T) C S
j'AT ( S) -
0 else.
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To simplify this proof, we introduce the notation N(T) :- 0 if T is not A-connected.
Further, we define the game (N, ue) by ug(S) :- 0 for all S C N. With these
notations we have
rAT - uH(T) for all T C N.
Now, note that the map that assigns to a game (N,v) the corresponding point game
(N,rÁ), is a linear map (see e.g. Owen (1986)). Hence, for a game (N,v)
v - ~ Ov(T ) uT
TCN
leads to
rÁ -~ ~v(T) rnT -~ Dv(T) 7LH(T) -~ ~ Dv(T) TLS .
TCN TCN SCN TEE(S)
Hence,
~r;,(S) - ~ 0„(T)
TE~(S)
for all S C N. o
For cycle-free graphs the sets E(S), S E 2N`{0}, and A(L), L E 2A`{0}, can be
characterized by means of extreme points. Here, for a connected graph (N, A) the
set Ext(N, A) of eztreme points of (N, A) is defined by
Ext(N,A) :- {i E N ~ ~A;~ - 1}.
Lemma 4.1.2 Let (N, A) be a cycle-free (communication) graph. Then the follow-
ing two assertions hold:
(i) For all S E 2"``{0}
E(S) -
~{T C S ~ Ext(S, A(S)) C T} if (S, A(S)) is connected
0 Ie se.
(ii) For all L E 2A`{l~}
A(L) -
r{S C N(L) ~ Ext(N(L), L) C S} if (N(L), L) is connected
Sl 0 else,
where N(L) :- {i E N ~ A; n L~ 0} is the set of all players that correspond
to an end point of an arc in L.
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Proof. (i) follows straightforward from the fact that (N, A) is cycle-free. To prove
(ii), let L E 2A`{0} be fixed. It is immediately clear that A(L) -~ if (N(L), L)
is not connected. So, suppose that (N(L), L) is connected. Now, if S E 2~~{~}
is such that Ext(N(L), L) c S c N(L), then H(S) - H(Ext(N(L), L)) - N(L).
Moreover, since (N, A) is cycle-free, it holds that A(N(L)) - L. Hence, we conclude
that S E A(L).
To prove the other inclusion, let S E A(L). Then it is immediately clear that
N(L) C H(S). Moreover, since (H(S), A(H(S))) is trivially connected, it must
hold that H(S) C N(L). Hence, H(S) - N(L) and Ext(N(L), L) C S C N(L).
This concludes the proof of part (ii). ~
The formulas in theorem 4.1.1 and lemma 4.1.2 can be used to obtain the results
for unanimity games we already encountered in the proof of proposition 3.4.1. We
consider two more special classes of games for which the formulas lead to nice ex-
pressions for the Myerson value and the position value. For convenience we will
restrict ourselves to connected graphs.
Quadratic measure games. Let w -(wl, ..., w„ ) be a non-negative (weight)
vector. The quadratic measure game (N,qW) corresponding to w(cf. Owen (1986))
is defined by
9~,(S) :- (~wi)2 - ~w? - ~ 2w;wj
iES iES {i,j}CS,i~j
for all S E 2N`{~}. Hence, in a quadratic measure game the worth of a coalition
is determined by the worths of its two-person subcoalitions. Using theorem 4.1.1,
lemma 4.1.2 and expression ( 3.3) for the Shapley value, one can show the next result.





where the sum is taken over all pairs { j, k} C N, j~ k, such that i lies on the
path from j to k. Note that ~H({j,k})~ is the number of nodes on the path
from j to k.
(ii) For the link value of an arc a E A it holds that
~a(N, 4W, A) - 2 ~
~`'jwk
~A(H({j,k}))~ '
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where the sum is taken over all pairs { j, k} C N, j ~ k, such that a is an arc
in the path from j to k. Notè that ~A(H({j, k}))~ is the number of ares in the
path from j to k.
The computations of the formulas provided in proposition 4.1.3 can be readily carried
out using genemting jurzctíons, cf. Owen (1986) and Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992).
Pure overhead games. Consider a group N of economic agents who all want to
make use of some machines or facilities. If these agents cooperate they can possibly
share and thus save costs. For example, suppose three agents want to read the same
newspaper. Instead of each buying the newspaper they can buy just one and share
it, hence saving the costs of two newspapers. It was shown by van den Nouweland,
Borm, Owen and Tijs (1991) that this kind of situations give rise to cost games
(N, c) that are non-negative linear combinations of dual unanimity games (N, u;y),




Here, the set M is to be interpreted as the set of players who demand a specific
machine or facility.
The cost savings game corresponding to (N,u1N) is the pure overhead game (N,p,y)




The interpretation is clear: if no players demanding the machine are present, then
no cost savings can be obtained, and if for example there are four players in S
demanding the machine, then they can save the costs of three machines.
For pure overhead games theorem 4.1.1 and lemma 4.1.2 lead to the next result.
Proposition 4.1.4 Let (N, p,y, A) E CS;'. Then the following two assertions hold
(i) ForalliEN
(-1)~SnM~
p, ,PM, - ~S~ ,
where the sum is taken over all coalitions S with i E S and ~S~ ~ 2 such that
(S, A(S)) is a connected (sub)graph with Ext(S, A(S)) - S n M.
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(ii) For the link value of an arc a E A it holds that
~ (NPM A)-~
(-1)~N(L)nM~
a , , ILI ,
where the sum is taken over all L C A with a E L such that (N(L), L) is a
connected ( sub)graph with Ext(N(L), L) - N(L) fl M.
The formulas in proposition 4.1.4 can be computed by means of integral formulas.
These integral formulas are derived in the next section.
4.2 Calculation methods
In this section we derive integral formulas for the computations of the Myerson value
and the position value of communication situations where the underlying games are
pure overhead games and the communication graphs are trees.
Consider a fixed communication situation (N, piy, A) where ~N~ ~ 2 and (N, A) is
a cycle-free connected graph.
Recall that for all i E N
(-1)~SnM~
~i(N,PM,A) - ~ IS,I ,
SEE(A,M): iES
where
E(A, M) :- {S C N ~(S, A(S)) is connected, ~S~ ~ 2 and Ext(S, A(S)) - S fl M}.
In order to apply (4.1) we have to find all elements in E(A, M) containing a player i.
This can be done in the following way.
Let i E N and let A; :- {{i,i(1)},...,{i,i(t)}}. Clearly, since (N,A) does not con-
tain a cycle, the partition N~(A`A;) contains t distinct components C(1),...,C(t)
with i(k) E C(k) for all k E{ 1, ..., t}. For each k E{1, ..., t} we define a connected
subgraph (T(k), A(T(k))) of (C(k), A(C(k))) by
T(k) :- U {H({i(k), j}) I IH({i(k),7}) n M~ - 1}. (42)
~EMnC(k)
So, in particular, T(k) -~ if C(k) fl M- 0, T(k) -{i(k)} if i(k) E M and in all
other cases Ext(T(k), A(T(k)))`{i(k)} - T(k) fl M.
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In deriving a generating function (cf. Owen ( 1972)) for the Myerson value we assume
that each player has a probability x to be 'active' or 'operational' and we compute
for each subgraph (T(k), A(T(k))) the probability Pk(x) that at least one of the
players in Mf1T(k) can actually interact with player i. Using the inclusion-exclusion
principle this probability Pk(x) is given by
pk(x) - ~ (
-1)Isftlx~x(su{;(k)})~ (4.3)
SC(T(k)nM), S~8
for all k E {1,... , t}. Note that Pk(x) - 0 if T(k) (1 M - 0. The expected marginal
contribution of player i when linking up the components C(1), ..., C(t) is described
by the generating junction 9;(x), where
~k-1 Pk(x) if i E M
Bi(x) ~- C~ T~
L.r-2 ~xc{t,...,t},fx~-.(-I)T 11kEK Pk(x) if i ~ M.
In particular we have that Bi(x) - 0 if i ~ M and t- 1.
Theorem 4.2.1 Let (N,A) be a tree with ~N~ ) 2. Then for all M E 2N`{0},
1
pi(N,PM,A) - f Bi(x)dx (4-5)
0
for all i E N, where B;(x) is defined as in (4.4).
Proof. Let i E M. Then
i ~ 1







~ SC(TÍk~ ),S~e ~H(S lJ {t(k)})~ f I
Note that, since i E M, for each k E { 1, ..., t} a coalition S C T(k) fl M with
S~~ uniyuely determines a set T- H( S U{i}) E r(A, M), which satisfies
Ext(T,A(T))~{i} - S. }íence, (4.6) equals
~ ( - I )ISnM~
(4.7)
k-1 SEEk(A,M):iES ISI '
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where Ek(A,M) :- {S E E(A,M) ~ S C(T(k) U{i})} for all k E{1,...,t}.
The fact that i E M implies that for all S E E(A, M) with i E S there is a




Let i E N`M. First note that we may assume that ~{k E{1,..., t}~ T(k) ~~}~ ~ 2,
for otherwise B;(x) - 0 and {S E E(A, M) ~ i E S} - 0, so trivially (4.5) is satisfied.
Since for all K C{1,...,t} with ~Ií~ 1 2
Tj pk(x) - TT ! ~` (-1)~S~t1x~H(Su{i(k)})~)
k1ElK k1E1KlSC(T(kL)n~M):S~O
- [~ ( jT (-1)~S(k)~}1x~H(S(k)u{i(k)})~)
L.~ 11 r
(S(k))kEh.Er(K) kEK





~ (-1 )LkElí (~S(k)~f1)
~ ~ (-1)r ~ H S k k.-~xc{i,...,~},Ixl-r (s(k))kEKEr(F")






r-2 KC{1....,E}~ IKI-r (S(k))kEh.Er(k)
Since i~ M, for each !í C{ 1, ..., t} with ~Ií ~) 2 a set (S(k))kEK E I'(Ií) uniquely
determines a set T- H( ~J S(k)) E E(A, M) satisfying Ext(T, A(T)) - ~J S(k)
kEK kEK
and i E T. Hence, (4.8) equals
[~ ( -1)~SnM~
J~ ~~,~ - hi(N,PM,A).
SEE(A,M): iES
O
We illustrate the actual computation of the Myerson value in the next example.
Example 4.2.2 Let N- { 1, ..., 10} and M- { 1, 3, 4, 7, 10}. The graph (N, A) is
represented in figure 4.1, where the points in lf1 are circled.




Consider player 2~ M. Following (4.2) we obtain four subgraphs corresponding to
T(1) -{1}, T(2) -{3}, T(3) - 0 and T(4) -{6,7,8,10}. The corresponding
polynomials (cf. (4.3)) are Pl(x) - PZ(x) - x, P3(x) - 0 and P4(x) - x2 ~ x3 - x4.
Hence, according to (4.4),
e2(x) - P,(x)P2(x) f P,(x)PQ(x) ~ P2(x)P,(x) - P,(x)Pz(x)P,(x) -
~
x2 ~- 2x3 f x4 - 3x5 ~- xs. So, las(N,PM, A) - f Bs(x)dx - ós.0
Now consider player 3 E M. We obtain two subgraphs corresponding to T(1) -{4}
and T(2) -{1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10}. The corresponding polynomials are Pl(x) - x and
Pz(x) - xz -} xs -~ xa - xa - xs - xs ~ xs - xz f x3 - 2xs -}- xs So, according to (4.4),
i
B3(x) - Pl(x) f P2(x) - x~- x~ } x3 - 2x5 f xs and ~3(lV,PM, A) - f 9s(x)áx -~.
0
For the sake of completeness we note that
~(N'pM'A) - 420(165,
284, 375, 210, 0, 249, 151, 123, 0, 123).
It may seem that the calculation of the polynomials Pk(x) (cf. (4.3)) may be quite
lengthy, especially if the sets T(k) fl l~1 have a large number of elements. An alter-
native way to obtain these polynomials is described below.
Let i E N and let (T(k), A(T(k))) be one of the connected subgraphs corresponding
to player i as described in (4.2). Suppose each player p has a probability xp to be
'active'. Consider the polynomial
1- rj (1- II xp)
jET(k)nM pEH({i(k),j})
and expand it. Now reduce the obtained polynomial to a multilinear polynomial by
the simple recourse of reducing each higher exponent to a 1. Finally, by replacing
the probabilities xy by the probability x E [0, 1~ we obtain the polynomial Pk(x).
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In this, we are effectively using the multilinear extension ( cf. Owen (1972)). As
we know, the partial derivative with respect to x, of this extension corresponds
to the expectation that other players will collaborate with player i. Typically, for
S C N`{i}, the term
u(S) :- ~ x~
jES
corresponds to the probability that all members of S collaborate, given that each
j E S has probability xj of collaboration and assuming independence. Now, if S
and T are disjoint, thèn
u(S U T) - u(S) . u(T),
since the players in S and T are independent. When S fl T ~ f~, however,
u(S U T) - u(S U(T~S)) - u(S) - u(T) ,
where the bar corresponds to a reduction operation: each exponent larger than 1 is
reduced to 1. If, for example, S-{1,2} and T-{2,3}, then
TL(S) - xlx2, ll(T) - x2xg and u(S U T) - xlx2x3 - xlx2x3.
Example 4.2.3 Let (N,p,y,A) be the communication situation as described in
example 4.2.2 and consider player 2. For the subgraph corresponding to T(1) -{1},
expression (4.9) yields
1 - (1 - xi),
which results in the polynomial Pl(x) - x. In the same way we obtain P2(x) - x
for the polynomial corresponding to T(2) -{3}.
Defining the empty product to be 1, we easily see that P3(x) - 0.
Finally, for the subgraph corresponding to T(4) -{6, 7, 8, 10}, expression (4.9)
yields
1 - (1 - xsx~)(1 - xsxaxio).
Expanding this, we obtain
xsx~ f xsxaxio - xsx~xsxio.
Reducing this polynomial and then replacing all xy's by x, we obtain
x2 ~ x3 - x4i
which is exactly the desired polynomial P4(x).
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We now concentrate on the position value. Recall that for all a E A
` (-1)~N(L)nM~




A(A, M) :- {L C A ~(N(L), L) is connected and Ext(N(L), L) - N(L) fl M}.
In order to apply (4.10) we have to find all elements in A(A, M) containing an arc a,
which can be done in the way described below.
Let a - {i(1),i(2)} E A. Clearly, since (N,A) is a tree, the partition N~(A`{a})
consists of two components C(1) and C(2) with i(1) E C(1) and i(2) E C(2). For
each k E {1,2} we define the connected subgraph (T(k), A(T(k))) of (C(k), A(C(k)))
as in (4.2). In deriving a generating function for the link value we assume that
each arc has a probability x to be 'available' and we compute for the subgraph
(T(k), A(T(k))) the probability Pk(x) that at least one of the players in M fl T(k)
can actually interact with player i(k), for k E {1,2}. Using the inclusion-exclusion




for k E{1,2}. The chance that arc a connects players in M by linking up the
components C(1) and C(2), and hence generates cost savings, is described by the
generating function Ba(.~) with
Ba(~) :- Pr(~)' P2(x). (4.12)
Theorem 4.2.4 Let (N,A) be a tree with ~N~ ) 2. Then for all M E 2N`{0},
~a(N,PM. A) - ~ Da(~)d~ (4.13)
U
for all a E A, where Ba(a) is defined as in (4.12).
Pmoj. Let a E A. We may assume that T(I ) and T(2) are both non-empty, for




f 9a(x)dx - f P,(x)P2(x)dx
0 0
~ 2
.Í~( ~p k-1 SC(T(k)nM):5~0
1
where I'({1,2}) :- {(S(1),S(2)) ~ S(k) C (T(k) fl M),S(k) ~ 0 for k E {1,2}}.











1 f ~k-i ~A(fl(S( ) U {z(k)}))~
(-1)IS(1)Ifls(2)I
(s(~),s(z))Er({~.z}) ~A(H(S(1) U S(2)))~
(4.15)
Note that each pair (S(1),S(2)) E I'({1,2}) uniquely determines a set
L- A(H(S(1) U S(2))) E A(A, M), which satisfies Ext(N(L), L) - S(1) U S(2) and





We illustrate the actual computation of the position value in the next example.
Example 4.2.5 Let (N, p1N, A) be the communication situation as described in ex-
ample 4.2.2. Consider player 6. To obtain the position value of player 6 we have to
compute ~{s,s}(N,PM, A), ~{s,r}(N,PM, A), and ~{s,s}(N,PM, A).
For a:- {2,6} we obtain (cf. (4.2)) the subgraphs corresponding to T(1) -{1,2,3}
and T(2) - {6,7,8, 10} with corresponding polynomials (cf. (4.11)) P~(y) - 2x-x~
and P2(x) - a t a2 - x3. Hence, according to (4.12), Ba(x) - 2a2 ~ x3 - 3i4 -~ xs
~
and ~a(N,PM, A) - f Ba(2)d~ - só~0
For b:- {6,7} we obtain T(1) -{1,2,3,6,8,10} and T(2) -{7} and the polyno-
mials Pi(x) - 3x2 - x3 - 22' f xs and P2(x) - 1. Hence, Bb(T) - 3.r2 - x3 - 2x4 f xs
~
and ~e(N,PM,A) - f Bd(x)dx - so.0
Finally, for c:- {6,8} we obtain T(1) -{1,2,3,6,7} and T(2) -{8,10} with
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corresponding polynomials Pl(x) - x~ 2x2 - 3x3 f x4 and PZ(x) - x. Hence, we
i
have B~(x) - x2 f 2x3 - 3x4 f xs and ~~(N, pM, A) - f 6~(x)dx - 5.
0
We now compute
~s(N,PM,A) - ~ i~e(N,PM,A) - 2( ~ f ~ f ~) - io.
eEAe
For the sake of completeness we note that
~r(N, pry, A) - 120 (36, 101, 96, 60, 0, 84, 31, 48, 0, 24).
Similarly to the method described for the polynomials with respect to the Myerson
value, there is an alternative way to compute the polynomials Pk(x) as described
in (4.11). The desired polynomial is obtained by considering the polynomial
1 - ~ (1 - ~ xa)
iET(k)nM QEA(H({i(k)j}))
and then following a reduction procedure similar to the one described before.
In deriving integral formulas for the Myerson value and the position value we re-
stricted our attention to communication graphs that are trees. However, since both
the Myerson value and the position value are component-decomposable (cf. theo-
rem 3.1.2), the integral formulas can be used to compute both values for communi-





Communícation situations as introduced in chapter 2 can be generalized in several
directions. For example, the communication possibilities of the players can be mod-
eled by means of hypergraphs or by directed graphs instead of undirected graphs.
Both extensions, hypergraph communication situations and directed communication
situations, are discussed in this chapter. Further, the economic possibilities of the
players could be modeled by means of non-transferable utility games (NTU-games)
instead of TU-games. This extension is treated under the name NTU communica-
tion situations. Communication situations can also be generalized in yet a different
way: one can consider a more general framework for cooperation and communication
involving control games on points and communication ares.
In section 5.1, which is based on van den Nouweland, Borm and Tijs (1992), we
discuss hypergraph communication situations. Directed communication situations
are discussed in section 5.2 and some ideas about communication situations where
the underlying games are NTU-games are refiected in section 5.3. Finally, in sec-
tion 5.4 controlled communication networks are discussed. This last section is based
on Feltkamp and van den Nouweland (1992).
5.1 Hypergraph communication situations
A hypergraph communication situation is a triple (N, v, 9-l), where (N, v) is a TU-
game describing the economic possibilities of t}ie players and (N,7-f), with 7-l C 2N,
is a (communication) hypergraph describing the communicative possibilities of the
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players. The idea of modelling communication by means of hypergraphs is due to
Myerson (1980). The interpretation of the communication hypergraph (N,7-l) is
that communication is only possible within a conference H E ~-l and that all players
in H have to be present before communication can take place. It is implicitly
assumed that each player can communicate with himself and therefore we restrict
our attention to hypergraphs (N, ~-O with 9-l C { H E 2N ~ ~H~ ~ 2}. For convenience
it is assumed that the game (N, v) is zero-normalized.
An example of a hypergraph communication structure appears in sports, for example
in football. Football teams have committees and some members of those committees
are also in the board of the national football association of their country, which in
turn has representatives in international football associations. Basic decisions can
be made within each of these three types of organizations and interaction between
two organizations is possible if they have at least one member in common.
The analogue of connected sets in graphs are interaction sets in hypergraphs. In a
hypergraph communication situation (N, v, ~-l) the players of a coalition S C N can
effect communication in the conferences in ?-l(S) :- {H E 7-l ~ H C S}. Interaction
sets of ( S,7-l(S)) are defined recursively in the following way:
1. Each {i} C S is an interaction set.
2. Each H E ~-l(S) is an interaction set.
3. If T~ and T2 are interaction sets such that Tl fl T2 ~ 0, then T~ U TZ is an
interaction set.
Example 5.1.1 Consider the hypergraph (N,~-L) that is represented in figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1
Some interaction sets of (N,7-[) are {1,2}, {1,...,5}, {4,5,6} and N. However,
denoting S:- { 1, 2, 3, 4}, (S, A(S)) contains only one interaction set other than the
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four singletons, namely { 1, 2}. Conference {2, 3, 4, 5} is of no use because player 5
is not a member of S.
The interaction sets of (S,7-l(S)) are the subgroups of players in S who can interact
with respect to communication in (S,7-l(S)). Consequently, each coalition S is
partitioned into maximal interaction sets. The resulting partition is denoted by
S~7{. Correspondingly, the reward ru(S, ~-L) of a coalition S in the hypergraph
communication situation (N,v,7i) is defined by
rv(S, 9-l) :- ~ v(C).
CES~H
The definitions of the Myerson value and the position value provided in chapter 3,
can be extended to HCSN as follows.
Definition. For a hypergraph communication situation (N, v, ~í) the Myerson value
of (N, v, ~{), p(N, v, ~-L) E RN, is given by
F~(N,v, ~) - ~(N~ rrt),
where the point game (N,rN) is given by ry~(S) - rv(S,?-l) for all S C N.
Further, the position value of (N, v, l-l), ~r(N, v, 7-O E R~, is given by
~~(N,v,x) - ~ ~H~-' ~H(x,rnr)
HE7{,
for all i E N, where the conference game (~l,rN) is given by rN(A) - rv(N,A) for
all ,.4 C?-(, and 7-l; :- {H E 7-l ~ i E H} denotes the set of all conferences of which i
is a member.
Example 5.1.2 Consider the hypergraph communication situation (N, v, ~-O,
where N-{1,...,6}, v- u{i,2,3} and ~-( -{{1,4},{2,5},{3,6},{4,5,6}}. Then
(N,ry~) is the unanimity game (N,uN) and, consequently, p(N,v,7-O -(s'--.'s).
Further, (9-l, rN) is the unanimity game (7-l, uy~). Therefore, ~E~(~{, rj~,) - 4 for all
HE~{and
~i(N,v,x) - ns(N,v,7~) - ~sÍN,v,I-t) -
~ i - i
2 4 8'
~4(N,~',~) - ~SIN,v,x) - ~s(N~V,x) - 2 ~ 4 } 3 - 4 - 24~
Let IICSN denote the class of all hypergraph communication situations with player
set N. Similarly to theorem 3.2.1, the Myerson value on HCSN can be characterized
axiomatically by component-ef~iciency and fairness. Of course, then these properties
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have to be defined for allocation rules on HCSN. However, the definition of these
properties is obvious and, moreover, they can be found in Myerson (1980), so we
will not provide them here.
The position value can be characterized axíomatically on the class HCSN of hyper-
graph communication situations with cycle-free communication hypergraphs.
Let (N,?{) be a hypergraph. A chain (of length k) in (N,?-l) is a sequence
(xl, Hi, x2i ..., Hk, xk~~ ) where sl, ..., xk are all distinct players and Hl, ..., Hk
are all distinct conferences such that {x~,x~f~} C Hi for all I E{1,...,k}. A cycle
is a chain (xl, H~, xZ, .. ., Hk, xkt~ ) of length k~ 2 with xl - xk~l. This implies
that a hypergraph (N, ~{) that contains two distinct conferences Hl and H2 such
that ~H~ n H2~ ~ 2 is not cycle-free. To see this, let x~, x2 E Hl n HZ be such that
xi ~ xz. Then (xi, H~, xzi Hz, xi ) is a cycle in (N,7-l).
To provide axiomatic characterizations of the position value and the Myerson value
on HCSN à la theorems 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, properties introduced in chapter 3 have to
be extended to allocation rules on HCS~.
~ If (N,v,7-l) E HCS~`, then a conference H E 7-l is superfiuous ( for (N,v,?{) ) if
for all A C 7í
rv(N,A~{H}) - rv(N,A).
This means that the deletion of a superfluous conference from a subsystem of con-
ferences does not affect the reward of the grand coalition.
An allocation rule F: HCSN ~ RN has the superfluous conference property if for
all (N, v, 9-O E HCSN and all conferences H E~L that are superfluous for (N, v,7-l)
F(N,v,7-f`{H}) - F(N,v,7-L).
~ The infiuence of a player in a communication situation (N, v, 7-[) is defined as
follows:
[;(N.v,7-l) :- ~ ~[[~-1.
H EH,
One could think of [;(N, v, ~{) as a natural measure of the importance of player i in
the hypergraph (N, ~{), just as the degree measures the importance of a player in a
graph.
A communication situation (N, v, ~-L) is conjerence anonymous if there exists a func-
tion f:{0,1,... , ~~{~} -{ R such that for all ,.4 C 7-(
rv(N,~4) - Í(~A~).
5.1 Hypergraph communication situations 69
F: HCSN -~ RN satisfies conjerence anonymity if for each conference anonymous
communication situation (N, v, ~-() E HCSN there exists an a E R such that for all
iEN
F;(N,v,~-() - a . I,(N,v,7-l).
~ A communication situation (N, v, ~{) E HCSN is point anonymous if there exists
a function f: {0,1,..., ~P~} ~ R such that for all S C N
rv(S,7-~) - f(ISn PI),
where P:- {i E N~ 3H E 7í : i E H} is the set of players who belong to at least
one conference.
An allocation rule F: HCSN ~ RN satisfies point anonymity if for each point
anonymous communication situation (N,v,7~í) there exists an a E R such that for
alliEN
-{ a ifiEP
F;( N, v, ~-( )
0 else.
Similarly to theorems 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, van den Nouweland, Borm and Tijs (1992)
proved the next theorem.
Theorem 5.1.3
(i) The position value a is the unique allocation rule on HCS;~ that satisfies additiv-
ity, component-efficiency, the superfluous conference property and conference
anonymity.
(ii) The Myerson value p is the unique allocation rule on HCSN that satisfies
additivity, component-efficiency, the superfluous coníerence property and point
anonymity.
Similarly to graph communication situations the axioms in the characterizations
in theorem 5.1.3 are logically independent. For the axioms of part ( i) this was
shown in van den Nouweland, Borm and Tíjs ( 1992) and for the axioms of part
(ii) this follows by a generalization of the results in section 3.3. Further, extending
the superfluous point property and the strong superfluous arc property to allocation
rules on HCSN in a straightforward way, axiomatic characterizations of the Myerson
value on HCS~` à la theorem 3.2.6 can be provided.
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5.2 Directed communication situations
A directed communication situation is a triple (N, v, A), where ( N, v) is a zero-
normalized TU-game and (N, A) is a directed graph. In a directed communication
situation (N, v, A) the players in a coalition S can effect communication in (i.e. send
information via) A(S) :- {(i, j) E A ~ i E S, j E S}. Let us call a coalition S
stmngly connected if for every pair of players i, j E S there is a(directed) path
from i to j in the (sub)graph (S, A(S)). Clearly, each coalition S is partitioned into
maximal strongly connected components. This partition of S is denoted by S~A.
Again, we assume that the reward rv(S, A) of a coalition S is defined by the sum of
the rewards of its components, i.e.
rv(S, A) :- ~ v(C).
C E S~A
In this setting the point game (N,rÁ), the arc game (A,rN), the Myerson value
p,(N, v, A) and the position value rr(N, v, A) can be defined in exactly the same way
as in chapters 2 and 3. It may be noted that with respect to the position value one
might want to distinguish between the roles of the begin point (information sender)
and the end point (information receiver) of a directed arc by putting a weight vector
(a, 1 - a) with 0 G cY G 1 on all ares (i, j) E A. The link value of each arc is then
divided proportionally to this weight vector. In this way we obtain an a-position
value.
Example 5.2.1 Consider the directed communication situation (N, v, A), where
N- { 1, 2, 3}, v is the unanimity game u{1,2} and (N, A) is the directed graph
represented in figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2
Then (N,rÁ(S)) is the unanirnity game (N,u{i.z}) and, consequently, Fe(N,v,A) -
(2~~~~).
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Further, it holds that
„ ~ 1 if {a, b} C L or {b, c, d} C L
r~,(L) -
0 else.
Hence, ~Q(A, rN) - 4 , ~6(A, rN) - 12 and ~~(A, rN) -~d(A, rN) - 12. Conse-
quently, with a E[0,1] the a-position value for player 1 is given by
;~ ~- 1zcr f 12(1 - a) - lz - 4a, for player 2 by 3 f 4 a, and for player 3 by iz.
Using point anonymity and adapting arc anonymity by replacing the degree by a
weighted average of the inner degree and the outer degree, I("oster (1990) provided
axiomatic characterizations à la theorems 3.2.3 and 3.2.2 for the restrictions of the
Myerson value and the a~-position values to a special class of communication situ-
ations. The condition imposed on the directed (communication) graphs is that for
every pair of players i and j there exists at most one directed cycle containing i
and j.
Obviously, an undirected graph (N, A) can be identified with a directed graph (N, A)
in a natural way: replace each undirected arc {i, j} E A by two directed ares, (i, j)
and (j, i). It is easily seen that for all communication situations (N, v, A) E CSN
the Myerson value p(N, v, A) equals the Myerson value p(N, v, A) of the directed
communication situation associated with (N, v, A). However, such a relation need
not exist for the a-position values.
Example 5.2.2 Consider the (undirected) communication situation (N, v, A)
where N- { 1, 2, 3}, v is the unanimity game u{~,z} and (N, A) is the complete
graph on N. Then (cf. example 3.1.1) a(N, v, A) - ( 12, i~, 12 ).
In the directed communication situation (N, v, ,Q) associated with (N, v, A) the link
value of the links (1,2) and (2,1) equals ló and for the four other links it equals ló.
Therefore, for each a E[0, 1], the a-position value equals (s~ s~ s).
It may be noted that in the model described above communication is only valuable
if it is two-way. Maybe this is too strong an assumption and interesting things can
be done if one-way communication is also rewarded.
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5.3 NTU communication situations
An NTU-game (cf. Aumann (1967)) is a pair (N, V), where N- { 1, ..., n} is the
set of players and V is a map that assigns to each coalition S E 2N`{0} a subset
V(S) of RS that is non-empty and comprehensive, i.e. if x E V(S) and y E RS is
such that y C x then y E V(S). The set V(S) is to be interpreted as the set of
attainable payoff vectors for S.
Let (N, V) be an N7'U-game. A weight vector ~-(~~, ...,~„) E RN with a 1 0
and ~;EN ~; - 1 is V-feasible if for all S C N, S~~,
va(S) :- sup {~ ~;a; ~ x E V(S)} G oo.
iES
Hence, a V-feasible weight vector a generates a TU-game va.
Definition. Let (N,V) be an NTU-game. Then the Shapley set Sh(N,V) C RN
(cf. Shapley (1969)) is given by
Sh(N,V) -{~ E V(N) ~ there is a V-feasible .1 E RN such that
(~i~i)iEN - ~(N,v~)}i
and a vector x E Sh(N,V) is a Shapley value of V.
An NTU communication situation is a triple (N,V, A), where (N,V) is an NTU-
game with V({i}) -(-00,0] for all i E N, and (N,A) is an undirected communica-
tion graph without loops or parallel ares. The definition of the Myerson value can
straightforwardly be generaliaed to NTU communication situations.
Definition. For an NTU communication situation (N, V, A) the (NTU) point game
(N, VA) is given by
VA(S) - ~ V(C) C RS
CES~A
for all S C N and the Myerson set M(N, V, A) C RN is given by
M(N.V,A) - Sh(iV, t'A).
In trying to extend the position value one would like to consider the sets
ncEn~~tV(C) for all L C A. However, since jjcEN~~V(C) C R~~ for all L C A,
this does not generate an ,NTU arc game. However, we can introduce an NTU
position value without explicitly introducing an .NTL' arc game as follows.
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Let (N,V,A) be an NTU communication situation. A weight vector ~ E RN is
arc-admissible if for all L C A
vN,a(L) :- sup {~ ~;x; ~ x E ~ V(C)} C oo. (5.1)
~EN CEN~L
Hence, an arc-admissible weight vector ~ generates a TU-arc game (A, vN,a).
Definition. For an NTU communication situation (N, V, A) the position set
II(N, V, A) C RN is given by
II(N,V,A) -{x E HCEN~AV(C) I there is an arc-admissible ~ E RN
such that ~;x; - ~ 2~a(A,vN,a) for all i E N}.
aEA~
Example 5.3.1 Let a E[0, 2]. Consider the NTU communication situation
(N,Va,A), where N - {1,2,3, },A - {{1,3}, {2,3}} and (N,V~,) is the NTU-game
introduced by Roth (1980), i.e.
Va({i}) .- {x; E R{`} ~ x; G 0},
V~({1,2}) .- {(xl,xz) E Rti,z} I xi C 2,xz C z},
Va({1,3}) .- {lxlix3) E
R{1,3} I
xl C~,xg ~ 1- Q'},
Va({2,3}) .- {(xzix3) E R{z'3} I xz G a,x3 c 1- a}
and
Va({1,2,3}) :- {(xl,xzix3) E Rtl'z'3} I(xl,xzix3) C y for some y in
the convex hull of ( z, z, 0), (a, 0,1 - a) and (0, cr, l-~)},
where the indices correspond to the players.
Considering the weight vector (3, 3, á), we see
(i,i,~)EM(N,V~,A)ifaE[O,i]and(i,~,i)EII(N,Va,A)forallaE[O,i].6 6 3 3 4 4 2 2
Further, with respect to the weight vector ( 4, 4, 2), we only find
(4,4,2)EM(N,Va,A)ifa-2.
Now let (N,B) be the complete graph on N, i.e. B- {{1,2},{1,3},{2,3}}, and
consider (N, Va, B). Choosing the weight vector ( 3, 3, 3) leads to
(3' 3' 3) E
M(N, Va, B) fl II(N, Va, B) for all o E[0, 2].
Further, considering weight vectors of the form (Q,Q,1 - 2Q), p E[0, Z]`{3}, we
find no elements of the position set II(N, Vo, B) for any a E [0, z].
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Each TU-game (N,v) corresponds to an NTU-game (N,V) where for all S C N
V(S) :- {x E RS ~ ~;ES x; c v(S)}. Theorem 5.3.2 states that the Myerson
correspondence and the position correspondence are indeed generalizations of the
Myerson value and the position value for TU communication situations.
Theorem 5.3.2 Let (N, v, A) E CSN and let (N, V) be the NTU-game corre-
sponding to (N, v). Then the following two assertions hold:
(i) M(N, V, A) -{p(N, v, A)}.
(ii) H(N, V, A) -{n(N, v, A)}.
Proof. Let .1 E RN be a weight vector. Suppose C E N~A and i, j E C are such that
a; ~ a~. Then, obviously, Sllp {~kEC ~kxk ~ x E V(C)} - oo. Hence, ~ is neither
VA-feasible nor arc-admissible.
Let the weight vector a E RN be such that for each component C E N~A there
exists a real a(C) with ~; -~(C) for all i E C. Then it is not difl'icult to see that
~ is both VA-feasible and arc-admissible.
We first prove part (i). For the TU-game vA„a corresponding to VA and ~ and for
all S C N we have
vA,a(S) - sup {~ ~;x; ~ x E VA(S)}
iES
- sup {~ a(C)( ~ x;) ~ x E RS and ~x; G v(T)
CEN~A iESnC iET
for all T E S~A}
- ~ ~(C)( ~ v(T))
CEN~A TESnC~A
- ~ 1(C) rA(S n C) ,
CEN~A
where the third equality follows from the fact that every component of S is contained
in a component of N.
Then, for each i E N and D E N~A such that i E D
~;(N,vA,a) - ~(D) ~~(D,rA ~o)
- ~(~) ~i(N, rA) - ~(D) i~i(N, ti, A)~
where rÁ ~D denotes the restriction of rÁ to D.
Hence, (,~;~;(N, v, A));E,v -~(N, vA,a). Since ~(N, v, A) E rjCEN~A V(C), the defi-
nition of M(N, V, A) implies that M(N, V, A) -{p(N, V, A)}.
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We now prove part (ii). For the TU-game v,v,a defined by (5.1) and for all L C A
we have
vN,a(L) - sup {~ ~;x; ~ x E ~ V(T)}
iEN TEN~L
- sup {~ a(C)(~ x;) ~ x E RN and ~ x; C v(T)
CEN~A iEC iET -
for all T E N~L}
- ~ ~(C)( ~ v(T))
CEN~A TEC~L
- ~ ~(C) r~(L fl A(C)).
C E N~A
Then, obviously, for each a E A and D E N~A such that a E A(D) it holds that
~a(A,vN.a) - a(D) ~n(A,ro) - a(D) aa(N,v,A).
Since for all C E N~A
~~i(N,v,A) - ~ ~ z~n(N,v,A)
iEC iEC nEA,
- ~ ~n(N, v, A) - v(C),
nEA(C)
and, correspondingly, ~r(N, v, A) E j-j~EN~A V(C), the definition of H(N, V, A) im-
plies that II(N, V, A) -{~(N, v, A)}. o
It would be interesting to investigate if one of the axiomatic characterizations of
the 5hapley correspondence provided by Aumann (1985) and !~ern (1985) can be
adapted to find axiomatic characterizations of t,he Myerson correspondence and the
position correspondence, possibly restricted to a subclass of NTU communication
situations. Alternatively, the notion of fairness might be extended to NTL~ commu-
nication situations to provide an axiomatic characterization of the Myerson corre-
spondence à la Myerson (1977).
Myerson (1980) considered situations in which the economic possibilities of a group
of agents are represented by an .VTU-game and where the communication possi-
bilities are modelled by a hypergraph. He shows that for this dass of situations
there exists a unique fair and component-efficient one-point solution concept, which
coincides with the Myerson value for hypergraph communication situations (cf. sec-
tion 5.1). It would be interesting to find out if there is a relation between the
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allocation rule of Myerson ( 1980) and the values we defined for NTU communica-
tion situations.
Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn and Tijs (1992) defined two possible extensions
of the r-value to NTU-games, the NTU r-value and the compmmise value. One
could also consider applying these solution concepts in NTU communication situa-
tions instead of the Shapley correspondence.
5.4 Controlled communication networks
Consider a finite undirected graph (P, A) without loops or paralle] ares. We assume
that for each point p E P a balanced simple control game (N,ep) is given and,
similarly, for each arc a E A we have a balanced simple control game (N, ca). Here,
a TU-game (N, v) is simple if v(S) E {0, 1} for all S C N and v(N) - l. The
interpretation of a(simple) control game cD for a point p E P, is that a coalition
S C N is allowed to use point p if and only if cp(S) - 1. The control games ca for
ares a E A have a similar interpretation. Furthermore, we assume that there is a
reward function r on the set of subsets of points and ares, i.e. r : 2P x 2A -~ R. In
this setting it seems reasonable to assume that an arc is useless without both of its
end points, i.e. for all Q C P and L C A it holds that r(Q, L) - r(Q, L`{{pl, pZ}})
if {p~, p~} E L is such that {pr, p2} is not a subset of Q. Further, we assume that
r is zero-normalized, i.e. r({p},(~) - 0 for all p E P, and that r has an additive
structure with respect to the components of (P,.A), i.e.
r(Q, L) - ~ r(C, L(C))
CEQ~L
for all Q C P and L C A such that P(L) C Q. Here, P(L) denotes the set of
points that. are an end point oí an arc in L. A controlled communication network is
a 6-tuple (N, P, A, {cy ~ p E P}, {ca ~ a E A}, r) as described above.
Note that for a communication situation (1V, t~, A) E CSN the corresponding reward
function rv satisfies the three properties mentioned. Further, the points in the
communica.tion graph ( N, A) are controlled by a single player, each player controlling
exactly one point, and each arc is controlled by the two players at its end points.
Using the following theorem of Curiel (1988) on balanced simple games we can
introduce a generalized Myerson value and position value.
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Definition. Let C- (N, P, A, {cP ~ p E P}, {ca ~ a E A}, r) be a controlled
communication network. Then the Myerson value p(C) E RN is defined by
p;(C) :- ~ ~ veto(cv) ~-~ ~P(P,rA)
PEP:iEVetO(cv)
for all i E N, where the game (P, rA) is defined by rA(Q) :- r(Q, A) for all Q C P.
Further, the position value ~r(C) E RN is defined by
7f{(C) :- ~ ~ veto(ca) ~-~ ~a(A,rP)
aEA:sEVetO(co)
for all i E N, where the game (A,rP) is defined by rP(L) :- r(P, L) for all L C A.
By extending the properties considered in chapter 3 in an appropriate way, Feltkamp
and van den Nouweland (1992) provided axiomatic characterizations à la theo-
rems 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 of the position value and the Myerson value for controlled
communication networks. Surprisingly, it turns out that no restriction to cycle-free





This chapter is concerned with the endogenous formation of communication graphs.
In the preceeding chapters we assumed the communication graph to be exogenously
given while in this chapter the players have to decide on the formation of some
communication graph, knowing the underlying TU-game and the allocation rule by
which a communication situation is going to be evaluated. In the process of the
formation of a communication graph, each player tries to influence this formation to
his own advantage. Hence, the formation process is a strategic process, which can be
modelled by means of a non-cooperative game. We will discuss two models for the
endogenous formation of communication graphs. The first model we discuss is the
extensive form model that was suggested by Aumann and Myerson (1988). Although
this model is rather interesting, it appears to be hard to make predictions about
the communication graphs that will evolve with this model. The second model we
discuss is a strategic form model. This model is much easier to handle in the sense
that it is relatively easy to make predictions about the formation of communication
graphs. The price one has to pay is that the predictions of this model seem to be
very rough.
In section 6.1 we provide the necessary definitions from non-cooperative game
theory and discuss the linking game in extensive form as introduced by Aumann
and Myerson (1988). Section 6.2 provides some further definitions and introduces a
linking game in strategic form.
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6.1 A linking game in extensive form
A game in extensive form consists of a game tree with a distinct point, called the
root of the game, and several end points. For each node in the tree that is not
an end point it is specified which player has to move, i.e. choose an action, and,
furthermore, which node in the game tree will be reached next given the chosen
action. Finally, for each end point the payoffs to the players are specified.
Example 6.1.1 Consider the game tree that is depicted in figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1
At the beginning of a play player 1 has to choose between two actions, L and R. If
player 1 chooses L, then the play is over and player 1 gets 1, whereas player 2 gets
nothing. If player ] chooses R, then player 2 has to choose between e and r. After
player 2 has made a choice, the play ends and the players get the specified payoffs.
Now we can describe the model for endogenous formation of communication links
that was suggested by Aumann and Myerson (1988).
Let (N,v) E TUN be a(zero-normalized) game and let y: CSN ~ RN be an
allocation rule. Let o be a rule of order on the possible communication links, i.e.
o:{{i, j} ~ i, j E N, i~ j} ~{ 1, 2, ...,(Z) } is a bijection. The corresponding
linking game in extensive form Gï(v, ry, o) is a game in extensive form, starting
from a situation where there are no communication links at all. The game consists
of pairs of players being offered to form communication links, where the offers are
made one after the other according to the rule of order o. When offered to form link
{i, j}, both players i and j can accept or reject this link. Link {i, j} is formed if and
only if both players i and j agree to form this link. Moreover, once it is formed, a
link cannot be destroyed anymore. Further, at any move, the entire history of offers,
acceptances and rejections is known to all players. The game ends when all pairs of
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players that are not linked up have had the opportunity to form a communica,tion
link after the last time a link was formed. At this point some communication graph
(N, A) is formed and the payoffs to the players are given by the Myerson value of
the communication situation (N, v, A).
We are interested in the subgame perfect equilibria of the game GE(v, ry, Q).
With respect to a game in extensive form, instead of deciding which action to take
once a decision node is reached, the players can also decide beforehand to take a
particular action if and when a particular decision node will be reached. Hence, a
player can work out a strategy and send a representative to play the game for him. A
strategy n-tuple is a Nash equilibrium if no player can gain by unilaterally deviating
from his strategy, or, stated differently, if the choice of strategy of each player is
optimal given the strategy choices of the remaining players.
A subgame of the game GE(v, ry, Q) is a game that starts at some point where a
pair of players is offered to form a communication link and that follows the rules
of the game GE(v, ry, Q) from there on. Hence, such a subgame is in itself a linking
game, where the only difference lies in the fact that one does not start from a
situation where there are no communication links, but from a situation where a
certain communication graph is already formed.
A subgame perfect equilibrium of the game GE(v, y, o) is a Nash equilibrium of the
game GE(v, ry, v) that satisfies the property that, when restricted to any subgame
of ,CE(v, ry, o), it induces a Nash equilibrium of this subgame.
A subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies of the linking game GE(v, ry, a)
results in the formation of a unique communication graph. All communication
graphs that occur in this way (for any choice of the rule of order) are GE(v, ry)-
stable, because, once such a graph is reached, no further communication links are
formed.
We will illustrate the linking game with an example.
Example 6.1.2 Consider the game (N, v), where N- {1, 2,3}, and
0 if~S~CI
v(S) - 60 if ~S~ - 2
72 if ~S~ - 3.
For the allocation rule ry we take the Myerson value p. When two players have
to decide whether or not to form a link, they have to take into account what will
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happen in subsequent rounds, because this also will affect their payoff. So, we use
backward induction to find the subgame perfect equilibria of the linking game.





players 1 and 3 get 24 instead of 14 when they form the link {1,3}. Hence, when
offered to form this link they will do so.
Since all players are symmetric in the game (N, v), we may conclude that whenever
a situation will be reached where two communication links have been formed so far,
the third link will also be formed.
Now, suppose one link has been formed, say link { 1, 2}. Knowing that they wil] end
up with the complete graph if an additional link is formed, the players face a choice
between
p(N,v,{{1,2}}) - (30,30,0)
and (24, 24, 24 ). Hence, players 1 and 2 wil not agree with player 3 to form an
additional link.
Finally, note that no player gets anything if no links at all are formed.
It follows from the above that the GE(v, ~)-stable graphs are the graphs with exactly
one link. What link will be formed, however, will depend on the rule of order of the
offers.
Example 6.1.2 is due to Aumann and Myerson (1988), who described the stable
graphs with respect to some particular games, where the commimication graphs were
evaluated by means of the 1~1yerson value. '1'wo of these games were reconsidered in
Borm (1990), who evaluated communication graphs by means of the position value.
The remaining part of this section is devoted to the following conjecture.
Conjecture 6.1.3 For a convex TU-game ( N, v), the complete graph on the set N
is a G~(v,~e)-stable graph.
If the conjecture is true, then this means that the Shapley value is consistent in
the sense that it is based on the assumption that all pla}~ers will cooperate and
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that indeed all players will cooperate if they know that they are going to be payed
according to the Shapley value (note that p(N, v, Ií(N)) -~(N, v)).
There are some partial answers to this conjecture, which will be described below.
The following proposition, which is due to Myerson (1977), shows that the formation
of a communication link is profitable in the short term for the two players at its end
points if the game is superadditive. Because a convex game is superadditive, the
proposition also holds for convex games.
Proposition 6.1.4 Let (N, v, A) be a communication situation where the game
(N,v) is superadditive. Then for any pair of players i, j E N such that the link
{i, j} is not in A, we have
pk(N,v,AU{i,j}) ~ pk(N,v,A)
for k E {i, j }.
For convenience we introduce the notation Iti (S) :- {{i, j} ~ i, j E S, i~ j}, the
set of all possible links between players in S, for all S C N. With this notation the
complete graph on the set S is the graph (S, Ií (S)).
A partial answer to conjecture 6.1.3 is given in theorem 6.1.5, which implies that
the complete graph on the set N is a GE(us, p)-stable graph for every S C N. Note
that a unanimity game ( N, us) is a convex game.
Theorem 6.1.5 Let S C N. Then all ,Ci(us, Ec)-stable graphs are the graphs that
contain (S, K(S)) as a subgraph.
Proof. We will prove this theorem using backward induction. First note that for
any graph (N, A) that contains (S, lí(S)) as a subgraph we have
p(N, us, A) - IsI-'es.
Now, suppose the players reached a situation where the communication graph (N, A)
that is formed so far does not contain (S, Ií (S)) as a subgraph. We will show that
it is advantageous for two players in S who did not yet form a communication link
between them, to form that link. So, let i, j E S be such that {i, j} ~ A. We have to
prove that ~;(N, us, A) C ~S~-1 -~;(.N, us). Using expression 3.5 for the Shapley
value, we see that is suffices to prove that
rÁs(T U {i}) - rÁs(T) C us(T U {i}) - us(T) (6.1)
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for all T C N`{i}.
Note that both the left-hand side and the right-hand side of 6.1 equal either 0 or
1. Hence, we only have to show that the following two equalities cannot hold at the
same time
rÁs(T U {i}) - rÁS(T) - 1 (6.2)
us(T U {i}) - us(T) - 0. (6.3)
Obviously, equation 6.3 holds if and only if either S C T or S~ T U {i}. However,
since i E S, S C T cannot hold. If S ~ T U{i}, then also rÁs(T U {i}) - rÁs(T) - 0
and equation 6.2 does not hold. This completes the proof of the theorem. ~
A direct consequence of this theorem is the next result.
Corollary 6.1.6 There is a unique payoff corresponding to GE(us, ie)-stable graphs.
This payoff equals ~S~-'es
The following proposition can be helpful when trying to prove conjecture 6.1.3.
Proposition 6.1.7 Let (.N, u, A) be a communication situation where the game
(N, v) is convex. Then the following two statements hold:
(i) ForallSCNandiEN
p;(N,v,Lí(S)) c ~,(N,v,lí(N)). (6.4)
(ii) If S~ N and i E N~S are such that lí (S) C A~ lí (S U {i}), then
~;(N, v, A) C~;(IV, v, lí(N)) (6.5)
for all j E S with the property Lhat {i, j} ~ A.
Proof. We start by proving part (i). Let S C N be fixed. For i E N`S and
T C N`{i} we have T U{i}~lí (S) - T~K(S) U {:} and, consequently,
rti.~s~(T U {i}) - rtiks~(T) - v({i}) G v(T U{i}) - v(T) , (6.6)
where the last inequality follows írom the couvexity of (N,v).
For i E S and T C N`{i} we have
r;~~sl(Tu{i})-r;,.~s~(T)-v((Tns)u{i})-~~(Tns)~~~(TU{i})-v(T), (s.7)
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where the equality follows from the structure of the graph and the inequality follows
from the convexity of the game (N,v). Now (6.4) readily follows from (6.6), (6.7)
and formula (3.5) for the Shapley value.
To prove part (ii), let S~ N and i E N`S be such that K(S) C A~ K(S U {i}).
Let j E S be such that {i, j}~ A. For T C N`{ j} we have
TU{j}~A-{CSU{j}}U{CET~A~CnS-O},
where CS denotes the unique component of T~A that intersects S, which implies
rÁ(T U{j}) - rÁ(T) - v(CS U{j}) - v(CS) C v(T U{j}) - v(T) , (6.8)
where the inequality follows by convexity of (N, v). Formula (3.5) for the Shapley
value and ( 6.8) imply ( 6.5). O
To conclude this section, we pose a second conjecture, which makes a statement
about communication situations and therefore seems easier to handle than conjec-
ture 6.1.3. Conjecture 6.1.8 states that for a communication situation (N, v, A)
where the communication graph is not the complete graph on N, we can find two
players whose Myerson value in the situation (N, v, A) is no more than in the situ-
ation (N,v,lf(N)) and who are not linked up yet.
Conjecture 6.1.8 Let (N, v, A) E CSN be such that (N, v) is convex and such
that (N, A) is not the complete graph on the set N. 5et
N :- { E N ~ p,;(N,v,A) c p;(N,v,lí(N))}.
Then the complete graph on the set N is not a subgraph of (N, A).
Using backward induction, it is not hard to see that conjecture 6.1.8 implies conjec-
ture 6.1.3: Assuming that we already know that eventually the complete graph
will be formed ( and the players will get their Myerson value in the situation
(N,v,K(N))), once a graph with k or more links is formed, conjecture 6.1.8 irn-
plies that an additional link will be formed if a graph with k - 1 links is formed so
far.
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6.2 A linking game in strategic form
A game in strategic form consists of a player set N- {1,...,n}, strategy spaces X;,
i E N, and payoff functions K; : j-j;EN X; --f R, i E N. In the strategic form
game (X~, ..., X,,, líl, ..., Kn) every player i E N chooses a strategy x; E X;. The
players do so simultaneously and independently. After every player i E N has chosen
a strategy x;, the payoff to a player i E N is K;(x~, ..., x„).
Example 6.2.1 Consider the game in strategic form (Xl, X2, Kl, KZ), where







Hence, if player 1 chooses R and player 2 chooses P, then the payoff for player 1 is
2 and for player 2 it is 1.
Note that this game is related to the game of example 6.1.1. With respect to the
game in extensive form in example 6.1.1, player 1 can decide to choose always R if
he is given the choice between L and R, and player 2 can decide to choose always P
if he is given the choice between P and r. If these are the player's decisions and the
game is played, then the players will reach the node with the payoffs (2,1), which
are defined to be the payofís in the strategic form game. The game in strategic form
in the current example is the strategic form of the game in example 6.1.1
We define a linking game in strategic from below.
Let (N,v) E TUN be a(zero-normalized) game and let ry : CSN -~ RN be an
allocation rule. The corresponding linking game in strategic form GS(v,ry) is a
game in strategic form in which all players simultaneously announce with which
other players they want to íorm a communication link. After these announcements
all communication links are formed that are desired by both players at its end
points and, correspondingly, the payoffs to the players are found by applying Lhe
allocation rule 7 to the communication situation that evolved. Hence, the linking
game GS(v, ry) is the game (,X~.. .., X,,, lí ~, ... , lí„), where for each i E N
X; :- 2N`(~)
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and
k;(zi, .. . , xn) :- ~;(N, v, A(x)) ~
where
A(x) :- {{i, j} ~ i E xj and j E x;}
the graph that is formed when the players announce the strategies xl, ..., x,,.
We are interested in the Nash equilibria in undominated strategies of the game
GS(v, ry).
Definition. Let (Xl, ..., X,,, Kl, ...,!ti„) be a game in strategic form. A strategy
~; E X; is undominated if there is no strategy x; E X; that is at least as good as i;
against all possible strategy tuples of the other players and that is sometimes better
than ~;, or, stated differently, if for all x; E X; either there exists a strategy tuple
xN`{i} E 11jEN`{i} -xj SllCll tÍlat
J~i(x;ixN~{i}) i Jii(xii~N~{i})
or for every strategy tuple xnr`{;} E rjjEN`{;} Xj
hi(xiixN~{i}) - ~ii(~i~~N~{i}) ~
Every Nash equilibriutn in undominated strategies of the linking game GS(v, ry)
corresponds to a unique communication graph. The communication graphs that are
found in this way are GS(v,7)-stable.
The following theorem shows that for superadditive games the complete graph on
N is GS(v, ~)-stable.
Theorem 6.2.2 Let (N, v) be a superadditive game. Then the complete graph on
N is GS(v, p)-stable.
Proof. The complete graph will evolve if and only if every player announces the will
to form communication links with all the other players. Hence, we have to prove
that the strategy i; :- N`{i} is undominated for every player i E N and, moreover,
we have to prove that the strategy tuple (xl, á2i ..., in) is a Nash equilibrium. The
latter follows immediately from proposition 6.1.4.
To prove that the strategies i~ ,..., i„ are undominated, let i E N be fixed
and consider a strategy tuple xn~`{i} E njEN`{i} X~. lndependent of the strat-
egy of player i, some communication links are formed between the other players,
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namely the links in A:- {{j,k} ~ j,k E N`{i} and j E xk, k E x~}. Let N;
be the set of players who want to form communication links with player i, i.e.
N; :- {j E N`{i} ~ i E x~}. The strategy of player i determines which of the
communication links in L; :- {{i, j} ~ j E N;} are formed. Hence, to prove that the
strategy N`{í} is undominated, it sufl7ces to prove that for every L; C L;
p; ( N, v, A U L; )~~; ( N, v, A U L;).
However, this is a direct consequence of proposition 6.1.4. ~
One consequence of theorem 6.2.2 is that for the game in example 6.1.2 the complete
graph on the set N is GS(v, p)-stable. Further, for all i E N the strategy N`{i}
is the unique undominated strategy for player i in the game GS(v, p). This can be
seen as follows. Since the players are symmetric in the game (N, v), it suffices to
show that all strategies of player 1 other than {2,3} are not undominated. Now, set
y~ :- {2, 3}. Then
Ií,(x,,{1,3},{1,2}) c Ií,(~i,{1,3},{1,2})
for all x~ E X~, xl ~ ~1, which implies that all strategies in Xl`{~1} are not
undominated. Since the strategy tuple ( {2,3}, {1,3}, {1,2}) is the unique strategy
tuple that is composed of undominated strategies, the complete graph on N is the
unique GS(v, p)-stable graph.
Chapter 7
Flow-shops with a dominant
machine
This chapter deals with flow-shop problems with a dominant machine and with cost
savings games that are derived from these problems.
It is well known that many of the classical flow-shop problems with n jobs and
m machines are NP-hard (cf. Carey and Johnson (19ï9)). In this chapter, which
is based on van den Nouweland, Krabbenborg and Potters (1992), we introduce a
subclass of flow-shop problems that are characterized by the presence of a so-called
dominant machine. It is shown that for this kind of problems we can restrict our
search for an optimal schedule to permutation schedules if the optimality criterion
is regular. Furthermore, an expression for the completion times with respect to
a semi-active permutation schedule is provided and fast algorithms to find optimal
schedules for both the weighted completion times criterion and the maximal lateness
criterion are described.
Further, we describe a way to construct a cooperative game corresponding to a
flow-shop problem where the jobs have already been arranged in a particular order
before the first machine. The resulting sequencing games are a generalization of
the sequencing games that were introduced by Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs (1989). It
is shown that sequencing games that are derived [rom a flow-shop problem with a
dominant first machine are in fact the games of Curiel, Pederzolí and Tijs (1989).
This chapter is organized as follows. The classical flow-shop problem is explained
in section ï.l, whereas section 7.2 introduces flow-shop problems with a dominant
machine and shows that with respect to such a problem we can restrict our attention
to permutation schedules when considering a regular criterion. Furthermore, we
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give an expression in the processing times for the completion time of a job with
respect to a semi-active permutation schedule. Section 7.3 describes algorithms to
find optimal schedules for the weighted completion times criterion and the maximal
lateness criterion. Sequencing games are described and investigated in section 7.4.
7.1 Flow-shops
A ftow-shop (problem) consists of a sequence of finitely many machines Ml, ..., M,,,
and a finite set of jobs J-{Jl, ..., Jn} to be processed by the machines in the order
Ml, ..., Mm. An n x m-matrix P of positive real numbers is given, where P;,k denotes
the time needed for the operation O;,k of the i`h job on the k`h machine. P;,k is the
pmcessing time of job J; on machine Mk. We assume that every job can start at
time zero.
A schedule or time taóle fixes for every operation O;,k a time interval of length P;,k
in which it will be processed. A schedule is jeasióle if no job is to be processed on
two machines at the same time and no two jobs are to be processed on the same
machine at the same time. If we denote with T;,k(r) the starting time of operation
O;,k with respect to the time table r then feasibility is characterized by
(i) T;,k(r) 1 0 for all i E{1,...,n} and all k E{1,...,m}.
(ii) T;,k(r) f P;,k C T;,k~i(r) for all i E{1,...,n} and all k E{1,...,rn- 1}.
(iii) (T;,k(r),T;,k(r) ~ P;,k)fl (T~,k(r),T~,k(r) f P~,k) - 0 for all k E {1,... ,m} and
all i, j E {1,...,n} with i~ j.
We denote the time T;,k(r) ~- P;,k, the tirne at which operation O;,k is finished,
by F;,k(r). The completion tíme C;(r) of job J; under time table r is F;,,,,(r).
Cii1ex(r) :- max C;(r) is the make-span under time table r.
An optimality criterion is a preference relation ~ on the set of feasible time tables.
It is often represented by a function which assigns a real number R(r) to every
feasible time table r such that for all feasible time tables r, r'
r~ r' t~ R(r) G R(r').
The optimality criterion defined by the function R is regular if
C;(r) G C;(r') for all jobs J; ~ R(r) C R(r').
A schedule is semi-active if no opf:ration O;,k can be started earlier without changing
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the job order on the machines or violating the feasibility conditions. Let vk be a
permutation of N- {1,...,n}, i.e. ak E P(N). We say that ak fixes the order of
processing of the jobs on machine Mk in schedule r if job Jok ~~;~ is the i`h job to be
processed on machine Mk. If Q~ -~z - . .. - trm we call r a permutation schedule. If
we define F,,o(r) : - 0 for all jobs J;, then a semi-active time table r ís characterized
by
Ti.k(T) - maX {max {Fi,k(r) I ~kO) C Qk(Z)}, Fi,k-1(r)}
for all i E N and k E{1,...,m}. Since every feasible time table r can be changed
into a unique semi-active time table r` with conservation of the job orders on the
machines, and the completion times C;(r') are not larger than the completion times
C;(r) we can restrict the search for an optimal time table under a regular criterion
to semi-active tables. We denote the semi-active permutation schedule fixed by
v E P(N) by Q. Further, if there can be no misunderstanding we shall write [i]
instead of v-1(i).
7.2 A dominant machine
In this section we introduce the notion of a dominant machine and we show that
flow-shop problems with a dominant machine are relatively easy to handle. The
definition of a dominant machine is rather technical.
Definition. Machine Mt is dominant if the processing times satisfy the following
conditions:
, .





~~ P~,k-1 for all i, j E N, i~ j and all r E{2, ..., Q}. (7.2)
Perhaps these conditions can be illustrated best by a Cantt diagram. In this we plot
m horizontal time-axes, corresponding to the m machines, starting with machine Ml
on top and Mm on the bottom. Blocks are placed above the axes to indicate when
the jobs are processed by the machines, where the lengths of the blocks correspond
to the processing times. If machine Ml is dominant, a Gantt diagram corresponding
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to a permutation schedule will typically be of the kind that is sketched in figure 7.1.
0
Figure 7.1
It is not necessarily true that a dominant machine is a machine where all jobs have
the largest processing times. This is shown in the next example.
Example 7.2.1 Consider the flow-shop problem with 3 jobs, 6 machines and pro-
cessing times matrix
2 3 5 4 5 1
P- 6 2 3 5 2 4.
4 2 4 5 1 6
It is easy to check that the fourth machine is dominant. Iíowever, for none of the 3
jobs the processing time is the largest on the fourth machine.
Further, a flow-shop problem may have more than one dominant machine as the
following examples show.
Example 7.2.2 Consider the flow-shop problem with 2 jobs, 5 machines and pro-
cessing times matrix
3 8 2 ï 3
P-
6 4 5 5 2~
Some calculation shows that both the second and the fourth machine are dominant.
Note that the second and the fourth column are different.
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Example 7.2.3 Consider the flow-shop problem with 3 jobs, 7 machines and pro-
cessing times matrix
4 6 1 1 6 3 2
P- 4 5 2 1 5 2 3.
5 4 1 3 4 1 6
In this problem the second and the fifth machine are both dominant.
Note that in example 7.2.3 the second and the fifth column are the same. This is
no coincidence, as is shown by the next result.
Proposition 7.2.4 In a flow-shop problem with more than two jobs each job has
the same processing-time on every dominant machine.
Proof. Suppose we have a flow-shop problem with n jobs (n ~ 3) and suppose Me,
and Me, are both dominant machines (el, QZ E { 1, ..., m}, 2~ G e2 ). By applying
condition (7.1) for Mc, with r- e2 - 1 we get
e,-i e,-i e,
~ P~,k ? ~ Pj,kfi - ~ Pj,k (7.3)
k-[1 k-l, k-f~}1
for all i, j E N, i~ j. By applying condition (7.2) for Mt, with r- 2~ f 1 we get
e2 rz e,-i
~ Pj,k ~ ~ P~,k-1 - ~ P~,k (7.4)
k-l, }1 k-[, }1 k-C,
for all i, j E N, i~ j. Since the right-hand side of (7.3) equals the left-hand side
of (7.4) and the left-hand side of (7.3) equals the right-hand side of (7.4), we see
e,-i e,
~ Pi,k - ~ Pj,k
k-f, k-t,f1
for all i, j E N, i~ j.
If e2 - el f 1 then this means P;,ej - Pj,tZ for all i, j E N, i~ j. Especially, if
i,j,k E N,i ~ j,i ~ k,j ~ k then
P~,e~ - Pj,cz - Pk.t~ - P~,ez - Pj.t, - Pk,e,.
Hence, if QZ - el f 1 then the two columns of the processing times matrix corre-
sponding to machines Me, and Mez are not only equal, but they are also constant,
i.e. there is an a E R~ such that P;,e, - P;,r2 - a for all i E N.
r,-i
If Q2 1 el f 1 then we define for each job J; E J Z; :- ~ P;,k. Now ( 7.5) states
k-l, t 1
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P;,t, f Z; - Z; f P;,e, for all i, j E N, i~ j. This implies P;,e, - Pi,t, - P~,t, - P~,e,
for all i, j E N, i~ j. Especially, ií i, j, k E N, i~ j, i~ k, j~ k then
Pi,ti - P~,rs - Pi~rs - Pi,l, - Pk,r, - Pk,tz - Pi.ls - Pi.ri -
So P;,t, - P;,t, for all i E N. ~
The remaining part of the current paragraph is devoted to work towards the proof
of the following theorem.
Theorem 7.2.5 If a machine Mr is dominant and á is a semi-active permutation
schedule corresponding to o E P(N) then the completion-time of job J[;1 is
L-1 i m
C[~1(Q) - ~ P[rl,k ~- ~ PGI,r -~ ~ P[;l,k (7.6)
k-1 j-1 k-ttr
for all i. Furthermore, there is for each regular criterion a permutation schedule
which is optimal for this criterion.
Note that, according to theorem 7.2.5, the completion time of job J; under a permu-
tation schedule Q consists of three parts. The first part only depends on the choice
of J[ll, the job that is processed first, the second part really depends on a(more
precisely on the set of predecessors of J; under o) and the third part is a constant
(independent on o). This observation will play an important role in the algorithms
that we will describe in section 7.3.
The proof of theorem 7.2.5 is built up in three parts. First the situation where the
first machine is dominant will be investigated. Note that in this situation the first
term in expression (7.6) disappears. Then the situation where the last machine is
dominant is investigated, in which case the last term in expression (7.6) disappears.
Finally, the obtained results are combined to prove theorem 7.2.5 for more gcncral
situations.
The idea behind theorem 7.2.5 is that, if we have an arbitrary schedule r where
the order of processing on the dominant machine is described by ~ E P(N), then
the completion times of the jobs according to the semi-active permutation schedulc
v are not larger than the completion times according to r. This idea will play an
important role in the proofs that follow.
We start by investigating the situation where the first machine is dominant. Note
that in this situation condition (7.2) is not relevant. Lemmas 7.2.6 and 7.2. ï state
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that if the first machine is dominant, under a semi-active permutation schedule jobs
only have waiting times before the first machine and that for any regular criterion
there is an optimal schedule which is a permutation schedule.
Lemma 7.2.6 If the first machine is domínant and the jobs are in order o E P(N)
on each machine, then the jobs will not have to wait in between machines and hence
i k-1
a machine Mk starts with a job J~;~ at Tl;~,k -~ PG7.~ f~ P[il.~.~-i ~-z
Pmof. Suppose the first machine is dominant and we have a permutation schedule
characterized by Q E P(N), where some job has to wait in between two machines.
Suppose Mk (k ~ 1) is the first machine where some job has to wait and that Jl;l
(i ~ 1) is the first job that has to wait there. Then
i k-1
~ P[jl,~ f ~ Pl;l,~ - Fjil,k-r
;-1 ,-z
i-1 k
G Fj;-~l,k -~ PUIa f~ Pl;-,~,,.
;-i ,-s
k-1 k-1
Hence, ~ P~;~,, C~ P~;-1~,,~~, but this is in contradiction with condition ( 7.1). D
a-i 1-i
Lemma 7.2.7 If the first machine is dominant, then there is for each regular cri-
terion a permutation schedule which is optimal for this criterion.
Proof. Suppose the first machine is dominant and we have a semi-active schedule r.
We will show that the completion times of the jobs will not increase by putting them
on each machine in the same order as they are on the first machine.
Without loss of generality we assume the jobs have the order J~, ..., J„ on M~. Sup-
pose Mk (k ~ 1) is the first machine where the order of the jobs is different and let
J; be the first job which is nout of order" on Mk. Let a E {i -~ 1, ..., n} be such that
job Ja is scheduled right after J;-1 on Mk. According to lemma 7.2.6
i k-1
Fi,k-i(r) - ~ Pi.i -~ ~ Pi.~
j-t .,-s
a-1 k-1 i k-1
Fa,k-1(r) - ~ Pj.~ f~ Pa., ,~ Pj,~ -4- ~ Pa,s.
j-1 s-] j-1 s-1
k-1 k-2
So Fa,k-1(r) - F;,k-~(r) 1 ~ Pa,, -~ P;,,t~ ~ P;,k ( here we use condition (7.1)).
- ~-i ,-i
Because also F;-l,k(r) G F;,k-~(r) (lemma 7.2.6) we can schedule job J; before job
Ja on Mk without causing any delay. D
To investigate the situation where the last machine is dominant we define the so-
called converse problem. Suppose we have a flow-shop problem where all jobs in J
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have to be processed by the machines in the order Ml, ..., Mm. With this problem
we associate the converse problem where all jobs in J have to be processed by the
machines in the order Mm, ..., Ml. For simplicity we rename the machines as follows:
Mk :- Mmtt-k for all k E{ 1, ..., m}.
So the processing time P,',k of a job J; E J on a machine Mk is equal to P;,mtl-k. If
we have a feasible schedule r for the original problem, determined by the starting
times T~,k(r), then the starting times T~ k(r') :- C711eX(r) - F~ mtl-k(T) of job J~ E J
on machine Mk (k - 1,...,m; j - 1,...,n) determine a feasible schedule T' for the
converse problem. We will refer to this schedule as the conversed schedule. Note
that the converse of the conversed problem is again the original problem. A relation
between dominance of machines and the conversion of a flow-shop problem is given
in the next lemma.
Lemma 7.2.8 If we have a flow-shop problem where the last machine is dominant,
then in the conversed problem the first machine is dominant.
Proof. Suppose we have a problem where ~kr P~,k ~~k r P;,k-1 for all i, j E N,
i~ j, and all r E{2, ..., m}. To prove that the first machine is dominant in the
r r
conversed problem, we have to prove that ~l P~ k~~l P;',ktl for all i, j E N, i~ j,
and all r E{1,...,m - 1}. So, let r E{1,...,rn - 1} and i, j E N,i ~ j. Then
r m
i







~ Pi,k-1 - ~ Pi,mt2-k - Pi,ktl'
k-mtl-r k-mt1-r k-1
The first part of lemma 7.2.9 implies that a Gantt diagram as shown in figure 7.2 is
typical if the last machine is dominant.
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Figure 7.2
Lemma 7.2.9 If the last machine is dominant and á is a semi-active permutation
schedule corresponding to v E P(N), then the completion time of a job Jl;l is
m-1 i
C[il(~) - ~ P[Il.k } ~ P[ll.m'
k-1 j-1
Furthermore, for each regular criterion there is a permutation schedule which is
optimal for this criterion.
Pmof. Suppose we have a flow-shop problem where the last machine is dominant
and suppose we also have a semi-active time table ~r, where the jobs are in order
a E P(N) for machine Mm. We will show that the completion times of the jobs will
not increase by putting them on each machine in order o.
Consider the converse problem and the conversed time table ~r with processing times
P;'k. According to lemma 7.2.8 the first machine is dominant in the conversed prob-
lem. Hence, according to lemma 7.2.7 for the semi-active permutation schedule r
corresponding to r E P(N) with r(i) :- n f 1 - v(i) for all i E N we have that
the completion times C;(T) are less than or equal to the completion times C;(a') in
the conversed schedule. Further, applying lemma 7.2.6 we see that the starting time
i k-1
Tr-,~;l.k(T) is equal to ~ P' , f~ P' , ( i E {1 n}~ k E{1 m} ).r- (i),l r- ( i),a , . . . , , , . . . ,
j-1 s-2
We again converse the problem together with the permutation schedule r we ob-
tained. Now we have a permutation schedule ó corresponding to a E P(N) which
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is feasible for the original problem. For the completion times oí this schedule the
following holds ( [i] - a-1(i)):
C[i]l~) - Cmax(T) - T[i],1(T)
m m ~
- ~ Pfjl,l f ~ P[11.k - ~ PGIa
;-1 k-2 ;-i}1
n m-1 [n~
~ PÍJ],m f ~ P[1],k - L P[Jl,m
j-1 k-1 j-i}1
m-1 i
~ P[1],k f ~ Pl,],m.
k-1 j-1
We still have to show that the completion times C;(Q) are less than or equal to the
completion-times C;(~r), i.e. we have to show that
m-1 i
~ P[]],k f~ PU],m - C[il(~) c C[i](~)~
k-1 j-1
Note that in the original schedule ~r the jobs are in order Q on M,,,, so
m i-1




Now we can prove theorem 7.2.5.
Proof of theorem 7.2.5. Suppose we have a flow-shop problem where machine Me
is dominant and suppose we also have a time table r, where the jobs are in order
a E P(N) for machine Me. We will show that the completion times of the jobs do
not increase by putting the jobs in order a on each lnachine. We will do this in two
steps: First we adjust the order of the jobs on the machines preceding the dominant
machine, in which case we can use lemma 7.2.9, and then we adjust the order of
the jobs on the machines following the dominant machine, in which case we can use
lemmas 7.2.6 and 7.2.7.
We make a new semi-active schedule a by putting the jobs in order o for each
machine Mk (k - 1, ..., Q- 1) and maintaining the job-order on the other machines
according to the time table r. Then, by lemma 7.2.9 we know ([i] - a-1(i))
f-1 ~
~ P[1],k f ~ P~],e - r[i].e(~) C F[~],e(T)
k-t j-1
7.3 Algorithms gg
for each i E N. So C;(a) C C;(r) for all i E N. Now we make a semi-active
permutation schedule Q corresponding to o and according to lemma 7.2.7 we have
cG](Q) - Tp],r(~) ~ ~[i](~) - ~[~L[(~)
for all i E{1,...,n}. Because T[1],r(á) - T[~],[(n) we know C[;](v) C C[;1(~r) C C[,7(r)
for all i E{1,...,n}. Furthermore, lemma 7.2.6 implies
m
CG](a) - F[i],r(~) f ~ P[i],k
k-[tl
m [-1 i m
- F[i],r(n) f ~ PGI,k -~ P[ll,k t~ P~],[ f~ P[;l,k.
k-[tl k-1 j-1 k-lt1
7.3 Algorithms
In this section we will give algorithms to find an optimal schedule for flow-shops
with a dominant machine with respect to the weighted completion times criterion
and the maximal lateness criterion.
Suppose we have a flow-shop with a dominant machine and suppose each job J;
costs a; ~ 0 per time unit as long as it is not yet completed. Now we are interested
in finding a feasible schedule r which minimizes the total cost ~ cr;C;(r). Since
i-1
this is a regular criterion theorem 7.2.5 tells us that we can restrict our search to
permutation schedules. Theorem 7.3.2 states that if machine Mr is dominant, we
obtain an optimal permutation schedule from the following algorithm.
Algorithm A.
(I) Compute the urgency a;~P;,r for each i E N.
(II) Define o E P(N) such that for each i E{ l, ..., n- 1}
~[i],P(i],r ? ~[it1]IP[it,],[~
(III) Compute for each i E N
n [-I i-I
D[~1 :- ~ ~j ~~P[1],k - P[;],k) - ~(a[j]P[i],e - o[i]P~],r).
,7-1 k-1 j-1
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(IV) Let i' E N be such that D;. - max Dj and define r as follows:
j
IfD;.~O T:-v
1 if j - i`
If D;. 1 0 r(j) :- o(j) f 1 if j E PRo(i')
Q(j) if i" E PRo(j).
This algorithm puts the jobs in an order such that the urgencies do not increase
(steps (I) and (II)) and decides afterwards which job should be processed first (steps
(III) and (IV)). As we will see in the proof of theorem 7.3.2, D~;l measures the gain
by putting job J~;~ first against the loss by the lower urgency.
Note that in steps (III) and (IV) of algorithm A it sufl'ices to consider jobs J~;l for
which the processing time on the machines preceding the dominant machine ( the
c-1 i-1
term ~ P;,k ) is smaller than for job Jl~l, because ~(ahlPl;l,e - a1;1PUl,e) is non-
k-1 j-1
positive for every i E N. Hence, it follows that it is immediately clear which job
should be processed first if the job with the highest urgency happens to be the job
with the shortest processing time on the machines preceeding the dominant machine.
We demonstrate algorithm A in the next example.
Example 7.3.1 Consider a flow-shop with 4 jobs and 6 machines and processing
times matrix
P-
2 3 5 4 5 1
6 2 3 5 2 4
3 2 4 5 1 6
1 3 2 6 1 2
Some calculation shows that the fourth machine is dominant. In addition, suppose
that the cost per time unit of the jobs are al - a.Z - a3 - a4 - 2.
According to step (I) of the algorithm we compute
~i 1 02 aa 2 ~4 iand---
P1,4 - 2~ P2,4 - P3,9 - 5~
P4,4 3
Hence, in step (II) we find the permutation v with a(i) - i, i E{1,...,4}. (Note
that we can also switch jobs J2 and J3, because they have equal urgencies.) We





Now, applying step ( IV) we find the permutation r defined by r(I) - 2, r(2) - 3,
r(3) - 4 and r(4) - 1.
Theorem 7.3.2 If we have a flow-shop where machine MP is dominant then the
semi-active permutation schedule corresponding to r which we obtain with algorithm
A, is an optimal schedule for the criterion Eo;C;.
Proof. Suppose we have a flow-shop where machine MP (for some P E{1,...,m}) is
dominant. If rT E P(N) theorem 7.2.5 tells us that for each i E N
[-1 i m
C(i](~) -~ P[1Lk -~ ~ PG1,P f ~ P(;l,k.
k-1 j-1 k-[}1
So the total cost equals
n l-I n i n m
~ ~(il ~ P[1],k ~ L~ a('] ~ PUI.e ~ ~ a(ij ~ P(il,k.
i-1 k-1 i-1 j-1 i-1 k-e}1
If we switch job J[;.1 and job J(;.}11 ( i' E{2, ..., n- 1}), obtaining p E P(N), the
total cost equals ( [[i]] - p-1(i))
n n [-1 i m l
~ a[f~]]C[(ill (P) -~ o[[il] ~ P[[1]],k f ~ P[[i11.P f ~ P[[ill.k I
i-1 i-1 k-1 j-1 k-et1 ii
n P-I i m l
~ a(~1 ~ P[ll.k f~ PUI,[ f~ P(ij,k I f
i-1;i~i',i'tl k-1 j-1 k-C}1 f
[-1 i'}1 m
~[i'1 ~ P[11,k -F ~ PGI.e f ~ P(;.l.kl -~
k-1 j-1 k-lt1 J
C-1 i'-1 m 1
~(~'fl] ~ P[ll,k f~ P~l,e f P(i'tll,e -1- ~ P(;'til,k I
k-1 j-1 k-t}1 J
n (-I n i n m
-~a(i] ~ P(1),k f~~[il ~ PGI,e f ~ a(il ~ P(il,k f
i-1 k-1 i-t ~-1 i-1 k-l}1
~[i'IP[i'fl],t - rY(;.~,1P(;.1.(.
So with this switch the total cost increases with an amount equal to
a(;.1P[;.t,l.e - o(;.t,1P(;.1,P.
Hence, a permutation p corresponding to a permutation schedule p with minimal
total cost has to be such that for each i E{2, ..., n- 1}
av-'(i)~Pv-'(~).P ~ av-'(~tl)~Pv-'(itl~,P.
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So, we define p E~r(N) such that for each i E{ 1, ..., n- 1}
~G-'(i)~Pv-'(i).e 1 aa-'(ifl)I Pn-~(;fl).e-
The only thing we have to do yet is to determine which job should be the first one
in order to minimize the total cost.
If we pick job JP-~~;.1 and make this job the first one while the other jobs stay in
the same order, obtaining r E P(N), the total cost is ([[i]] - p-1(i); [i] - r-1(i))
n
~ a[ilC[il (T )
i-1
n (!-1 i m
~ ~[;] I ~ P[]l,k -} ~ P[,l,e ~ ~ P[il,k
i-1 `k-1 j-1 k-[}1
i'-1 ~!-1 i m
~ a[[ill ~ P[[i'll,k f ~ P(U]],! f P[[i'll,! f~ P[(i]],k~ }
i-1 k-1 j-1 k-f}1
m n !-1 i m
~[[i'1) ~ P[[i'll,k ~- ~ a[[ill ~ P[[i'll,k f~ P[[,11,L f~ P[(ill,k
k-1 i-i'ti k-1 j-1 k-!}1
n !-1 n i n m
L. ~[[ill ~ P[[i']],k ~~ a[[ill ~ P[(i]],! f~ a[[ill ~ P[Pll,k f
i-1 k-1 i-1 j-1 i-1 k-1tl
i'-1 i'-1
~ a[(i]1P[Ii'U.! - ~[G']] ~ P[G1L1.
So, when going from p to r the total cost decreases with an amount equal to
n L-1 i'-1
~ a[[ill ~(P[[1]].k - P[[i'll,k) - ~ (~[[i11P[[i'll,e - a[[i'11 P[[,]Lt)-
i-1 k-1 j-1
Note that this is the expression for D[[;.11. Hence, we have to make the job J[[;p
with D[[;11 ~ 0 maximal the first one and that is exactly what we do in step (IV) of
algorithm A. 0
Now, suppose we have a flow-shop with a dominant machine and suppose each job
J; has a due date d; ) 0. If we have a feasible schedule r then the lateness of job J; is
L;(r) - C;(r) - d;, the difference between the completion time of job J; and its due
date. We are interested in finding a feasible schedule r which minirnizes the maximal
lateness L,,,~(r) - max L;(r). Since this is a regular criterion theorem 7.2.5 tells
i
us that we can restrict our search to permutation schedules. Theorem 7.3.4 states





(I) Compute the Q-due date D; :- d; - ~ P;,k for each i E N.
k-c}1
(II) Define Q E P(N) such that for each i E{ 1, ..., n- 1}
Dl;l C D~~}11.
(III) Compute for each i E N and each j E N
m
E P;,k - d~
k-1
c-1
Li(~) f Pt,c - ~ (Po-~(1),k - P;,k)
k-1
1-1
Li(a) - ~1(Po-~(1),k - P~~k)
(IV) Compute for each i E N
ifj-i
if j E PRo(i)
if i E PRo(j).
.- max L'~.
i
(V) Let i` E N be such that Li,;~X - min L,'nax and define r as follows:
i
If L;,,~ - L1118x(á) r:- o
1 if j -i'
If L;,;~ C Lí11ex(v) r(j) :- Q(j) ~ 1 if j E PRo(i')
Q(j) if i' E PRo(j).
This algorithm puts the jobs in an order such that the Q-due dates do not decrease
(steps (I) and (II)) and decides afterwards which job should be processed first (steps
(III) and (IV)). L~ is the lateness of job J~ when job J; is put first.
Example 7.3.3 Consider the flow-shop problem described in example 7.3.1. In
addition, suppose that the due dates of the jobs are given by dl - 16, d2 - 13, and
d3 - d4 - 15. According to step (I) of the algorithm we compute
D1-16-6-10, D2-13-6-7, D3-15-7-8andD4-15-3-12.
Hence, in step ( II) we find the permutatiion a with v(1) - 3, a(2) - 1, 0(3) - 2
and v(4) - 4. We proceed with steps ([II) and (IV). Using theorem 7.2.5 we first
compute
Cl(Q)- 11 f 14f6-31, Cz(v)- I1 f5f6-22,
C3(ó)-114-1Of7-28andC4(á)-11-~20-~3-34.
,
- ! .?~t,' r-~r ~ ~.~2
f y~~,. ~ kr~ ~:[
~i( ~~A~I . ~'.i1 ~C
L Cn. ~~ . ~hn l1.




Further calculation shows that, G,l,,,x - 18, Lma,~ - 17 and L,4„ax - 10. Therefore, in
step (V) we find the permutation r with r(1) - 4, r(2) - 2, r(3) - 3 and r(4) - 1.
Theorem 7.3.4 If we have a flow-shop where machine Me is dominant then the
semi-active permutation schedule corresponding to r which we obtain with algorithm
B, is an optimal schedule for the criterion Lmax.
PmoJ. Suppose we have a flow shop where machine Ml (for some e E{1, ... , m}) is
dominant. If rr E P(N) theorem 7.2.5 tells us that for each i E N
t-1 i m
C[i](~) - ~ P(1],k ~ ~ P[j]~e } ~ P[;],k.
k-1 j-1 k-[tl
Suppose a E P(N) and i` E {2, .. ., n- 1} are such that
m
d[;.] -~ P[;.l.k ~ d[;'fl] -~ P[i'f~],k.
k-[tl k-l}1





~ P[l),k ~ ~ P[j],! ~ ~ P[i'tl]~k - d[i'}1]
k-1 ,7-1 k-l}t
f-1 i'-1 m
~~ P(~),k -~ ~ PGI,e f P[;'tl].r f ~ P[;.t~],k - d[;'tl) - L[i'tl](P)
k-1 ~-1 k-ef1
[-1 i'}1 m
L[i'fl](~) ~ ~ P(1],k ~ ~ P[j],e ~ ~ P[i'].k - ~[i'] - L[i'](~)~
k-1 j-1 k-(tl
Because Cj(Q) - C~(p) for all j E N`{[i`], ~i' -f 1]} we see
Gmax(~) ! Gmax~i~)-
Hence, we can find a permutation a corresponding to an optimal permutation sched-
ule such that for each i E{2, ...,1I - 1}
m m
~(i] - ~ P[i],k ~ u[;tl] - ~ P[itl],k~
k-etl k-ef1
7.4 Sequencing games
So, we define o E P(N) such that for each i E { 1, . .., n- 1}
m m
dl;l -~ Pl;l,k ~ dl;t~l -~ Pl~f~l,k.
k-l}1 k-f}1
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The only thing we have to do yet is to determine which job should be the first one
in order to minimalize the maximal lateness.
If we pick job J; and make this job the first one while the other jobs stay in the
same order, obtaining v; E P(N), then the lateness of the jobs is
m
~ P~,k - d;
k-1
l-1
Li(~) f P:.e - ~ (Po-~(1),k - P;,k)
k-1
(-1
L.7(~) - ~1(Po-~~1),k - P;,k)
Hence, we have to make that job J; the first one with max L~(Q;) minimal and that
i
is exactly what is done in step ( V) of algorithm B. o
Remark. From the proof of the theorem it follows that if Q- 1 we can forget the
steps (III), (IV) and (V) of algorithm B. Note that in this case the algorithm is an
Earliest-Due-Date algorithm.
Using theorem 7.2.5 one can also easily give an algorithm to find an optimal sequence
for the regular criterion C,„~. Because the regular criteria Ea;W; and Ea;L; are
equivalent to the criterion Ea;C;, algorithm A gives us a sequence which is also
optimal for these criteria. Here, W; denotes the waiting time of a job J;, defined by
m
W; :- ~(T;,k - F;,k-1) -F T;,1. Further, since each sequence which is optimal for the
k-2
criterion L,,,~ is also optimal for the criterion Tm„~, algorithm B gives us a sequence
which is optimal for the regular criterion Tmax. Here, Tmgx denotes the maximal
tardiness and the tardiness T; of a job J; is defined by T; :- max{L;,O}.
7.4 Sequencing games
Suppose we have a set N of players who all have jobs that are to be processed
through a set oí machines. Or, stated differently, suppose each player has a job that
is part of a flow-shop problem. The jobs are arranged in an order v E P(N) before
the first machine and will consequently be processed according to the semi-active
permutation schedule á if the players do not switch jobs. Also suppose that each
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player i bears a cost a; ~ 0 per time unit as long as his job J; is not yet completed.
Obviously, the players may be able to make cost savings by rearranging the order
in which their jobs are to be processed on some of the machines. Now we can define
a corresponding cooperative game (N, vo) by defining for each coalition S C N the
worth vo(S) as the maximal cost savings that the members of the coalition can ensure
themselves by rearranging the positions of their jobs before some of the machines
through neighbour-switches within the coalition. Hence, the players in a coalition
S C N are only allowed to rearrange their jobs before one of the machines if all jobs
in between the jobs they want to rearrange belong to members of S. We call the
game (N,vo) the corresponding sequencing game. The sequencing games that were
introduced in Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs (1989) are in fact cooperative games which
are derived from one-machine flow-shops in the way we described above.
For a general flow-shop problem the game we defined can be rather complicated.
However, suppose the flow-shop problem under consideration has a dominant ma-
chine Mt. It then follows from theorem 7.2.5 that we only have to consider permu-
tation schedules and, hence, it suffices to consider the order of the jobs before the
first machine. If it is the first machine that is dominant, then we can say a lot more.
Suppose we have a flow-shop problem where the first machine is dominant. Then
from theorem 7.2.5 we know that
i m
C[~1(a) - ~ P[jl,~ f ~ P[tl,k
j-1 k-2
for each ~ E P(N) and i E N. Some calculation shows that in this case the total
cost decreases with an amount equal to
a(,fi]P[;l.i - a~;1P[;til,i
if we switch jobs Jl;l and J~;t~l, for each i E { 1, ..., m- 1}. So, we see that the
machines M2, ..., Mm are not relevant for determining cost savings and the resulting
sequencing game is equal to the sequencing game that arises from the one-machine
flow-shop with machine M~. Hence, sequencing games which are derived from flow-
shops where the first machine is dominant are sequencing games that are derived
from one-machine flow-shops and the results of Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs ( 1989) can
be generalized to sequencing games corresponding to flow-shops with a dominant
first machine. In particular, the games (N,z~~), a E P(N), are convex. Further, we
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can define an allocation rule for the cost savings of the grand coalition, the Equal
Cain Splitting rule ECS(N, vs) E R~, by
EGS; N, vo - '( ) :- 2 ~ 9i,; ~- ~ 9;,j~ ,
jEPRo(i) j:iEPRo(j)
where gj,; :- max{a;Pi,l - aiP;,l, 0} for all i, j E N. The interpretation of this rule
is that the optimal order for the grand coalition is accomplished through neighbour-
switches that are in itself profitable and, furthermore, every time such a neighbour-
switch occurs, the player owning the job that comes foreward in the order compen-
sates the player who owns the job that goes backward and the remainíng cost savings,
i.e. the cost savings for the player that comes foreward minus the compensation he
has to pay to the player going backward, are split equally among these two play-
ers. The resulting allocation of the cost savings is in the core of the corresponding
sequencing game, i.e. EGS(N,vo) E C(N,vo) for all o E P(N).
What can we say about the sequencing games corresponding to a flow-shop problem
where another than the first machine is dominant? Example 7.4.1 shows that these
games are not necessarily convex.
Example 7.4.1 Consider a flow-shop with 3 jobs and 2 machines and processing
times matrix
1 8
P- 2 8 .
2 9
It is easily checked that the second machine is dominant.
In addition, suppose that the cost per time unit for the players are al - 3, a2 - 4,
and a3 - 3 for players 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Hence, the urgency for player 1 is
8, for player 2 it is 2, and player 3 has urgency 3 . Note that this implies that job
Jz is the job with the highest urgency, whereas job Jl is the job with the shortest
processing time on the first machine. Suppose that the players are arranged before
the first machine in the order v E P(N) with Q(i) - í for every i E N.
We apply algorithm A to find the optimal order for the grand coalition: In step (II)
we find the order r E P(N) in which the jobs are lined up in order of decreasing
urgency, namely r(1) - 2, r(2) - 1 and r(3) - 3. Since job J~ is the only job that
has a shorter processing time on the first machine than job JT-~(1) - J2, in step (III)
we only have to compute D~ . Clearly, Dl -(3 -~ 4 f 3). (2 -1) -(4 . 8- 3 . 8) - 2~ 0.
Consequently, we find in step (IV) that Q is the optimal order for the grand coali-
tion. This implies that the maximal cost savings for the grand coalition equal 0.
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Now consider S:- {1} and T:- {1,3}. Obviously, neither the one-player coali-
tion S nor the separated coalition T can obtain any cost savings and, therefore,
vo(S) - v,(T) - 0. By switching jobs J~ and J2i coalition S U{2} can obtain cost
savings vo({1,2}) - 3.9-}-4.17-(4 . 10 ~- 3. 18) - 1. Further, the coalition TU{2}
cannot obtain any cost savings, as we computed above. Hence, we see that
vo(S U {2}) - vo(S) - 1 1 0- vv(T U {2}) - vo(T),
which shows that the sequencing game (N,vo) is not convex.
Now we showed that sequencing games are not necessarily convex, the question arises
whether we ca,n still find a nice rule to divide the cost savings of the grand coalition
among the players in such a way that we obtain a core-element of the corresponding
sequencing game. The answer to this question must again be negative, because the
sequencing game of example 7.4.1 has an empty core.
Chapter 8
Spanning network games
This chapter, which is based on van den Nouweland, Maschler and Tijs (1992),
deals with games that are associated with spanning network enterprises. Spanning
network enterprises model economic situations where a group of users has to finance
a network that connects them all to a central supplier. Spanning network games
were defined by Granot and Maschler (1991) and they generalize spanning tree games
(cf. Megiddo (1978)) and the more general monotonic minimum cost spanning tree
games (cf. Granot and Huberman (1981)). It is shown in this chapter that the class
of spanning network games coincides with the class of monotonic TU-games.
It is important to identify a class of games that are associated with a certain class
of economic situations, because such an identification enables one to decide whether
a certain solution concept is appropriate to the corresponding economic situations.
For example, if the class of games associated with the economic situations is the
class of simple games, then it makes no sense to recommend the Shapley value on
the basis of the original axioms of Shapley (1953), because the sum of simple games,
which appears in one of the axioms, is not a simple game and therefore the system
is not meaningful when restricted to that class.
An example of a class of games that correspond to economic situations can be
found in Shapley and Shubik (1969), who showed that the class of market games
equals the class of totally balanced games. líalai and Zemel (1982) proved that the
class of flow games corresponding to flow situations where each arc is controlled by
a single player, coincides with the class of non-negative totally balanced games. The
class of flow games corresponding to flow situations where the control games have
veto players was identified by Curiel, Derks and Tijs (1989) as the class of non-
negative balanced games. An example of a class of games corresponding to certain
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economic situations that is not identified (yet) is the class of games corresponding to
bankruptcy situations. Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1987) showed that bankruptcy
games are non-negative convex games, but they also showed that not every non-
negative convex game is a bankruptcy game.
In section 8.1 we formally introduce the model of a spanning network enterprise
and its corresponding spanning network game. Further, some properties of spanning
network games are investigated in this section and the class of monotonic minimum
cost spanning tree games is briefly addresssed. In section 8.2 a subclass of spanning
network games, the class of so-called simplex games, is introduced and it is proved
that every monotonic game is a simplex game.
8.1 Spanning network games
A spanning network enterprise is a structure S:- (V, E, a, b, N), where (V, E) is a
finite undirected graph containing a distinguished vertex, 0, called the root or the
eentral supplier. We assume that the graph (V, E) is connected. Further, a is a
function from E to R that associates with each edge e E E a cost a(e), and b is a
function from V to R associating with each vertex v E V a cost b(v). Note that
both a and b can also assign negative values, in which case they represent profits
rather than costs. In addition, N- {1,...,n} is a set of players. Each player is
located in a vertex v E V. Vertices, other than the root, that are not inhabited by
players will be called switch boaes. Note that we do not exclude the possibility that
several players are located in the same vertex, neither do we exclude the possibility
that the root is inhabited.
The pla}'ers are users of some good that can be provided by the central supplier.
Hence, the players in a coalition S C N want to build a network that connects them
to the root. Moreover, they want to do this in a cheapest possible way. Now, it is
important to note that players are only located in vertices, they do not own them
and cannot prevent other players from using the vertices they inhabit. Further,
the players in a coalition S may find it profitable to utilize edges and vertices that
they do not need for the actual connection to the root. They are allowed to do so.
However, we do require that the network that is built by a coalition is connected
and that it contains both end points of every edge it contains. Correspondingly, for
every coalition S C N the cost c( S) is defined to be the cost of a least expensive
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connected subnetwork of (V, E) that connects all players in S to the root. Here, the
cost of a subnetwork G' -(V', E') is w(G') -~„EV, b(v) f~~EE, a(e). In the above
we defined a cost game FS - (N, c) associated with a spanning network enterprise
S. The game I'S is called (the corresponding) spanning network game.
There is somewhat of a problem with the empty set of players. Should we require
an empty coalition to pay the cost of the root? We will not do so here. Instead, we
simply define c(0) :- 0. It can be checked from van den Nouweland, Maschler and
Tijs (1992) that the results in this chapter still hold if we require an empty coalition
to pay the cost of the root.
Example 8.1.1 Let N- { 1, 2, 3} and consider the network that is represented in
figure 8.1, where the root is denoted by a triangle p and switch boxes are denoted
by a square O, and where we omitted the costs that equal zero.
Figure 8.1
Then the cost for coalition { 1} is c( { 1})- 3- 1~- 2- 4. Further, an optimal
subnetwork for coalition {2} is given in figure 8.2.
Figure 82
Hence, for the spanning network game ( N,c) associated with this network
c({2})-3-1 f5-3-4.
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The game (N, c) is given in table 8.1.
c(S)
{1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
4 4 5 6 7 5 7
Table 8.1
Theorem 8.1.2, which is due to Cranot and Maschler (1991), shows that spanning
network games are monotonic.
Definition. A TU-game (N,c) is monotonic if
c(S) C c(T) for all S C T C N.
Theorem 8.1.2 Let S-(V, E, a, b, N) be a spanning network enterprise. Then
the associated spanning network game I'S is monotonic.
Proof. Let I'S -(N, c) and S C T C N. Suppose GT -(VT , ET ) is a subnetwork
that is optimal for coalition T, i.e. GT connects all players in T to the root and
w(GT) - c(T). Since S C T, the network GT also connects all players in S to the
root. Hence, the players in coalition S have to spend no more than c(T) to build a
connected subnetwork that connects all players in S to the root. This shows that
c(S) C c(T). a
The following theorem shows that if all costs in a spanning network enterprise are
non-negative, then the corresponding spanning network game is subadditive.
Definition. A TU-game (N,c) subadditive if
c(S U T) C c( S) f c(T) íor all disjoint S,T C r~`.
Theorem 8.1.3 Let S- (V, E, a, 6, .N ) be a spanning network enterprise where
a(e) ~ 0 for all e E E and b(v) ~ 0 for all i~ E V. Then the spanning network game
I'S is subadditive.
Proof. Let FS -(N, c) and S,T C N such that S(1 T-~. Suppose Gs - (Vs, Es)
is a subnetwork that is optimal for coalition S, i.e. Gs connects all players in S to
the root and w(Gs) - c(S), and let GT -(VT,ET) be an optimal subnetwork for
coalition T. Consider the network GsuT :- (Vs U VT, Es U F.T ). Since the root
must be contained in both Vs and VT, the network GsuT is connected. Further, it
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obviously connects all players in S U T to the root. Moreover, with respect to the
cost of the network GsuT we have
w(GsuT) ~ b(v) f ~ a(e)
vEVSUVT eEESUET
~ b(z') f ~ b(z') - ~ b(v) ~
vEVs vEVT vEVSnVT
~ a(e) f ~ a(e) - ~ a(e)
eEEs eEET eEESnET
w(Gs) f w(GT )- ~ b(v) - ~ a(e)
vEVsnVT eEESnET
w(Gs) ~- w(G~) - c(S) -F c(T),C
where the inequality follows from the fact that all a(e) and b(v) are non-negative.
This shows that the coalition SUT has to spend no more than c(S)-}-c(T) to build a
connected subnetwork that connects the players of this coalition to the root. Hence,
we have c(S U T) G c(S) ~- c(T). O
Example 8.1.4 shows that spanning network games are not in general subadditive.
Example 8.1.4 Let N-{1,2} and consider the network that is represented in
figure 8.3.
Figure 8.3
The spanning network game (N,c) associated with this network is not subadditive,
because it satisfies c({1}) - c({2}) - 0 and c(N) - 1.
Now, we briefly discuss monotonic minimum cost spanning tree games. Monotonic
minimum cost spanning tree enterprises are spanning network enterprises that sat-
isfy the following requirements. First of all, there are no switch boxes and every
vertex other than the root is inhabited by exactly one player whereas the root is
not inhabited by any player. Further, there are no costs associated with the vertices
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(b(v) - 0 for all v E V) and the costs associated with the edges are non-negative
(a(e) ~ 0 for all e E E). Monotonic minimum cost spanning tree games are span-
ning network games that are derived from monotonic minimum cost spanning tree
enterprises. It follows from theorems 8.1.2 and 8.1.3 that monotonic minimum cost
spanning tree games are monotonic and subadditive. Also, Granot and Huberman
(1981) proved that monotonic minimum cost spanning tree games have non-empty
cores. Here, the core of a cost game (N,c) E TUN is defined by
Core(N, c) :- {x E RN ~ ~ x; - c(N) and ~ x; C c(S) for all S C N}.
iEN iES -
The monotonic minimum cost spanning tree games do not exhaust the class of
monotonic subadditive games with non-empty cores. To see this, consider the games
4 if ~S~ - 1
({1,2,3},ca), a E[6,9], definedby ca(S) - 6 if ~S~ - 2. It isstraightforward
a if (S~ - 3
to check that the games ({1,2,3},ca) are monotonic subadditive games with non-
empty cores. We try to find a monotonic minimum cost spanning tree enterprise
that generates the game ({ 1, 2, 3}, ca). Since for every i E{ 1, 2, 3} it holds that
c({i}) - 4 C 6 G c(S) for every S C{1,2,3} with i E S and ~S~ ~ 2, the costs of
the edges connecting the root to the vertices inhabited by the players must be 4.
Further, since c(S) - 6 if ~S~ - 2, the costs of the edges connecting the vertices
inhabited by the players must be 6- 4- 2. Note that now the costs on all edges are
fixed and, consequently, c( { 1, 2, 3} )- 8 for the monotonic minimum cost spanning
tree game associated with the spanning network enterprise we built. Hence, if ~~ 8
the game ({ 1, 2, 3}, ca) is no monotonic minimum cost spanning tree game.
Example 8.1.5, which is due to Tamir (1991), shows that the presence of switch
boxes may cause the core of a spanning network gatne to be empty.
Example 8.1.5 Let N-{1,2,3} and consider the network that is represented in
figure 8.4.
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Figure 8.4
The spanning network game (N,c) associated with this network satisfies c({i}) - 2
for i E N, c(S) - 3 if ~S~ - 2 and c(N) - 5. It is easily seen that the core of this
game is empty.
8.2 Simplex games
In this section we show that every monotonic transferable utility game is a spanning
network game. In fact, we construct for each n E N a so called simplex network,
that is shown to generate all monotonic games with player set { 1, ..., n} just by
adapting the costs of the vertices.
We cannot avoid using switch boxes. This becomes clear when we consider the game
({1,2,3},c), defined by c(S) - 2 if ~S~ - 1, c(S) - 5 if ~S~ - 2 and c({1,2,3}) - 9.
Clearly, this game is monotonic. However, there is no spanning network enterprise
without switch boxes that generates the game ( {1,2,3},c).
In the following, let n E N be fixed and N-{1, ..., n}. The simplex network
ON -(Vn,, EN) is constructed as follows. The central supplier is identified with the
origin, the vertex 0, and player i is identified with the vertex e', i E N. Further,
for each non-empty coalition S C N there is a vertex ds, the door for coalition S.
For {i} C N this door is the vertex Ze`, and for S C N with ~S~ ~ 2 this door is
the vertex ~S~es, the center of gravity of the vertices e' with i E S. Finally, there
is a reward vertex R, which is the vertex eN. All edges in the simplex network are
incident to a door ds: For every non-empty S C N the door ds is directly connected
to the central supplier 0, to the reward vertex R, and to all e' with i E S.
The simplex network for n- 3 is sketched in figure 8.5. In this figure the edges
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connecting the doors ds to the central supplier are of the form -.- and the edges
connecting the doors ds to the vertices e` with i E S are of the form ---. In
order to get a clear picture the edges between the doors ds and the reward vertex
are all omitted and, moreover, the edges of the unit cube are drawn in straight lines,

















We proceed by providing for every game (N, c) a set of costs attached to the vertices
of the simplex network ~N. In this, we will use for a game (N, c) the number
a(c) E Rt defined by
k
a(c) :- max ~0 , max max ~(k - 1)-i(c(S) - ~ c(T~))~ ,
SCN:~S~~2 (T,.....Tk)EP(S) ~-l
where for S C N, P(S) denotes the set of aIJ partitions of S' in at least two (non-
empty) subcoalitions. The number a(c) can be thought of as some sort of ineasure
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of non-subadditivity of (N,c). Note that a(c) - 0 for subadditive games (N,c).
Now let (N, c) be fixed. We define all edges in the simplex network ON to be
costless, as well as the vertices corresponding to the central supplier and the single
players. Further, for every coalition S, S~ 0, the cost of the vertex ds, the door
for coalition S, is c(S) - }- a(c), and to the reward vertex R we assign the cost -a(c)
(the reward a(c)). Now we have the following result.
Theorem 8.2.1 Let (N, c) be a monotonic game with c(0) - 0. Then the simplex
network ~N with costs as described above, generates the game (N, c).
Proof. We first consider the empty coalition. Obviously, the network consisting of
the root only, is feasible for ~. Hence, c(0) C 0. Further, the only vertex with
a(possibly) negative cost is the reward vertex R. A connected subnetwork that
includes R and the root must necessarily include one of the costly doors. Since
the cost of a door is at least a(c), it is not profitable to build such a subnetwork.
Therefore, c(~) - 0.
Now, let S C N, S~ 0. We have to prove two things, namely that there is a
subnetwork of ~N that is feasible for S and has cost c(S), and that every subnetwork
of ON which is feasible for S costs at least c(S).
Obviously, the subnetwork of ON that is spanned by the central supplier, the door ds,
the vertices e' with i E S, and the reward vertex, is a feasible network for coalition S.
The cost of this network is c(S) -}- a(c) -}- (-a(c)) - c(S).
Suppose G- (V, E) is another subnetwork of D~r that is feasible for coalition S.
Then this network has to contain the central supplier and the vertices e' for each
i E S. Moreover, the network has to be connected. Since for each i E N the vertex
e` is only directly connected to the doors dT with i E T C N, the fact that G
is connected implies that for every i E S there is a door dT~ contained in G with
i E T; C N. It is possible that we find the same door for different i. Hence, we can
find k E { 1, ..., ~S~ } and different Tl, ..., Tk C N satisfying S C ~J~-1 T; such that
G contains the doors dT~ ,... dTk . Using monotonicity of ( N, c), it is clear that for
all non-empty T C N it holds that c(T) ~ a(c) ~ c(0) ~- a(c) - a(e) ~ 0. Since
the reward vertex is the only vertex having a non-positive cost (-a(c)), we may
without loss of generality assume that R belongs to G and hence, the cost w(G) of
the network G is at least
k k
- a(c) ~~(c(T;) f a(c)) -(k - 1) a(c) f ~ c(T;). (8.1)
~-1 i-~
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We distinguish between two cases. If k- 1, then S C Tl must hold. Hence, by (8.1)
and monotonicity of (N, c) it follows that
w(G) ~ c(T~) 1 c(S).
If k~ 1, then we can find sets Ti, T2, ... Tk such that T~ C T~ for all j E { 1, . .., k}
and, moreover, {T~ ~ j E {1, . .. , k}, T~ ~~} forms a partition of S. One way to do
this is to define for all j E{ 1, ..., k}
i-1
T, .- (T, ~ S)` ~J T,-
~-~
Now it follows from (8.1) and the monotonicity of (N, c) that
k k
w(c) ~ ~ c(T;) ~ ( k -1) a(c) ~ ~ c(T,) ~ (k -1) a(c). (s.2);-, ;-~
From the definition of a(c) we derive that
~(c) ~ ~c(S) - ~ c(T~)~ (k - 1)-'. (8.3)
;-~
Combining (8.2) and (8.3) shows that
w(G) ~ c(S).
This completes the proof of the theorem. ~
A direct consequence of theorems 8.1.2 and 8.2.1 is
Corollary 8.2.2 The class of monotonic games coincides with the class of spanning
network games.
Also, using the fact that c~(c) - 0 for subadditive games (N,c) with c(0) - 0, we
derive from theorem 8.2.1
Corollary 8.2.3 For every monotonic subadditive game (N, c) with c(0) - 0 there
is a spanning network enterprise S- (V, E, a, b, N) with a 1 0 and 6 1 0 such that
the associated spanning network game I'S equals (N, c).
Chapter 9
Multi-choice games
This chapter deals with the so-called multi-choice games. A multi-choice game is
a cooperative game in which each player has a certain number of activity levels at
which he or she can choose to play. In particular, two players may have different
numbers of activity levels. The reward that a group of players can obtain depends
on the effort of the cooperating players. The class of multi-choice games contains
the class of (ordinary) TU-games as a subclass, because a coalitional game can be
viewed as a multi-choice game in which every player has two activity levels, namely
to participate or not to participate.
An example of a multi-choice game occurs when we consider a large building
project with a deadline and a penalty for every day with which this deadline is
exceeded. Obviously, the date of completion of the project depends on the effort
that is made by all people involved: the greater their effort is the sooner the project
will be completed. This situation gives rise to a multi-choice game where the worth
of a coalition in which each player works at a certain activity level is defined as
minus the penalty that is to be paid given the date of completion of the project
when every player makes the corresponding effort.
Another example of a multi-choice game appears in a large company with many
divisions, where the profits of the company depend on the performance of the divi-
sions. This gives rise to a multi-choice game in which the players are the divisions
and the worth of a coalition where each division functions at a certain level is the
corresponding profit made by the company.
We provide one more example of a situation that gives rise to a multi-choice
game. The performance of an orchestra heavily depends on the performance of the
individual musicians. Further, the performance of an individual musician is better
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if the effort made by this musician, like the time spent on practicing playing his
instrument, is larger. Now, an orchestra can charge more for its tickets and it will
attract more visitors if it is well known because of its beatiful performances. Hence,
this gives rise to a multi-choice game with the individual musicians as its players
and the entrance money that is earned for a concert as its payoff.
Multi-choice games were introduced by Hsiao and Raghavan (1990). However,
they only considered games in which all players have the same number of activity
levels, while we allow different numbers of activity levels for different players. In
their paper Hsiao and Raghavan introduced extended Shapley values for multi-choice
games where all players have the same number of activity levels. They did so by
using weights on activity levels, each level having the same weight for all players,
and they provided axiomatic characterizations of the corresponding Shapley values.
In this chapter, which is based on van den Nouweland, Potters, Tijs and Zarzuelo
(1991), cores and related solution concepts are extended to multi-choice games.
In section 9.1 imputations, cores and dominance cores of multi-choice games are
introduced and relations between those concepts are investigated. Also, a notion
of balancedness is introduced and a theorem in the spirit of Bondareva (1963) and
Shapley (1967) is proved. Further, in section 9.2 we introduce Weber sets and we
explore the relations between cores and Weber sets, especially for convex games.
Possible extensions of the Shapley value are discussed in section 9.3 and, based
on the notion of dominance introduced in section 9.1, stable sets and subsolutions
are introduced and studied in section 9.4. Section 9.5 discusses the application of
multi-choice games in flow-situations. It is shown that multi-choice flow games can
be related to non-negative multi-choice games with non-empty cores. Finally, in
section 9.6 we briefly discuss two recent models that are related to multi-choice
games.
9.1 Imputations, core and dominance core
In this section we define imputations, cores and dominance cores for multi-choice
games and we extensively investigate relations between cores and dominance cores.
Further, a not.ion of balancedness is introduced and it is shown that a multi-choice
game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. However, we first provide
the formal definition of a multi-choice game.
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Let N- { 1, ..., n} be a set of players and suppose each player i E N has m; levels
at which he can actively participate. We set M; :- {0,1, ..., m;} as the action space
of player i E N, where the action 0 means not participating. Hence, player i has
m; f 1 activity levels, including the action 0. For notational convenience we will
allow m; - 0 for some i E N. A function v: j-j;EN M; ~ R with v(0) - 0 gives
for each coalition s- (s~, ..., s„ ) E]-j;E~, M; the worth that the players can obtain
when each player i plays at level s; E M;.
Definition. A multi-choice game is a triple (N, m, v), where N is the set of players,
m E NN is the vector describing the number of activity levels for every player, and
v:]-j;EN M; -. R is the characteristic function.
If no confusion can arise a game (N, m, v) will be denoted by its characteristic
function v. The set of all multi-choice games with player set N and activity-level
vector m is denoted by MCN~"`. Note that with the definitions provided above, a
TU-game (N, v) is equal to the multi-choice game (N, (1, . .., 1), v). Hence, the class
of multi-choice games contains the class of TU-games as a subclass.
Let (N,m,v) E MCN~m. We define M:- {(í,j) ~ i E N,j E M;}. A(level) payoff
vector for the game v is a vector x E RM, where, for all i E N and j E M;`{0},
x;j denotes the increase in payoff to player i corresponding to a change of activity
from level j-1 to level j by this player and x;o - 0 for all i E N. Such a payoff
m,
vector is efj~icient if ~~ x;j - v(m) and it is level increase rational if, for all
iEN j-1
i E N and j E M;`{0}, x;j is at least the increase in worth that player i can
obtain when he works alone and changes his activity from level j-1 to level j, i.e.
x;j ~ v(je') - v((7-1)e').
A payoff vector is an imputation of (N,m,v) if it is efficient and level increase
rational. We denote the set of imputations of the game (N, m, v) by I(v). It is
easily seen that
1(v) ~ ~ ~~ ~ v(m;e') G v(m). (9.1)
iEN
Now let x be a payoff vector for the game (N,m,v). If a player i works at his jth
j
level (j E M;), then he obtains, according to x, the amount ~ x;k. It will often be
k-0
more natural to look at these accumulated payoffs. Therefore, for i E N and j E M;
j
we denote X;j :- ~ x;k. The members of a coalition s E ]-[iEN M; altogether obtain
k-0
X(s) :- ~ X;,,. Using this, we come to the following definition.
iEN
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Definition. The core C(v) of the game (N, m, v) consists of all x E I(v) that satisfy
X(s) ~ v(s) for all s E ]-[;EN M~.
Now let s E ]-j;Elv M; and x, y E I(v). The imputation y dominates the imputation x
via coalition s, denoted by y dom,x, if
Y(s) C v(s) and Y;,, ~.K;,,
for all i E C(s). Here C(s) :- {i E N ~ s; 1 0} is the carrierof s, the set of players
who participate in s. We say that the imputation y dominates the imputation x if
there exists an s E n;EN M; such that y dom,x.
Definition. The dominance core DC(v) of the game (N, m, v) consists of all imputa-
tions x with the property that there exists no imputation y such that y dominates x.
Theorems 9.1.1, 9.1.3 and 9.1.4 deal with the relations between the core and the
dominance core.
Theorem 9.1.1 For each game ( N, m, v) the core C(v) is a subset of the dominance
core DC(v).
Proof. Let x E C(v) and suppose y E I(v) and s E R;EN M;, s ~ 0, such that
y dom,x. Then
v(s) 1 Y(s) - ~ Y,,, ~~ X;,, - X(s) ? v(s),
~EN iEN
which clearly gives a contradiction. Therefore, x is not dominated. ~
To simplify the proof of theorem 9.1.3 we introduce zero-normalized multi-choice
games.
Definition. A multi-choice game ( N, m, v) is zero-nornaalized if the players cannot
gain anything by working alone, i.e. v(je`) - 0 for all i E N and j E~f;.
A multi-choice game (N, m, a) is o.dditive if the worth of each coalition s equals the
sum of the worths of the players when they all work alone at the level they work at
in s, or, in formula,
a(s) - ~ a(s;e')
;E,N
for all s E jj;E,v M,.
For an arbitrary multi-choice game (N,rra,i~) the ;ero-nor~nalization of (N,m,v) is
the game (N, m, vo) that is obtained by subtracting írom (N, m, v) the additive game
(N, m, a) with
a(Je~) :- Z~(Je~)
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for all i E N and j E M;`{0}. Hence,
vo(s) - v(s) - ~ v(s;e')
iEN
for all s E ]-[iEN Mi.
Let (N, m, v) be a zero-normalized game and x a payoff vector for (N, m, v). Then
the condition of level increase rationality boils down to the condition x 1 0. For an
additive game (N, m, a) we have C(a) - DC(a) - I(a) -{x}, where x E RM is
given by
xij :- a(.7e') - a((J-1)e')
foralliENandjEM;`{0}.
Lemma 9.1.2 Let (N, m, v) be an arbitrary game and (N, m, vo) its zero-nor-
malization. Let x be a payoff vector for the game (N, m, v) and define y E RM
by y;j - x;j - v(jei) f v((j-1)e`) for all i E N and j E M;`{0}. Then we have
(i) x E I(v) ~ y E I(vo)
(ii) x E C(v) G~ y E C(vo)
(iii) x E DC(v) ~ y E DC(vo).
Pmof. We only prove one implication of part (i) and leave the proofs of the other
implication and of parts (ii) and (iii) to the reader. Suppose x E I(v). Then
m, m,
~ ~ yii - ~ ~ ~xtj - v(7e~) ~ v((J - 1)et)~
iEN j-1 iEN j-1
m,
~(~ x;j - v(mie'))
iEN j-1
m,
~ ~ xii - ~ tilmie~)
iEN j-1 iEN
v(m) - ~ v(m;e') - vo(m),
iEN
where equality (~) follows from the fact that x is efficient for (N, m, v). Hence, y is
efficient for ( N, m, vo).
Now let i E N and j E M;`{0}. Then, using level increase rationality of x, we
immediately see
yi, - xij - v(je`) f v((J - 1)e`) ~ 0.
Hence, y is also level increase rational and we conclude y E I(vo). O
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Theorem 9.1.3 is an extension to multi-choice games of a theorem for TU-games by
Derks ( 1991).
Theorem 9.1.3 Let (N, m, v) be a multi-choice game with a non-empty dominance
core. Then the core C(v) equals the dominance core DC(v) if and only if the zero-
normalization (N, m, vo) of (N, m, v) satisfies vo(s) C vo(m) for all coalitions s.
Pmof. Because of lemma 9.1.2 it suffices to prove this theorem for zero-normalized
games. So, assume (N, m, v) is zero-normalized.
Suppose C(v) - DC(v). Then, since DC(v) ~ 0, we can choose x E C(v). Now we
have
s, m,
v(m) - X(m) - ~ ~~ij } ~ ~ ~ij
i v(s)
iEN j-1 iEN j-a,t1
for all s E]ZiEN Mi'
Now suppose v(s) G v(m) for all s E r[;EN M;. Since C(v) C DC(v) ( theorem 9.1.1),
it suffices to prove that x~ DC(v) for all x E 1(v)~C(v). Suppose x E!(v)~C(v)
and let s E rj;EN M; be such that X(s) C v(s). Define y E RM as follows:
x;j ~ v' -X ' if i E N, j E{1, .. ., s;}
- kEN'k
y~~ ~- v m v a 1
kEN~mk-~k)
lf 2 E N,, E{Si T 1,...,m;}.
It íollows readily from the definition of y that y is efbcient. Since x 1 0, v(s) J X(s)
and v(m) 1 v(s), it follows that y 1 0. Hence, y is also level increase rational and
we conclude that y E I(v).
For i E N and j E{ 1, ..., s;} we have that y;j 1 a;j. Iíence, Y;s, ~ X;,, for all
i E N. This and the fact that
~ ~ v(s) - X(s)
y(S) - ~ (S) } iEIV )L-,~ ~kE,V .S~ - 1'(S)
imply that y dom,x. Hence, r~ DC(v). ~
Theorem 9.1.4 Let ( N, m, v) be a multi-choice game with a non-empty core. Then
the core C(v) equals the dominance core DC(v).
Prooj. In view of lemma 9.1.2 it suffiices to prove the theorem for zero-normalized
games. So, assume~ (N, m, v) is zero-normalized. From the first part of the proof of
theorem 9.1.3 we see that the fact that C(v) ~ 0 implies that v(s) C v(m) for all
s E j-j;EN M;. Because C(v) C DC(v) (cf. theorem 9.1.1), we know that DC(v) ~ 0.
Now theorem 9.1.3 immediately implies C(v) - DC(v). ~
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Since the class of multi-choice games contains the class of TU-games as a subclass,
theorem 9.1.4 also holds for TU-games.
Considering theorem 9.1.4 one might ask if there actually exist games where the core
is not equal to the dominance core. The answer to this question is given in exam-
ple 9.1.5, where we provide a multi-choice game with an ernpty core and a non-empty
dominance core. To simplify the notations in the examples we represent a payoff
vector x E RM by a deficient n x m'-matrix [a;~~, where m' :- max{mr, ..., m„},
a;~ :- x;~ if i E N and j E M;`{0} and a;~ is left out (~) if í E N and j 1 m;.
Example 9.1.5 Let (N, m, v) be the multi-choice game given by N-{1, 2},
m-(2,1) and v((1,0)) - v((0, 1)) - 0, v((2,0)) - 1~4 and v((1, 1)) - v((2,1)) - 1.
An imputation x should satisfy the following (in)equalities:
~i,r f xr.z f xz,r - 1
Hence, we obtain
I(v) - co
xr,r ? O,xz,r ~ 0
~r,z ? 1~4.
~L3I4
1~41 ' r304 1~4J
~ L6 ~J~.
Note that for this game an imputation can only dominate another imputation via
the coalition ( 1,1) and, since xl,r -~ ~z,i C 3~4 for all z E I(v), this gives us
DC(v) - co
{r3,4 1~4j ~304 1~4j}
Finally, for none of the elements x lof the dorninance core x~,l ~ az,l 1 v((1, 1)) holds.
Since C(v) C DC(v) this gives us C(v) - 0. Note that for the zero-normalization
vo of v it holds that vo((1, 1)) - 1 1 3~4 - vo((2,1)).
We also provide an example of a TU-game for which the core is not equal to the
dominance core.
Example 9.1.6 Let (N,v) be a TU-game where N- {1,2,3} and v({1,2}) - 2,
v(N) - 1 and v(S) - 0 for all other S C N. The imputation set of (N, v) is
i(N,v) -~a{(l,o,o),(o,l,o),(o,o,l)}.
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Since imputations can only be dominated via coalition {1,2} and ~~ ~-xz C 1 for all
2 E I(N,v), this gives us
DC(N, v) - co {(1, 0, 0), (0,1, 0)} .
Since none of the elements of the dominance core is in the core, we see that
C(N, v) - 0.
For the game in example 9.1.5 the dominance core is a convex set. This is generally
true, as is stated in the following theorem, which also provides an interesting proof
of the convexity of the dominance core for TU-games.
Theorem 9.1.7 For a multi-choice game (N, m, v) both the core and the dominance
core are convex sets.
Proof. We omit the proof of the convexity of the core, because this is a simple
exercise. We now prove that the dominance core is convex. It suffices to prove
that DC(v) is convex if (N, m, v) is zero-normalized. So, assume (N, m, v) is zero-
normalized. Obviously, if DC(v) - 0, then it is convex. Now suppose DC(v) ~~.
We define a multi-choice game (N, m, w) and we show that DC(v) - DC(w) -
C(w). For all s E jI;EN M;
w(s) :- inin{v(s), v(m)}.
It is easily seen that
w(m) - v(m). (9.2)
Since DC(v) ~ 0 , we know that I(v) ~(~. Since ( N,m,v) is zero-normalized, this
implies v(m) ~ 0 (cf. (9.1)) and
w(je`) - min{u(je'),t~(m)} -0
for all i E N and j E M,. L'sing ( 9.2) and ( 9.3) we see that
1(w) - 1(v).
(9.3)
Now let s E j-[;EN M; and let ~, y E I(v) - I(w). Since w(s) C v(s) we see that if
x dom,y in (N, m, w), then .r dom,y in (N, rn, v). On the other hand, if ~ dom,y in
(N, m, v), then
.~ (s) ~ z~(s)
9.1 Imputations, core and dominance core 12?
and
m, m,
X (s) - ~ ~ x;j - ~ ~ x;j G v(m)
iEN j-1 iENj-s,}1
and therefore X(s) G w(s) and a dom,y in (N, m, w).
We conclude that
DC(w) - DC(v). (9.4)
This implies that DC(w) ~ 0. Since (N, m, w) is zero-normalized (cf. (9.3)) and
w(s) - min{v(s), v(m)} G v(m) - w(m),
theorem 9.1.3 shows that
C(w) - DC(w). (9.5)
Now (9.4), ( 9.5) and the convexity of C(w) immediately imply that the dominance
core DC(v) is convex. O
The next theorem is an extension of the theorem of Bondareva (1963) and Shapley
(1967) to multi-choice games and gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the
non-emptiness of the core of a game.
Definition. A multi-choice game (N, m, v) is balanced if for all maps ~: jj;E~, M; ~
Rt satisfying
~ ~(s)ec(s~ - eN
sEn E~, M,
it holds that
~ ~(s)vo(s) C vo(m),
sE~,E~, M,
where (N, m, vo) is the zero-normalization of (N, m, v).
Note that this definition coincides with the familiar definition of balancedness for
TU-games.
Theorem 9.1.8 Let (N, m, v) be a multi-choice game. Then the core C(v) of
(N, rn, v) is non-empty if and only if (N, m, v) is balanced.
Proof. It suffices to prove the theorem for zero-normalized games. So, assume
(N, m, v) is zero-normalized.
Suppose C(v) ~~ and x E C(v). Then we define a payoff vector y E R`y by
0 if i E N and j E{2,...,m;}
yij ~- m~~.~;~ ifiENandj-l.
e-i
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Then, obviously, y E C(v). Further, we can identify y with the vector ( y~,l, ..., y,,,l ).
This proves that C(v) ~ 0 if and only if there exist zl, ..., z„ E R~ such that
and
~ z; - v(m) (9.6)
iEN
~ z; 1 v(s)
iEC(a)
for all s E]T;EN M;. Obviously, there exist zl, ..., zn E R~ satisfying (9.6) and (9.7)
if and only if
v(m) - min { ~z;~z;ERforalliENand
iEN
~ z;1v(s)forallsE ~M;}. (9.8)
iEC(s) iEN
From the duality theorem of linear programming theory we know that (9.8) is equiv-
alent to
v(m) - max { ~ ~(s)v(s) I ~ ~(s)e~(') - eN,
SEn,EN M~ sE~~EN M,
a(s) 1 0 for all s E~ M;}. (9.9)
iEN
It is easily seen that ( 9.9) is equivalent to (N, m, v) being balanced. O
9.2 The Weber set
Weber ( 1988) considered for each cooperative game (N, v) the convex hull of all n!
marginal vectors corresponding to v and he showed that the core of a game is always
a subset of this so-called Weber set. Shapley (1971) showed that for convex games
the core coincides with the Weber set and Iehiishi ( 1983) proved the converse, i.e.
a game for which the core coincides with the Weber set is convex. In this section
we will extend the definition of the Weber set to multi-choice games and investigate
the relations between the core and the Weber set of a multi-choice game.
First we define the marginal vectors of a multi-choice game. Let (N, m, v) E MCN,m
Suppose the coalition m forms step by step, starting from the coalition ( 0, ..., 0) and
where in each step the level of one of the players is increased by 1. So, in particular,
there are ~;E~r m; steps in this procedure. Now assign for every player to each level
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the marginal value that is created when that player reaches that particular level
from the level directly below. This is formalized as follows:
Define Mf :- {(i, j) ~ i E N, j E M;`{0}}. An admissíble order (for (N,m,v)) is a
bijection o : M} -~ {1,2,...,~;ENm;} satisfying
~((~~7)) G ~((~,~ ~- 1))
for all i E N and j E { 1, 2, ..., m; - 1}. The number of admissible orders for
(N, m, v) is
(~;EN mi)~
11iEN(m~~)
Now let v be an admissible order and let k E{1,...,~;ENm;}. The coalition that
is present after k steps according to o-, denoted by so~k, is given by
s;'k :- max ({j E M;~{0} ~ o((i, j)) G k} U{0})
for all i E N, and the marginal vector wo E RM corresponding to o is defined by
wQ - v (sa.o(G,i))~ - v (so~o((i,i))-1~~,i - `
foralliENand j EM;`{0}.
In general the marginal vectors of a multi-choice game are not necessarily imputa-
tions, but for zero-monotonic games they are.
Definition. A multi-choice game (N, m, v) is zem-monotonic if its zero-normal-
ization is monotonic, i.e.
vo(s) G vo(t)
for all s, t E n;EN M; with s G t.
We leave the proof of the following theorem to the reader.
Theorem 9.2.1 Let ( N, m, v) be a zero-monotonic multi-choice game. Then for
every admissible order o the marginal vector corresponding to o is an imputation
of v.
Definition. The Weóer set W(v) of a multi-choice game (N,m,v) is the convex
hull of the marginal vectors of (N, m, v), or, in formula,
W(v) - co {wo ~ o is an admissible order for (N,m, v)}.
130 Multi-choice games
It is well-known that for TU-games the Weber set contains the core, i.e. for every
TU-game (N, v), C(N, v) C W(N, v). For multi-choice games this is not true (see
e.g. example 9.2.5). However, theorem 9.2.3 shows that a somewhat weaker result
also holds for multi-choice games. First we provide another definition.
Definition. Let (N, m, v) E MCN~"` and let x E RM and y E RM be two payoff
vectors for the game (N, m, v). Then x is cumulatively smaller than y if
X(s) G Y(s)
for all s E j~j;EN M;.
Note that this does not imply that x;~ C y;~ for all i E N and j E M;. Further, the
definition implies that every payoff vector x is cumulatively smaller than itselí. We
consider an example.
Example 9.2.2 Let (N,m,v) be the multi-choice game given by N-{1,2},
m-{2,1} and v((1,0)) - v((0,1)) - 1, v((2,0)) - 2, v((1,1)) - 3 and
v((2, 1)) - 5. Now consider the two core-elements x and y, defined by
x- I2 ~ 1 , y- [2 ~,
Then x is cumulatively smaller than y, since
X((1,0)) C Y((1,0)), X((1, 1)) c Y((1,1)) and X(s) - Y(s) for all other s.
What is causing this is the fact that, although according to both payoff vectors
player 1 gets 3 for playing at his second level, according to y he gets 2 for playing
at his first level and according to x he gets only 1 at the first level.
Now we are ready to formulate theorem 9.2.3. This theorem is due to van den
Nouweland, Potters, Tijs and Zarzuelo (1991) and the proof they gave is an induction
proof similar to the proof for TU-games given in Weber (1988). Recently, Derks
(1992) gave a direct proof of the inclusion of the core in the Weber set for the case
of TU-games and Derks and Cilles (1992) indicated how this proof can be adapted
for multi-choice games. This resulted in the proof we provide here.
Theorem 9.2.3 For each multi-choice game (N, m, v) and each core-element x of
(N, m, v) there is a vector y in the Weber set of (N, m, v) that is cumulatively smaller
than x.
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Proof. Define W(v) :- {y E RM ~ there is a vector z E W(v) that is cumulatively
smaller than y}. Obviously, W(i~) is a closed and convex set. We have to prove that
C(v) C W(v). So, suppose this is not the case and let ~ E C(v)`W(v). Using the
separation theorem (cf. Rockafellar (1970)), we know there is a z E RM with the
property that
m,
~ ~ y~i z~i
iEN 7-1
~ ~ ~ ~~i z~i
iEN j-1
(9.10)
for every y E W(v). For the vector z it must hold that z;a-1 ~ z;j for all i E N
and j E{2, ..., m;}. This can be seen as follows. Set a:- ~;EN ~~'1 x;iz;i and let




5ince y is cumulatively smaller than yp for each Q E R~, it holds that yp E W(v)
for each Q E R~. Using (9.10) we see that
mk
L~ ~ yklzkl -
mk
~~yk~zkl f Q(zi,i-1 - zii) 1 a
kEN l-1 kEN l-1
for each Q E Rt. This can only be true if z;,j-1 ~ z;j.
Using this specific property of z, we can find an order o that is admissible for
(N, m, v) and that satisfies the property that
zo-~ (k-1) ~ ~o-t (k)
for all k E{2, ...,~;EN m;}. Consider the marginal vector wo E W(v) C W(v).






~ ~ zi~ (v
~So.o((i.i))~ - v (so~a((i.i))-1 ~~
iEN j-1
m-1
za-1(m),V(,t,l,t) - zo-~(1)Z](O) }~` 1, rSa.kl r,zo- (k) - zo-~(ktl)~
k-1
m-t
o,k~ .~ S ) (.',o-t(k) - Zo-t(ktl)) f `'o-t(m)'~(m)
k-7
m
~ 4o-i(k) (íl (Sv.k~ - ,~l `SO k-1~I
k-1
m m,
~ ~o-i(k)~o-~(k) - ~ ~ x')zii
k-1 sEN 1-1
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and this is clearly a contradiction with inequality (9.10). Hence, it follows that
C(v) C W(v). o
For the class oï convex multi-choice games we can say more about the relation
between the core and the Weber set.
Definition. A multi-choice game (N, m, v) is convex if
v(s ~ t) f v(s V t) 1 v(s) f v(t)
for all s,t E j~;ENM;. Here
(s n t); :- min{s;, t;} and (s V t); : - max{s;, t;}
for all i E N.
For a convex multi-choice game (N, m, v) it holds that
v(s f t) - v(s) ? v(s ~ t) - v(s)
(9.11)
(9.12)
for all s, s, t E]-[;EN M; satisfying s G s, s; - s; for all i E C(t) and s-{-t E niEN Mt.
This is seen by putting s and s f t in the roles of s and t in expression (9.11). In
fact, every game satisfying expression (9.12) is convex, but we do not need this fact.
Theorem 9.2.4 Let (N, m, v) be a convex multi-choice game. Then the Weber set
W(v) is a subset of the core C(v).
Proof. Note that convexity of both C(v) and 6V(v) imply that it suffices to prove
that wo E C(v) for all orders Q that are admissible for v. So, let v be an admissible
order for (N, m, v). Ef6ciency of wo follows immediately from its definition. That
wa is level increase rational follows straightforwardly when we use expression (9.12).
Now let s E ]-[;EN M,. We have to prove that ~;EN ~~-o w,~ ~ v(s). This is seen as
follows. The order a induces au acliuissible order
v': {(i,j) ~ i E N, j E {1,...,s,}} -~ {1,...,~,ENS;}
in an obvious way. Since so~~o~~~'~'~~ C so~o~~'~'~~ for all i E N and j E {1,...,s;},
convexity of (N,m,v) implies
w~~ C w~
for all i E N and j E { 1, ..., s; }. Hence,
J~ 5~
~~~~ ~ ~~w~ -v(s).
~EN~-O ,EN~-O
We conclude that wo E C(v). ~
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In contrast to TU-games, the converse of theorem 9.2.4 is not true for multi-choice
games. We provide an example of a convex game (N, m, v) with W(v) ~ C(v).
Example 9.2.5 Let (N, m, v) be the multi-choice game given by N-{1, 2},
m-(2,1) and v is the convex game defined by v((1, 0)) - v((2,0)) - v((0, 1)) - 0,
v((1, 1)) - 2 and v((2, 1)) - 3. There are three marginal vectors,
0 0 0 1 2 1 j
wl - 3 ~ ' w2 - [ 2 ,~,
and w3 - ~ 0 ~ J .
Some calculation shows that C(v) - co{wi, wzi w3, x}, where
We see that x~ co{w~,w2iw3} - W(v).
The core element x in example 9.2.5 seems to be too large: Note that w3 is cumu-
latively smaller than ~ and w3 is still in the core C(v). This inspires the following
definition.
Definition. For a multi-choice game (N,m,v) the set Cr,,;,,(v) of minimal core
elements is given by
Cm;,,(v) -{x E C(v) ~ there is no y E C(v) such that y~ x and
y is cumulatively smaller than ~}.
Theorem 9.2.6 Let (N, m, v) be a convex multi-choice game. Then the Weber set
W(v) is the convex hull of the set CR,;,,(v) of minimal core elements.
Pmof. We start by proving that all marginal vectors are minimal core elements.
Let Q be an admissible order for (N, m, v). Then wo E C(v) (cf. theorem 9.2.4).
Suppose y E C(v) is such that y~ wo and y is cumulatively smaller than w`. Let
i E N and j E M,`{0} be such that Y(je`) c~~-1 w,~ and consider t :- so~oll'a11.
Then
~k
Y(t) -~ Y(tkek) C ~~ wkt - v(t), (9.13)
kEN kEN t-0
where the inequality follows from the fact that t, - j and the last equality follows
from the definitions of t and wo. Now (9.13) implies that y~ C(v). Hence, we see
that wo E Cr,,;,,(v). This immediately implies that
W(v) C CO(C~n(U)). (9.14)
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Now let x be a minimal core element. We prove that x E W(v). According to theo-
rem 9.2.3 we can find a payoff vector y E W(v) that is cumulatively smaller than r.
Using (9.14) we see that y E eo(C,,,;n(v)) C C(v). Since x is minimal we may con-
clude that x - y E W(v). Hence, because W(u) is convex, W(v) - co(C,,,;,,(v)). ~
Note that theorem 9.2.6 implies that for a convex TU-game (N, v) the core C(v)
equals the Weber set W(v). The converse of theorem 9.2.6 also holds.
Theorem 9.2.7 Let (N, m, v) be a multi-choice game for which the Weber set W(v)
coincides with the convex hull of the set CR,;,,(v) of minimal core elements. Then
the game (N,m,v) is convex.
Proof. Let s, t E r[iEN M;. Clearly, there is an order o that is admissible for (N, m, v)
and that has the property that there exist k, I with 0 G k G 1 G~iE~, m; such that
s n t- so~k and s V t - so~~. Note that for the corresponding marginal vector wo we
have that wo E co(C,,,;,,(v)) C C(v). Using this we see
v(s) f v(t) G
J~ I~
~~wï ~ ~~wï
iEN j-1 iEN j-1
(,nt), (eVt),
~~u~~~-~~w~
iEN j-1 iEN j-1
- 4i(S l~ t) -~ 2~(S V t),
where the last equality follows from the definition of the marginal vector wo. Hence,
(N, m, v) is convex. ~
From theorems 9.2.6 and 9.2.7 we immediatcly obtain the next corollary.
Corollary 9.2.8 A multi-choice game is convex if and only if its Weber set coincides
with the convex hull of the set of its minima,l core elements.
9.3 Extensions of the Shapley value
In this section we will discuss possible extensions of the Shapley value to multi-choice
games. It will turn out that there seems to be more than one reasonable extension
of the definition of the Shapley value for TC~-games to multi-choice games. First
we will consider the Shapley values that were introduced by Hsiao and Raghavan
(1990). They defined Shapley values using weights on the actions, thereby extending
ideas of weighted Shap(ey values (cf. I~alai and Saniet (1988)). Secondly, we will
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discuss the value that was introduced by van den Nouweland, Potters, Tijs and
Zarzuelo (1991), who considered the average of the marginal vectors of a multi-
choice game. Thirdly, we consider a value that was proposed by Derks and Peters
(1992), extending expression (3.3) for the Shapley value to multi-choice games.
We start by examining the class MCN'm more closely. The analogue of unanimity
games for multi-choice games are minimal effort games (N,m,u,) E MCN'm, with
s E IIiEN M;, defined by
r 1 ift;~s;foralliEN
Sl 0 else
for all t E ]~iEN M;. The name of these games is clear: All players have to put in a
minimal effort in order to obtain profit.
We extend the definition of dividends to multi-choice games as follows: For
(N, m, v) E MCN,m
0„(0) :- 0
o„(s) - v(s) - ~ o„(i).
~~s,i~~
Theorem 9.3.1 The minimal effort games (N, m, u,), s E r[iEN M;, form a basis
of the space MCN'm. Moreover, for a multi-choice game (N, m, v) it holds that
v - ~ ~v(s) ue-
~En,EN M,
The proof of this theorem is merely an exercise and therefore it will be omitted.
When introducing the values of Hsiao and Raghavan ( 1990), we must restrict our-
selves to multi-choice games where all players have the same number of activity
levels. So, let MC;~'m denote the subclass of multi-choice games ( N, m, v) with
the property that m; - m~ for all i, j E N. For a game (N, m, v) E MCN.m
set m:- m; ( i E N arbitrarily) and let for each j E{0, 1, ..., m} a weight
w~ E R be associated with level j such that liigher levels have larger weights, i.e.
0- wo C wl, .. . G w;,,. The value ~ is defined with respect to the weights w.
Definition. For s E rj;EN M;, the value ~w(N, m, u,) of the minimal effort game
(N, m, u,) is given by




for all i E N and all j E M;. Further, the value ~Yw(N, m, v) of an arbitrary game
(N, m, v) E MC;'~m is determined by
~w(N,m,v) :- ~ í,~(s)~w(N,m,u,).
aEn,ENM,
An axiomatic characterization of this value was provided by Hsiao and Raghavan
(1990), using additivity, the carrier property, the minimal effort property and a
fourth axiom that explicitly uses the weights. We describe these properties of an
allocation rule 7: MCN~m -~ RM} below.
~ Additivity: For all ( N, m, v) and (N, m, w) E ~11CN~m
l'(N, m,1' f w) - 7(N, m, 2') f 7(N~ ~~~ w).
~ Carrier property: If t is a carrier of (N, rn, v) E MCN~m, i.e. v(s) - v(s n t) for
all s E ]-j;EN M;, then
~ ~7ii(N,m,v) - v(m).
~EC(t) j-1
~ Minimal effort property: If ( N, m, v) E MCN~m and t E j[;EN M; are such that
v(s)-0forallswiths~t,thenforalliENand j Gt;
ry,~(N,m,v) - 0.
~ Weight property: Suppose the weights wl, w2i ..., w,;, are given. If a multi-choice
game (N, m, v) E MC;'~m is a multiple of a minimal effort game, say v- Qu„
s E [[;EN M;, then for all i,j E N
1;,~,(N,ni,v) - w,, - 7i.s,(N~m~v)' ws, .
The following theorem is due to Hsiao and Raghavan (1990) and we refer to this
paper for its proof.
Theorem 9.3.2 Consider the class MG;'~m. Let weights 0- wo G w~ c... G w;,,
be given. Then ~w is the unique allocation rule on MCN~m satisfying additivity, the
carrier property, the minimal effort property and the weight property.
The value that was introduced by van den .Nouweland, Potters. Tijs and Zarzuelo
(1991) is a straightforward generalization of expression (3.4) towards multi-choice
games.
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Definition. Let (N, m, v) be a multi-choice game. Then the value ~(N, m, v) is the
average of all marginal vectors of v, or, in formula
~ N m v
niEN(mi~) ~~o
( i , ) '-
(~iEN mi)~ o '
where the sull] is taken over all admissible orders o- for v.
The value ~ can be characterized by additivity, the carrier property and the hier-
archical strength property, which in fact incorporates the minimal effort property
and the weight property, where the difference lies in the fact that the 'weights' that
are used are now determined by the numbers of the activity levels of the players
(cf. Faigle and Iiern (1992)).
~ The hierarchica! strength h,((i, j)) in s of (i, j) E Mt with j C si is defined as the
average number of admissible orders in which (i, j) is s-maximal, i.e.
h,(i, j) - n iEN(mil) I { admissible orders o- ~ v((i, j)) - max o-((k,l))}~.
(~iEN mi) ~ (k~l):IGsk
An allocation rule ry: MCN~m -~ RM' satisfies the hierarchical strength property
if for all (N, m, v) E MCN~m that are a multiple of a minimal effort game, say
v- Qu„ s E jl;En, M;, and for all (il, jl) and (izi jz) E Mt
7itJi(Nimiv) ~ hs(Z2i.i2) - 7isJs(Nim~U) ~ hs(Zlii]).
The following theorem is due to Faigle and Iíern (1992) and we refer to this paper
for its proof.
Theorem 9.3.3 The value ~ is the unique allocation rule on MCN~m satisfying
additivity, the carrier property and the hierarchical strength property.
An interesting question now whether this value is related to the values ~w. We
provide an example of a multi-choice game for wtlich the value ~ is not equal to any
of the values ~Yw.
Example 9.3.4 Let (N, m, v) be the multi-choice game where N - { 1, 2},
m-(3, 3) and v- uil,z) f u13,1) ~ utz,3). There are 20 admissible orders for this
game. Some calculation shows that
4 4 19
~(N m v) - zó zo zo ~.i ]s ls
zo zo zo
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Now, suppose we have weights wr C w2 G w3 associated with the activity levels.
Then the corresponding value ~w(N, m, v) is
~w(N,m,v) -
r wt ~ wa
I T~ltun untwa witwa
IL wl w ws
wltwa wltwZ wztw3
Hence, if we want to find weights w~ such that ~w(N, m, v) -~(N.m.v), then these
weights should satisfy the conditions O G wr G w2 G w3, w2 - 4wr, w3 - 4w2 and
w3 - 19wr. Clearly, it is impossible to find weights satisfying all these conditions.
A third possible extension of the Shapley value to multi-choice games is provided in
the following definition.






for all i E N, j E M,`{0}, where ~„(s) (s E j]kEN Mk) denotes the dividend as
defined above.
Note that for a TU-game (N, v) this definition boils down to expression ( 3.3) for the
Shapley value. Example 9.3.5 shows that the value O is different from the values
defined before.
Example 9.3.5 Let ( N, m, v) be the multi-choice game defined in example 9.3.4.
The dividends of this game are already clear from the description of the game.








So, the value O(N, m, v) equals neither ~(N, m, t ~) nor ~w(N, m, v) for any set of
weights wJ, j E {0, 1,...,m}.
Some examination shows that O satisfies additivity and the carrier property. Fur-
ther, O does not satisfy the minimal effort property. The axiomatic characterization
of O that is provided in theorem 9.3.6 is inspired by the characterization of the Shap-
ley value for TU-games by Young ( 1985). We need the following properties of an
allocation rule 7 : MCN'm --~ R~r}.
~ E,~ciency: For all (N,m,v) E MCN.m
m~
~ ~7;~(N,m,v) - v(m).
~EN ~-1
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~ Sirong monotonicity: For all (N, m, v) and (N, m, w) E MCN~m, if i E N and
j E M;`{0} are such that for all s E r[kE,yk with s; - j
v(s) - v(t) 1 w(s) - w(t) ,
where t E ]-jkEN Mk is such that tk - sk if k~ i and t; - s; - 1, then
y;~(N,m,v) ? -y,;(N,m,w).
~ Veto property: For every (N, m, v) E MCN~m and il, i2 E N(not necessarily
different), if jl E M;,`{g} and j2 E M;z`{~} are veto levels, then
7t~.i~(N,m,v) -7;z.iz(N~m~v).
Here, j E M; is a veto level if v(s) - 0 for all s E rj;EN M; with s; c j.
Theorem 9.3.6 The value O is the unique allocation rule on MCN~n` satisfying
efficiency, strong monotonicity and the veto property.
This theorem is a modification of a theorem by Derks and Peters (1992) and the
proof of theorem 9.3.6 can easily be derived from their proof.
9.4 Stable sets and subsolutions
In section 9.1 we introduced the notion of dominance between imputations. The
dominance core was defined using this notion: DC(v) is the set of undominated
imputations. In this section we introduce some other sets of payoff vectors for
multi-choice games which are based on the notion of domination, stable sets and
subsolutions.
Let (N,m,v) E MCN~m and let 21w~ :- {A ~ A C 1(v)}. We introduce two maps,
D : 211v~ ~ 2j~v~ and U: 2~~v~ ~ 2~1v~, where
D(A) :- {x E I(v) ~ there exists an a E A that dominates a}
and
U(A) :- I(v)~D(A)
for all A C I(v). The set D(A) consists of all imputations that are dominated by
some element of A. The set U(A) consists of all imputations that are undominated
by elements of A. Hence,
DC(v) - U(I(v)).
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A set A C I(v) is internally stable if elements of A do not dominate each other, i.e.
A fl D(A) - ~, and it is externally stable if all imputations not in A are dominated
by an imputation in A, i.e. I(v)`A C D(A).
Definition. ( cf. von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)). A set A C I(v) is a stable
set if it is both internally and externally stable.
It is easily seen that a set A C 1(v) is stable if and only if A is a fixed point of
U, i.e. U(A) - A. The extension of the following theorem from cooperative games
towards multi-choice games is straightforward and therefore we will omit the proof.
Theorem 9.4.1 Let (N, m, v) be a multi-choice game. Then the following two
assertions hold:
(i) Every stable set contains the dominance core as a subset.
(ii) If the dominance core is a stable set, then there are no other stable sets.
With respect to stable sets of convex games we have the next result.
Theorem 9.4.2 Let ( N, m, v) be a convex multi-choice game. Then the core is tihe
unique stable set.
Proof. Using corollary 9.2.8 we see that the core C(v) is non-empty. Hence, it
follows from theorem 9.1.4 that the core C(v) equals the dominance core DC(v).
So, by theorem 9.4.1 (ii) we know that it suffices to prove that the core C(v) is a
stable set.
Internal stability of C(v) is obvious. To show external stability, let a E I(v)~C(v).
We will construct a z E C(v) that dominates x. First we choose s E r[iEN M; such
that
~C(s)~ i(v(s) - X(s)) - max ~C(t)~-i (v(t) - X(t)) .
tE~ EN ~1~
Since ~~ C(v) it holds t.hat
~C(s)~ ' (v(s) - .~ (s)) ~ 0. (9.15)
Now, let o be an order that is admissible for (N, nz, v) with the property that there
exists a k such that s- so~k. Then (cf. theorem 9.2.4) the corresponding marginal
vector wo is an element of C(v) and, moreover, it holds that ~;EN ~~-i w,~ - v(s).
For notational convenience we set y:- wo. We define the payoff vector z by
,r;~ ifiEC(s)and2CjCs,
z;~ :- x;~ -f ~C(s)~-1 (v(s) -.~(s)) if i E C(s) and j- 1
y;~ if i ~C(s)oriEC(s)and j7s;.
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Using the fact that both x and y E I(v) and recalling ( 9.15), it is easily seen that z
is level increase rational. Further,
Z(m) - X(s) f(v(s) - X(s)) f(Y(m) - Y(s)) - v(s) f (v(m) - v(s)) - v(m),
where the second equality follows from the way we choose y. This shows that
z is also efficient and, hence, z is an imputation of v. Since Z(s) - v(s) and
Z;,, - X;,, ~ ~C(s)~-' (v(s) - X(s)) ) X;,, for al i E C(s), it holds that z dom,x.
The only thing that is left to prove, is z E C(v). So, let t E jj;E~, ~LI;. We distinguish
two cases. If C(t) fl C(s) - ~, then
Z(t) - Y(t) ~ v(t) ,
since y E C(v). If C(t) fl C(s) ~ 0, then
z(s n t) -(Z - x)(s n t) ~ x(s n t)
- Ic'(s) n c'(t)I . I~(s)I-' (v(s) - X(s)) ~- x(s n t)
~ v(s n t) - x(s n t) f x(s n t) - v(s n t) , (9.1s)
where the inequality follows from (9.15). Hence,
~, ni, e,
Z(t) - ~ ~ z;j f ~ ~ y;j
~EN j-1 iEN:e,~a, j-a,}1
,, vt, ,, ,,
- Z(s n t) -~ ~ ~ y;j - ~ ~ y;j - ~ ~ y;j
~EN j-1 iEN:s,~t, j-1 iEN:a,Gt, j-1
- Z(s n t) f Y(S v t) - Y(s)
~ v(s n t) f v(s v t) - v(s) , (9.17)
where the last equality follows from (9.16) and the fact that y E C(v) is such that
Y(s) - v(s). Using convexity of (N, m, v), we see that expression (9.17) is larger
than or equal to v(t). This completes the proof of the theorem. O
Lucas (1968) showed that there exist cooperative games without a stable set. There-
fore, since all our definitions are consistent with the corresponding definitions for
cooperative games, we may conclude that miilti-choice games do not always have a
stable set.
Now let A C I(v) and x E !(v). Then x is protected 6y A if each imputation that
dominates x is on its turn dominated by an element of A. The set A is self-protecting
if each a E A is protected by A. It is not hard to see that for all A C !(v)
{x E I(v) ~ x is protected by A} - U2(A).
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Definition. ( cf. Roth (1976)). A set A C I(v) is a subsolution if it is internally
stable, self-protecting and does not protect any element of I(v)`A.
It is easily seen that a set A is a subsolution if and only if it is internally stable
and a fixed point of U2. The following theorem is a straightforward extension of a
corresponding theorem of Roth ( 1976) for cooperative games.
Theorem 9.4.3 Let v be a multi-choice game. Then the following assertions hold:
(i) Each stable set is a subsolution.
(ii) A subsolution cannot contain a stable set as a proper subset.
(iii) Every subsolution contains the dominance core as a subset.
(iv) Every multi-choice game has at least one subsolution.
9.5 Flow games
Let N be a set of players and let m E INN. A flow situation consists of a directed
network with one source and one sink and for each arc its capacity and a simple
multi-choice game, the control game, that describes which coalitions are allowed to
use the arc.
Definition. A multi-choice game (N, m, v) is simple if v(m) - 1 and v(s) E{0,1 }
for all s E 11;EN M;.
If Q is an arc in the network and ( N, m, w) is the (simple) control game for arc ~,
then a coalition s is allowed to use arc Q if and only if w(s) - 1. The capacity of
an arc ~ in the network is denoted by ce E (0, oo). The flow game corresponding to
a flow situation assigns to a coalition s the maxirnal flow that. coalition s can send
through the network from the source to the sink.
For TU-games it was shown by Curiel, Derks and Tijs (1989) that a non-negative
game is balanced if and only if it is a flow game corresponding to a flow situation in
which all control games are balanced. Furthermore, Iíalai and Zenrel (1982) proved
that a non-negative TU-game is totally balanccd if and only if it is a flow game
corresponding to a flow situation in which all ares are controlled by a single player.
Example 9.5.1 shows that we cannot generalize the theorems mentioned above to
multi-choice games.
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Definition. A simple multi-choice game (N, m, v) is dictatorial if there exist i E N
and j E M;`{0} such that v(s) - 1 if and only if s; 1 j for all s E]ÍkEN Mk-
A multi-choice game (N, m, v) is totally balanced if for every s E r[;EN M; the sub-
game (N, s, v ~,) is balanced, where v ~, (t) :- v(t) for all t E ]-j;EN M; with t G s.
Example 9.5.1 Let (N,m,v) be the multi-choice game where N-{1,2},
m-(2,1) and v is the flow game corresponding to the flow situation with the di-
rected network as represented in figure 9.1, the capacities cr, - 2, ce, - ce, - c~, - 1
and the control games ( N, m, wi, ), ...,( N, m, wet ) defined by
wt,(s) - we~(s) :-
we3(s) :- S
r 1 if st 1 1
Sl 0 else,




1 if s2 ~ 1
0 else.
sou rc e .~ ~ `. sink
~4
Figure 9.1
The games (N, m, we, ), ...,(N, m, wts ) are dictatorial. However, for the flow game
we calculate v((0,1)) - 0, v((1,0)) - 1, and v((2,0)) - v((1,1)) - v((2,1)) - 2.
It is easily seen that v is not even balanced.
The difficulties in example 9.5.1 can be avoided by restricting to zero-normalized
games, because for zero-normalized games the condition of level increase rationality
boils down to a condition of non-negativity.
Theorem 9.5.2 Consider a flow situation in which all control games are zero-
normalized and balanced. Then the corresponding flow game is non-negative, zero-
normalized and balanced.
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Proof. Let (N, m, v) be the flow game corresponding to the flow situation under
consideration. It is obvious that (N, m, v) is zero-normalized and non-negative.
Now let L-{el, ..., QP} be a set of ares with capacities cr, ..., cP and control games
(N, m, wi), . ..,(N, m, wP) such that every directed path from the source to the sink
contains an arc in L and the capacity of L, ~p-1 cr, is minimal. From a theorem of
Ford and Fulkerson (1956) we find that v(m) -~;-1 cr and v(s) C~p-r crw,.(s) for
all s E j-j;EN M;. Now let xr E C(w,) for all r E {1,...,p}. Define y:- ~p-rC,x'.
Then
P P
Y(m) - ~ c,Xr(m) - ~ c.wr(m) - v(m) (9.18)
r-i .-i
and
for all s E II ;EN Mi'
Now let i E N and j E M;`{0}. Since c,. ~ 0 and i~ 1 0 for all r E{1, .. .,p} it
easily follows that
P P
I'(s) - ~ crX'(s) ? ~c,w,(s) ? v(s), (9.19)
r-~ .-i
P
yij - ~ C,.2~ ) 0. (9.20)
,-~
Now (9.18), (9.19) and ( 9.20) imply that y E C(v). Hence, (N, m, v) is balanced. ~
We can prove the converse of theorem 9.5.2 using the next result.
Lemma 9.5.3 Each non-negative zero-normalized balanced multi-choice game is a
non-negative linear combination of zero-normalized balanced simple games.
Proof. Let (N, m, v) be a non-negative zero-normalized balanced game. We provide
an algorithm to write v as a non-negative linear combination of zero-normalized
balanced simple games.
Suppose v ~ 0 and let x E C(v). Let k E N be the smallest integer in the set
{i E N ~ there exists a j E.11i`{0} such that x;j ~ 0} and let Q be the smallest
integer in {j E Mk`{0} ~ akj ~ 0}. Further, let






Let v:- v- pw and let i E R~1 be defined by
~ke-~3 ifi-kand j-e
a;j else.
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Then w is a zero-normalized balanced simple game and ~3 1 0. Furthermore,
(N, m, v) is a non-negative zero-normalized game and á E C(v). Note that
v - v f (iw. Further,
~{(i, j) E M ~ ii~ ~ 0} ~ C ~ {(i, j) E M ~ xi~ ~ 0} ~ or
I{S E 11iEN ~1i I v(S) i ~} I~ I{S E 11iEN ~1i I vlS) i ~} I.
If v~ 0 we can follow the same procedure with v in the role of v and á in the
role of x. It is easily seen that if we keep on repeating this procedure, then after
only finitely many steps we will obtain the zero game. Suppose this happens after
q steps. Then we have found Ql, ...,~q 1 0 and zero-normalized balanced simple
games wl, ..., wq such that
v
v - ~ ~irw,.
r-i
O
The algorithm we described in the proof of lemma 9.5.3 is a generalization of an
algorithm by Derks (1987) for TU-games.
Theorem 9.5.4 Let (N, m, v) be a non-negative zero-normalized balanced game.
Then (N, m, v) is a flow game corresponding to a flow situation in which all control
games are zero-normalized and balanced.
Proof. According to lemma 9.5.3 we can find k E N, Ql, ...,~3k ) 0 and zero-








source . ~ ~. sink
Figure 9.'2
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where for each r E{ 1, ..., k} the capacity restriction of arc Q, is given by Qr and the
control game of Pr is (N,m,w,). It is easily seen that the flow game corresponding
to the flow situation described is the game ( N, m, v). ~
Combining theorems 9.5.2 and 9.5.4 we obtain the next corollary.
Corollary 9.5.5 Let (N, m, v) be a non-negative zero-normalized multi-choice
game. Then (N, m, v) is balanced if and only if (N, m, v) is a flow game corre-
sponding to a flow situation in which all control games are zero-normalized and
balanced.
9.6 Related models
In this section we will discuss two recent models that are related to the model of
multi-choice games, namely games under precedence constraints (cf. Faigle and
ICern (1992)) and games with restricted coalitions (cf. Derks and Peters (1992)).
We start with the model of games under precedence constraints. Let N be a set of
players and ~ a partial order on N. The relation i~ j indicates that the presence of
j enforces the presence of i in any coalition S C N. This implies that not necessarily
every subset of N may occur as a coalition. A coalition of (N, ~) is a subset S C N
such that j E S and i~ j imply i E S, for all i, j E N. Thus unions and intersections
of coalitions are again coalitions while complements of coalitions are not necessarily
coalitions. We define
C(N, ~) :- { S C N ~ S is a coalition of (N, ~)}.
A game under precedence constraints is a triple (.N, ~, v), where N is a set of players,
~ is a partial order ou N and i~ is a function that assigns a worth to every coalition
of (N, ~), i.e. v: C(N, ~) -~ IZ, with v(~) - 0.
A multi-choice game ( N, m, v) can be seen as a game with precedence constraints in
which the players are the combinations (i, j) of players and corresponding activity
levels, i.e. the player set is A1t, and where the precedence constraints are given by
(t,~r) ~(z,~2) if and only if ~r C~2
for all í E N and j~, j2 E M,`{0}. Hence, the coalitions of (lllt, ~) correspond to
vectors s E j1;EN M;, which are the coalitions of the multi-choice game ( N, rn, v). It
is clear that this correspondence is a one-to-one correspondence.
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In their paper, Faigle and Kern (1992) introduced and investigated a Shapley value
for games under precedence constraints. Their main result is an axiomatic charac-
terization of this Shapley value. The value ~ which we encountered in section 9.3,
is the translation of the Shapley value for games under precedence constraints to
multi-choice games and the axiomatic characterization in theorem 9.3.3 can be de-
rived from the axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value for games under
precedence constaints.
We continue with the model of games with restricted coalitions. Let N be a set
of players. Consider a function p: 2N -~ 2N satisfying p(S) C p(T) C T for all
S C T C N, and p2 - p. The function p is called a restriction. A coalition of (N, p)
is a subset S C N such that p(T) - S for some T C N. Note that S is a coalition
of (N, p) if and only if p(S) - S. We define
C(N, p) :- {S C N ~ S is a coalition of (N, p)}.
Consider a triple (N, p, v), where N is a set of players, p: 2N --~ 2N is a restriction
and v: 2N --~ R is a characteristic function. The corresponding game with restricted
coalitions is the game (N, w) defined by
w(S):- v(p(S))
for all S C N. Hence, the worth assigned to a subset S C N is defined as the value
obtainable by the players in S who are able to cooperate.
A multi-choice game (N, m, v) can be seen as a game with restricted coalitions in
which the players are the combinations (i, j) of players and corresponding activity
levels, i.e. the player set is Mt, and where the restriction p: 2N -~ 2N is given by
p(G) :- {(i, j) E Mt ~(i,k) E G for al1 k E{1,..., j}}
for all C C M}. Hence, the coalitions of (Mt, p) correspond to vectors s E r[iE1v M~
which are the coalitions of the multi-choice game ( N, m, v). It is clear that this
correspondence is a one-to-one corespondence.
In their paper, Derks and Peters (1992) introduced and investigated a Shapley value
for games with restricted coalitions. Their main result is an axiomatic character-
ization of this Shapley value with the property that the restriction is determined
endogenously by the axioms. The value O which we encountered in section 9.3, is
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the modification of the Shapley value for games with restricted coalitions to multi-
choice games and the axiomatic characterization in theorem 9.3.6 can be derived
from the axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value for games with resricted
coalitions.
Derks and Peters (1992) showed that the model of games in a restricted cooperation
setting also incorporates the model of games with permission structures, both the
disjunctive approach (cf. Cilles and Owen (1990)) and the conjunctive approach
(cf. Cilles et al. (1992)).
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Dit proefschrift behandelt speltheoretische situaties waarin grafen of, meer algemeen,
netwerken een rol spelen. Grafen komen op verschillende manieren voor in spel-
theoretische situaties: om communicatierestricties te modelleren, in welk geval zij
invloed hebben op een spel dat al bekend is, maar ook om economische situaties te
modelleren, in welk geval zij mede het spel bepalen dat ontstaat.
Binnen de speltheorie kunnen twee deelgebieden onderscheiden worden, niet-
coóperatieve speltheorie en coóperatieve speltheorie. Dit proefschrift behandelt
voornamelijk co~peratieve speltheorie. Een coóperatief spel met overdraagbaar
nut, afgekort tot TU-spel, bestaat uit een spelersverzameling en een zogenaamde
karakteristieke funktie die aan iedere deelgroep van spelers een waarde toekent die
geïnterpreteerd moet worden als de maximale winst of de minimale kosten die de
spelers in de~ae deelgroep kunnen bereiken wanneer zij besluiten om samen te werken,
ongeacht wat de andere spelers doen. De term overdraagbaar nut verwijst naar het
feit dat aangenomen wordt dat nut overgedragen kan worden van de ene speler op
de andere speler. Daarom is het voldoende om te weten wat het totale nut is dat de
spelers in een deelgroep kunnen bereiken.
Het grootste deel van dit proefschrift, te weten de hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 6,
is gewijd aan het model van communicatiesituaties. In het model van een TU-spel
wordt in het algemeen aangenomen dat er geen beperkingen zijn in communicatie en
dat zodoende iedere deelgroep van spelers effectief kan samenwerken. Dit lijkt niet
altijd juist wanneer men een economische situatie wil modelleren. In een commu-
nicatiesituatie worden de communicatiemogelijkheden van de spelers gemodelleerd
door middel van een (communicatie-) graaf. In een communicatiegraaf zijn de spelers
de punten en een lijn tussen twee spelers geeft aan dat deze twee spelers effectief kun-
nen communiceren. Een coóperatief spel samen met een communicatiegraaf op zijn
spelersverzameling noemen we een communicatiesituatie. In hoofdstuk 2 definiéren
we twee spelen bij een communicatiesituatie, een puntenspel en een lijnenspel. Het
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puntenspel belicht voornamelijk de rol van de spelers in een communicatiesituatie
en het lijnenspel belicht de rol van de communicatielijnen. De relaties tussen eigen-
schappen van enerzijds het oorspronkelijke spel en anderzijds het puntenspel of het
lijnenspel worden onderzocht. Daarnaast onderzoeken we de klasse van zogenaamde
cykel-volledige grafen, die we tegenkomen bij het onderzoeken van een van deze
eigenschappen.
Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt oplossingsconcepten voor communicatiesituaties. Een op-
lossingsconcept voor communicatiesituaties is een functie die voor communicatiesitu-
aties uitbetalingen aan de spelers aanwijst. We zullen voornamelijk twee oplossings-
concepten bekijken, de Myerson-waarde en de positiewaarde. Deze waarden worden
gedefinieerd met behulp van de Shapley-waarde van de twee communicatiespelen die
in hoofdstuk 2 geintroduceerd zijn, het puntenspel en het lijnenspel. We laten zien
dat de Myerson-waarde en de positiewaarde aan enkele mooie eigenschappen voldoen
en we geven axiomatische karakteriseringen van beide waarden. Verder bekijken we
enkele alternatieve oplossingsconcepten.
De berekening van de Myerson-waarde en de positiewaarde kan erg omslachtig
zijn. Voor speciale deelklassen van communicatiesituaties echter worden in hoofd-
stuk 4 elegante berekeningsmethoden gegeven. Deze methoden zijn gebaseerd op
zogenaamde genererende functies en zij hangen sterk af van de relaties tussen de
dividenden van enerzijds het originele spel en anderzijds het puntenspel en het lij-
nenspel van een communicatiesituatie.
In hoofdstuk 5 generaliseren we communicatiesituaties zoals die geïntroduceerd
zijn in hoofdstuk 2 op verscheidene manieren. We bespreken hypergraaf-communi-
catiesituaties en gerichte communicatiesituaties, waar de communicatiemogelijkhe-
den van de spelers gemodelleerd worden door middel van hypergrafen respectieve-
lijk gerichte grafen in plaats van ongerichte grafen. Verder worden de economische
mogelijkheden van de spelers gemodelleerd door middel van spelen met niet-over-
draagbaar nut in zogenaamde NTU-communicatiesituaties. Communicatiesituaties
kunnen eveneens op een andere manier gegeneraliseerd worden: we bekijken een
meer algemeen raamwerk voor samenwerking en communicatie dat controlespelen
op punten en communicatíelijnen bevat. Deze situaties worden besproken onder de
naam gecontroleerde communicatiesituaties.
Hoofdstuk 6 behandelt de endogene formatie van communicatiegrafen. Terwijl we
in de hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 4 hebben aangenomen dat de communicatiegrafen
exogeen gegeven waren, moeten de spelers in dit hoofdstuk beslissen over de forme-
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ring van een communicatiegraaf, wetende wat het onderliggende spel is en wetende
aan de hand van welk oplossingsconcept een communicatiesituatie geëvalueerd gaat
worden. De formering van een communicatiegraaf is een strategisch proces dat
gemodelleerd kan worden met behulp van een niet-coóperatief spel. We bespreken
twee modellen voor de endogene formatie van communicatiegrafen, een spel in uit-
gebreide vorm en een spel in strategische vorm. We onderzoeken of voorspellingen
kunnen worden gedaan over de communicatiegrafen die zullen worden gevormd.
De resterende hoofdstukken hebben betrekking op andere modellen waarin zowel
spelen als netwerken een rol spelen. In hoofdstuk 7 bekijken we kostenbesparingsspe-
len die afgeleid zijn van zogenaamde flow-shops. Een flow-shop bestaat uit een
eindig aantal machines en een eindig aantal jobs die bewerkt moeten worden door
deze machines in een vaste volgorde. Het is bekend dat vele van de klassieke flow-
shop problemen NP-hard zijn. In dit hoofdstuk introduceren we een deelklasse
van flow-shop problemen die gekarakteriseerd worden door de aanwezigheid van een
zogenaamde dominante machine. We laten zien dat we voor dit soort problemen
de zoektocht naar een optimaal schema kunnen beperken tot permutatieschema's
als het optimaliteitscriterium regulier is. Bovendien geven we een uitdrukking voor
de voltooiingstijden met betrekking tot een semi-actief permutatieschema en een
snel algoritme om optimale schema's te vinden voor het gewogen voltooiingstij-
dencriterium en het maximale tijdsoverschrijdingsscriterium. Verder laten we zien
dat een kostenbesparingsspel dat afgeleid is van een flow-shop probleem waar de
eerste machine dominant is, gezien kan worden als een kostenbesparingsspel dat
afgeleid is van een 1-machine probleem.
Hoofdstuk 8 bespreekt opspannende netwerkspelen. Een opspannende netwerk
onderneming is een graaf die een centrale bevoorrader omvat en de locaties van de
spelers, waarbij iedere lijn en ieder punt vaste kosten heeft, die mogelijk negatief
kunnen zijn onder invloed van externe factoren. Bovendien kan het netwerk ook
punten bevatten die niet corresponderen met spelers. Met zo'n situatie kunnen
we een opspannend netwerkspel associëren, waar de waarde van een deelgroep van
spelers wordt gedefinieerd als de minimale kosten die de deelgroep moet maken om
een netwerk te construeren dat hen verbindt met de centrale bevoorrader. We laten
zien dat de klasse van opspannende netwerkspelen samenvalt met de klasse van de
monotone TU-spelen.
In hoofdstuk 9 bekijken we multi-choice spelen in het algemeen en multi-choice
stroomspelen in het bijzonder. Een multi-choice spel is een coóperatief spel waarin
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iedere speler een aantal activiteitsniveaus heeft waarop hij kan spelen. De winst die
een deelgroep van spelers kan behalen hangt af van de inspanningen van de betrokken
spelers. We breiden de definities van de core en gerelateerde oplossingsconcepten
uit naar multi-choice spelen en we onderzoeken de relaties tussen deze concepten.
Verder bespreken we mogelijke uitbreidingen van de Shapley-waarde naar de klasse
van multi-choice spelen. Speciale aandacht wordt besteed aan de toepassing van
multi-choice spelen in stroomsituaties. We laten zien dat multi-choice stroomspe-
len gerelateerd kunnen worden aan niet-negatieve multi-choice spelen met niet-lege
cores. Tenslotte bespreken we kort twee modellen die gerelateerd zijn aan multi-
choice spelen, spelen met volgorde beperkingen en spelen met beperkte coalities.
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